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ABSTRACT 
CAPITALISM IN POST-COLONIAL INDIA: PRIMITIVE ACCUMULATION 
UNDER DIRIGISTE AND LAISSEZ FAIRE REGIMES 
 
MAY  2010 
 
RAJESH BHATTACHARYA, B.Sc., PRESIDENCY COLLEGE 
 
M.A., CALCUTTA UNIVERSITY 
 
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST 
 
Directed by: Professors Stephen A. Resnick and Richard D. Wolff 
 
 
In this dissertation, I try to understand processes of dispossession and exclusion within a 
class-focused Marxian framework grounded in the epistemological position of 
overdetermination. The Marxian concept of primitive accumulation has become 
increasingly prominent in contemporary discussions on these issues. The dominant 
reading of “primitive accumulation” in the Marxian tradition is historicist, and 
consequently the notion itself remains outside the field of Marxian political economy. 
The contemporary literature has de-historicized the concept, but at the same time missed 
Marx’s unique class-perspective. Based on a non-historicist reading of Marx, I argue that 
primitive accumulation—i.e. separation of direct producers from means of production in 
non-capitalist class processes—is constitutive of capitalism and not a historical process 
confined to the period of transition from pre-capitalism to capitalism. I understand 
primitive accumulation as one aspect of a more complex (contradictory) relation between 
capitalist and non-capitalist class structure which is subject to uneven development and 
which admit no teleological universalization of any one class structure. Thus, this 
  ix
dissertation claims to present a notion of primitive accumulation theoretically grounded 
in the Marxian political economy.  
In particular, the dissertation problematizes the dominance of capital over a 
heterogeneous social formation and understands primitive accumulation as a process 
which simultaneously supports and undermines such dominance. At a more concrete 
level, I apply this new understanding of primitive accumulation to a social formation—
consisting of “ancient” and capitalist enterprises—and consider a particular conjuncture 
where capitalist accumulation is accompanied by emergence and even expansion of a 
“surplus population” primarily located in the “ancient” economy.  
Using these theoretical arguments, I offer an account of postcolonial capitalism in India, 
distinguishing between two different regimes—1) the dirigiste planning regime and 2) 
the laissez-faire regime. I argue that both regimes had to grapple with the problem of 
surplus population, as the capitalist expansion under both regimes involved primitive 
accumulation. I show how small peasant agriculture, traditional non-capitalist industry 
and informal “ancient” enterprises (both rural and urban) have acted as “sinks” for 
surplus population throughout the period of postcolonial capitalist development in India. 
 
Keywords: primitive accumulation, surplus population, postcolonial capitalism 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
This dissertation is an intervention in the contemporary debate on the “violence” of 
capitalism—a debate animated by concerns over dispossession, exclusion and 
marginalization of poor and vulnerable laboring people all over the world, but especially 
in developing countries. The present work is an attempt to understand whether these 
processes of dispossession, exclusion or marginalization can be theoretically analyzed 
within a class-focused Marxian framework. Therefore, this dissertation constitutes — 
partly, of course—a Marxian response to the questions posed before Marxian theory in 
these debates1. Such a response is generally to be expected in the context of all debates in 
the society in which Marxists participate or are drawn into, but more so in the present 
case, since many of the participants in the debate specifically make use of certain 
Marxian concepts. One such concept, the Marxian concept of “primitive accumulation”, 
is the theoretical object of analysis in this work. The dissertation originates in the claim 
that a new meaning and a new significance, different from those in circulation, can be 
attached to the Marxian notion of “primitive accumulation, if we employ a different 
epistemology (overdetermination) and a distinct Marxian entry point (class) for 
theoretical analysis.  
                                                 
1
 Questions are not always posed before theoretical traditions, as open critiques. Often, the theoretical 
tradition rises up to the questions that it wants to face, in other words, poses the question before itself, for 
itself. The contemporary debates I refer to have not generally questioned the relevance of Marx in 
understanding the phenomenon under study. On the contrary, participants in the debate have often invoked 
Marx to offer interesting analyses. It is the use of Marxian theoretical categories that makes it easier for one 
to enter the debate via formulation of specific questions to which one claims to provide specific Marxian 
answers in contention with non-Marxist as well as other distinct Marxist theoretical positions.  
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The traditional understanding of Marx’s notion of primitive accumulation is that of a 
historical process—or more precisely, a convergence of many different processes— that 
results in the dissolution of the unity of direct producers with means of production. This 
history of dispossession precipitates an encounter between owners of money capital on 
the one hand and dispossessed, i.e. “free” laborers—“freed” of means of production and 
of non-capitalist class relations—on the other hand, and thus the basic conditions of 
existence of the capitalist class process are created. Once the capitalist class relations 
come into being, the capitalist class structure can secure its conditions of existence 
through economic processes (market mechanisms, real subsumption of labor, alienation 
etc.) without involving primitive accumulation. Therefore, in the dominant reading of 
Marx, primitive accumulation belongs to the pre-history of capital; it ceases to exist once 
the capitalist class relations are born.   
One of the major contributions of the contemporary literature on primitive accumulation 
is a reformulation of the concept as a process constitutive of the capitalist class process 
rather than as a historical process related to transition from feudalism to capitalism2 
Those writers who put forward this view argue that capitalism relies on primitive 
accumulation for securing/renewing its conditions of existence (market, accumulation, 
supplies of labor power, means of production etc.) and hence primitive accumulation is a 
continuous process central to the reproduction of capitalism. My point of departure is this 
new theoretical problematic, a conceptual terrain waiting for new questions to be posed. 
To pose these questions is, however, not a simple act. It raises numerous conceptual 
problems and remains open to epistemological overhauling. On epistemological grounds, 
                                                 
2
 In Chapter 2 of this thesis, I discuss the contemporary literature on primitive accumulation 
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this new problematic invites a notion of primitive accumulation that breaks away from 
functionalist and essentialist explanations. A Marxian theory grounded in the 
overdeterminist epistemology and employing class as an entry point offers such an 
alternative and unique understanding of primitive accumulation. Yet, while a class 
analysis enables a new meaning of primitive accumulation to emerge, at the same time, 
the introduction of this new concept of primitive accumulation in the class-focused 
theoretical space induces changes in the meaning of other established concepts like 
transition, social formation, dominance of capital and interaction between class 
structures. In short, the ontology of capitalism gets reconstructed. This dissertation thus 
belongs to the new problematic that recent rethinking of primitive accumulation has 
opened up to the discerning (class-trained) eyes.    
In this dissertation, I accept overdetermination. I accept Althusser’s reading of Marx that 
Marx’s Capital is seared through by contradictions between an essentialist and a non-
essentialist mode of theorizing (Althusser, 2006). Althusser opposes two distinct possible 
readings of Marx’s Capital—one which he variously refers to as idealist, philosophical or 
teleological and the second which he calls aleatory materialist. Althusser argues that the 
organization of the text of Capital exemplifies the former (semi-Hegelian and hence 
idealist) position of Marx while the exposition of Marx’s theory forces him to “take into 
account what the order of exposition requires him to bracket out” (Althusser, 2006: 39). 
Here, Althusser mentions the chapters on working day, the labor process, and primitive 
accumulation—those chapters, which, according to him, “stand outside ‘the order of 
exposition’.” (Althusser, 2006: 40). It is in these chapters that aleatory materialism creeps 
into or forces itself into Marx’s analysis.   
  4
They have confronted commentators with a formidable problem: why this leap from theory 
to history, from abstraction to the concrete, without the least justification? And, ultimately: 
what is Marx’s real object? ‘The capitalist mode of production and exchange in its ideal 
average’, as Capital incessantly repeats, or the concrete history of the conditions of class 
struggle that precipitate the Western bourgeoisie into capitalism? But if it is the latter, then 
we are at the very heart of ‘the concrete’, for primitive accumulation and the expropriation 
of (rural and urban) workers’ means of production and conditions of reproduction, which 
produced the capitalist mode of production, have  nothing to do with any abstraction or 
‘ideal average’ whatsoever” (Althusser, 2006: 40).   
The distinction between the two readings should not be thought in terms of a simplistic 
abstract/concrete opposition; rather the distinction Althusser draws attention to, is one 
between the given-ness of the abstract versus the openness of the concrete, or in other 
words, between essentialism and overdetermination as alternative epistemological 
positions.  
The historicist understanding of primitive accumulation, following from the teleology of 
historical materialism and the assumption of “full or closed totality”, has the following 
theoretical implication—the theory of capitalist accumulation is constituted by the 
analytics of capital that Marx lays out in the three volumes of Capital whereas primitive 
accumulation lies beyond — i.e. behind, in so far as it constitutes the pre-history — the 
theoretical plane of Capital. As, Perelman observes, “Marx’s presentation of primitive 
accumulation had the unfortunate consequence of divorcing primitive accumulation from 
political economy” (Perelman, 2000: 32). Thus the theoretical categories of Marxian 
political economy seem to enable an understanding of capitalist accumulation. It is 
otherwise with primitive accumulation, which is related to the coercive state, force and 
violence. But “force” and “violence” are not categories of Marxian political economy. 
Thus, in the dominant reading of Marx, the theoretical (class) categories of Marxian 
political economy can make sense of capital, but not the arising of capital.  
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I argue that this particular understanding of primitive accumulation suffers from the 
“origin” problem. The British physicist Stephen Hawking (1988) wrote that the origin of 
the universe cannot be explained by the laws of Physics, since the laws of Physics came 
into existence at the moment of origin of the universe. The origin is the pre-history of the 
being and therefore also belongs to the pre-analytic history of the being—i.e. it lies 
beyond the analytics of the present, the being. Thus, the class-based theoretical categories 
related to the production, appropriation and distribution of surplus labor can explain the 
capitalist social formation, but when it comes to the moment of transition to the capitalist 
social formation, class-based categories are replaced by non-Marxian categories like 
violence and force (“extra-economic processes”).  
In this dissertation, I differ from the dominant reading in the following sense. The notion 
of transition is understood from a non-teleological, i.e. aleatory materialist perspective. I 
understand any social formation to be comprised of multiple class structures. A capitalist 
social formation is one where capitalist and different non-capitalist class structures are 
present and where the capitalist class structure is dominant, where dominance itself is 
theorized in class (i.e. surplus) terms. Class structures in a social formation are always 
changing—the change being overdetermined by all other processes occurring in the 
society. One possible direction of change in a social formation is transition to the 
dominance of a different class structure—and this possibility is always present. 
Dominance of any class structure in a social formation—in my understanding—is a 
provisional and contingent outcome, always threatened by its own unraveling. If Marxian 
categories can capture the provisional dominance of a class structure in a social 
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formation, they can also be used to construct the history of that dominance, including the 
arising of that dominance. 
The different class structures are forever changing, being subject to the contradictory 
pulls and pushes exerted by all other processes in the society which are themselves 
continuously changing. In particular, a class structure changes because i) its fundamental 
and subsumed class processes interact to produce those changes, ii) its interaction with 
other class structures produces those changes and iii) ever-changing non-class processes 
in the society produce changes in each class structure. Since these class structures 
overdetermine each other, changes in any one also imply changes in the others—but in a 
contradictory way, in the sense that, each class structure supports and undermines the 
conditions of existence of other class structures at the same time. Thus, the capitalist class 
structure reproduces and expands itself by providing conditions for expansion and 
destruction of non-capitalist class structures at the same time. I offer a very thin 
definition of primitive accumulation to refer to only one aspect of this overdetermined 
relation between capitalist and non-capitalist class processes.  
If we recognize the play of the aleatory at the heart of a social formation, there is no 
notion of an “origin” that stands outside the theorized process of overdetermined change 
in each of the existing class structures, including the dominant one. The same Marxian 
theoretical categories employed in theorizing a capitalist social formation can also be 
used to account for its emergence. Therefore, to understand history beyond history, i.e. 
history beyond the analytic history of the being, we must question history itself, its 
lawfulness, its rationality and its telos. We must ask why we take teleological, law-driven 
change as the only intelligible history available to us. Only by questioning the Reason 
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that drives our dominant writing of history can we bring back the “unthinkable” into the 
domain of theory. This dissertation, therefore, accepts a different historiography—a 
writing of aleatory history that recognizes contingency as an intelligible form in which 
history can be written. Primitive accumulation becomes a Marxian theoretical category 
in this realm of contingencies.  
In this dissertation, I seek to establish primitive accumulation as a theoretical category, 
rather than a concrete historical account. There is discursive violence to capital’s “others” 
when one form in which capital and non-capital interact—i.e., primitive accumulation— 
remains un-theorized. There is a devalorization of capital’s “others” when they are also 
relegated to the outside of theory. Marxian theory has to learn to negotiate “violence” 
associated with primitive accumulation on the calm surface of the Marxian theory and not 
banish it outside its theoretical field. By historicizing “violence” and thereby not 
theorizing it in terms of Marxian categories, Marxists end up valorizing capital, rather 
than its victims.  
In this dissertation, I claim to make the following contributions to the Marxian tradition. 
First, I will try to offer a new understanding of primitive accumulation based on the 
epistemology of overdetermination and employing class-as-surplus-labor as the entry 
point. I claim that through this theoretical move, I introduce primitive accumulation as a 
theoretical category in Marxian political economy. Specifically, I will use my 
formulation of the notion of primitive accumulation to identify it as one aspect of a more 
complex (contradictory) relation between capitalist and non-capitalist class structures 
with no teleological outcomes. I will present a new understanding of primitive 
accumulation as a condition of existence of the capitalist class process and hence a 
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continuous-constitutive process. Second, I will develop the theoretical distinction 
between primitive and capitalist accumulation as distinct processes that secure conditions 
of existence of the capitalist class structure. In doing this, I claim to provide an answer to 
the thorny problem of the distinction between capitalist and primitive accumulation that 
plagues contemporary interventions. Third, I will use this new notion of primitive 
accumulation to problematize and present a new notion of the dominance of capital. I 
pursue the theoretical implications of this new understanding of the dominance of capital 
in a social formation with heterogeneous class structures and a surplus population. In the 
process, I will also advance a theoretically precise class-based notion of surplus 
population, using the theoretical insights offered by the existing literature. Fourth, I will 
present a Marxian theory of a capitalist social formation where I show how capitalist 
accumulation and primitive accumulation may lead to a proliferation of ancient class 
structures along with an expanding capitalist class structure and how the two class 
structures may support and constrain each other. Finally, I will offer an account of 
postcolonial capitalism in India using the simple “model” of a social formation with 
ancient and capitalist class structures. I will show how a surplus population emerged in 
the course of expansion of the capitalist class structure in India and how it has been partly 
confined to the “ancient” economy at the same time that capitalist class structure 
expanded in India. I will argue that the ancient economy effectively acted and still acts as 
the “sink” of surplus population in India and further, that the dominance of capital in the 
Indian social formation is supported and undermined at the same time by the specific 
social outcome of primitive accumulation that provides one condition of existence of the 
capitalist class structures.  
  9
I end this introductory chapter with an outline of the dissertation. In Chapter 2, I discuss 
Marx’s understanding of the process of primitive accumulation, how it exemplifies his 
use of class as an entry point, even though he presents a teleological-historicist notion of 
primitive accumulation. I also engage with the contemporary debate to show how the 
contemporary debate attempts to de-historicize the concept and admits an inescapable 
“outside” of capital. But, at the same time, I argue that contemporary interventions 
largely remain trapped within an essentialist problematic, particularly in the 
capitalocentric notions of the “outside” that dominate contemporary debates. I further 
argue that Marx’s unique class perspective is also lost in contemporary debates.  
In Chapter 3, I advance a new notion of primitive accumulation using a new reading of 
Marx produced by Resnick and Wolff (1987) and specifically building on the notion of 
“encounter” and the epistemology of “aleatory materialism” (which, I identify as 
overdetermination) presented in Althusser (2006). I attempt to make a clear distinction 
between primitive and capitalist accumulation and show how they overdetermine each 
other and how they both act as conditions of existence of the capitalist class structure. I 
problematize the notion of dominance of the capitalist class structure in a heterogeneous 
social formation in surplus terms and in presence of a re-theorized surplus population.  
In Chapter 4, I analyze the dynamics of a social formation with only two class 
structures—ancient and capitalist—where primitive accumulation and capitalist 
accumulation produce a surplus population. I argue that conditions of production and 
appropriation of surplus in the two class structures are transformed in the presence of a 
surplus population. I also explore the contradictory effects on capitalist and ancient 
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surplus in such a social context. This chapter also provides theoretical tools to make 
sense of much of the struggles around dispossession of land.  
In Chapter 5, I offer a new account of the postcolonial development of capitalism in 
India. I distinguish between two different regimes or social contexts in India—
identifiable in terms of their unique economic, political and cultural conditions—the 
dirigiste planning regime dominated by state capitalist enterprises and the laissez-faire 
free-market regime dominated by private capitalist enterprises. I argue that both regimes 
had to grapple with the problem of surplus population, as the development of both state 
and private capitalism involved primitive accumulation. I also argue how agriculture, 
traditional non-capitalist industry and informal “ancient” enterprises (both rural and 
urban) have acted as “sinks” for surplus population—enabling and undermining capitalist 
accumulation at the same time. I end with a concluding Chapter 6, where I briefly 
articulate the political implications of the present work as well as future directions of 
research based on the theoretical arguments advanced in the present dissertation.     
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CHAPTER 2 
PRIMITIVE ACCUMULATION AND THE “OUTSIDE” OF CAPITAL: A 
CRITIQUE OF CLASSICAL AND CONTEMPORARY READINGS 
 
Introduction 
 
Marx’s sparse writings on primitive accumulation contain elements of a unique Marxian 
historiography that stands in sharp contrast to the dominant tendency—within classical 
political economy—of writing universal history. Marx engaged with the notion of 
primitive accumulation to contest the dominant “bourgeois” history of his times, which 
sought to naturalize, eternalize and legitimize the emerging and consolidating capitalist 
economy. Marx contested this “bourgeois” history from the perspective of class—
emphasizing the distinctiveness of the capitalist class process and arguing that the latter’s 
rise to dominance in the West European social formations constituted a historical 
discontinuity discernible as a class-transformation within those societies. This transition 
required the dissolution of one type of economy based on the dominance of feudal mode 
of production and the emergence of a different type of economy dominated by the 
capitalist mode of production. Marx showed how contradictory developments within the 
West European feudal social formations led to this transitional conjuncture.  
However, Marx also argued—in his writings on primitive accumulation—that this 
historic transition from pre-capitalism to capitalism was neither spontaneous nor was it 
achieved by ethical means; this entire reorganization of society required a protracted 
period of violence, robbery and coercive state power to undermine existing non-capitalist 
modes of production. Having historicized capitalism, Marx could then posit the 
possibilities of historical transcendence of capitalism. Thus, Marx’s critique of the 
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bourgeois notion of primitive accumulation is animated by his political vision of a future 
beyond capitalism.  
 
Marx’s Critique of the “Bourgeois” Notion of “Primitive Accumulation” 
“Primitive accumulation” is a “bourgeois” 3 notion and it was through his critique of the 
notion that Marx produced an entirely new history of the rise of capitalism. Just as Marx 
took the category of “capital” from classical political economy and invested it with a 
radically new meaning in terms of class relations, in the same way, he engaged with the 
bourgeois notion of primitive accumulation—frequently referring to the “secret of the 
“so-called” primitive accumulation”— and uncovered the history of class struggles that 
remain invisible in the dominant texts of political economy. What Marx refers to as the 
secret of primitive accumulation is the repressed narrative of class. 
In classical political economy, the historical emergence of capitalism was never posed as 
an object of theoretical analysis. There are vague references in Smith (1776) to a prior 
accumulation of stock that enabled capitalists to employ workers in production. 
As soon as stock has accumulated in the hands of particular persons, some of them will 
naturally employ it in setting to work industrious people, whom they will supply with 
materials and subsistence, in order to make a profit by the sale of their work, or by what 
their labour adds to the value of the materials. In exchanging the complete manufacture 
either for money, for labour, or for other goods, over and above what may be sufficient to 
pay the price of the materials, and the wages of the workmen, something must be given 
for the profits of the undertaker of the work who hazards his stock in this adventure. 
(Smith, 1776: 48) 
 
Theories that explained profit as a return to abstinence4 implicitly or explicitly argued 
that capitalists emerged out of people who saved money they earned with their labor and 
                                                 
3
 I use the adjective “bourgeois” to refer to those views in Marx’s time, which provided ethical justification 
of the class-position of the capitalists.  
4
 See Senior (1836) 
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hence there is no exploitation when such capitalists employ workers out of the capital 
(i.e. money) they have previously accumulated5.  
At the abstract-theoretical level, Marx criticized this view for failing to understand the 
distinctive class nature of capitalism.  
Thus e.g. while the process in which money or value-for-itself originally becomes capital 
presupposes on the part of the capitalist an accumulation—perhaps by means of savings 
garnered from products and values created by his own labor etc., which he has 
undertaken as a not-capitalist, i.e. while the presuppositions under which money becomes 
capital appear as given, external presuppositions for the arising of capital—
[nevertheless,] as soon as capital has become capital as such, it creates its own 
presuppositions, i.e. the possession of the real conditions of the creation of new values 
without exchange, by means of its own production process…..That is, individual capitals 
can continue to arise e.g. by means of hoarding. But the hoard is transformed into capital 
only by means of the exploitation of labor. The bourgeois economists who regard capital 
as an eternal and natural (not historical) form of production then attempt at the same time 
to legitimize it again by formulating the conditions of its becoming as the conditions of 
its contemporary realization; i.e. by presenting the moments in which the capitalist still 
appropriates as non-capitalist—because he is still becoming—as the very conditions in 
which he appropriates as capitalist. (Marx, 1973: 460, Italics in the original) 
 
Marx clearly argued that primitive accumulation must be understood as a process that 
produces conditions of existence of a very specific class relation—the productive 
capitalist class relations—in which the capitalists’ profit originates in the sphere of 
production through appropriation of the surplus value produced by wage-laborers. One of 
the conditions of existence of the productive capitalist class structure is therefore the 
presence of dispossessed laborers who are compelled to sell their labor-power as a 
commodity in return for wages.  Marx argued that capitalism could not have been born 
                                                 
5
 Marx ridiculed the bourgeois view in the following words. “This primitive accumulation plays in Political 
Economy about the same part as original sin in theology. Adam bit the apple, and thereupon sin fell on the 
human race. Its origin is supposed to be explained when it is told as an anecdote of the past. In times long 
gone by there were two sorts of people; one, the diligent, intelligent, and, above all, frugal elite; the other, 
lazy rascals, spending their substance, and more, in riotous living. The legend of theological original sin 
tells us certainly how man came to be condemned to eat his bread in the sweat of his brow; but the history 
of economic original sin reveals to us that there are people to whom this is by no means essential. Never 
mind! Thus it came to pass that the former sort accumulated wealth, and the latter sort had at last nothing to 
sell except their own skins. And from this original sin dates the poverty of the great majority that, despite 
all its labour, has up to now nothing to sell but itself, and the wealth of the few that increases constantly 
although they have long ceased to work. Such insipid childishness is every day preached to us in the 
defence of property” (Marx, 1912: 784-785) 
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only with people with prior accumulation of wealth “who will naturally employ it in 
setting to work industrious people”.  For capitalist class relations to emerge, it was 
necessary that there should exist a sizable population dispossessed of all property so that 
they are compelled to accept wage-employment. Marx therefore emphasized the forceful 
dispossession and proletarianization of the peasants and artisans as the central moment of 
primitive accumulation. Further, the same processes of dispossession also implied 
concentration of wealth and property in the hands of emerging capitalists.  
At the concrete-historical level, Marx also contested the view that hoarding, saving or 
abstinence explain the original accumulation of the capitalists. He argued that a whole 
range of economic processes were responsible for the emergence of the capitalists. 
Colonial plunder, the national debt, international credit system, taxation policies and the 
protectionist trade policies were all instrumental in “manufacturing the 
manufacturers”(Marx, 1912: 830). Similarly, Marx lays special emphasis on “enclosures” 
in accounting for the creation of free wage-laborers. “Enclosures” refer to forcible private 
or state acts of expropriation of the agricultural producers from their land, which was also 
their chief means of production. The dispossessed laborers were then whipped into 
factories through “bloody legislations” against vagabonds, beggars and robbers. 
Eradication of holidays, game laws that closed hunting grounds to people for self-
provisioning, the attack on the “sloths” and wage-legislations were pressed into service 
for the consolidation of the capitalist class-structure6. The nation-states played a crucial 
role in the so-called primitive accumulation by adopting policies that facilitated the 
                                                 
6
 See Perelman (2000) 
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destruction of non-capitalist production units7 and consequent proletarianization of 
independent producers and by helping the ascendant bourgeois amass massive wealth. 
Thus, Marx located violence right at the heart of the historic process through which 
capitalism was born out of feudalism.8 
Critics of Marx explained the “industrial revolution” in Britain in terms of several 
“exogenous” factors. For example, the European discovery of America and the 
subsequent flow of precious metals (gold and silver) from America to Europe in the 
sixteenth century led to a high rate of inflation and a consequent “profit-inflation” to the 
advantage of the emerging capitalist class, to the extent that money wages grew at a 
slower rate than commodity prices and the landlords’ rental claims remained relatively 
fixed in nominal terms9. On the other hand, some critics of Marx pointed out that the 
most important source of the industrial proletariat In England was rapid population 
growth due to early marriage and larger families in the 18th century10.  
For Marx, the rise of capitalism was a complex socially overdetermined process and 
hence it was important to identify the social context within which capitalism emerged. 
Marx argued that capitalist class structures emerged within a feudal social formation 
whose contradictory developments led first to a disintegration of the feudal class 
structures and the expansion of “ancient” production and then further dissolution of both 
feudal and ancient class structures to give way to the prevalence of capitalist class 
structures.11 That is why Marx laid greater emphasis on the process by which capitalism 
                                                 
7
 See Marx (1912) 
8
 “Force is the midwife of every old society pregnant with a new one” (Marx, 1912: 824) 
9
 See Dobb (1947) for a discussion of this view 
10
 See Lazonick (1974) for a discussion of this view. 
11
 “Capitalism arises and develops historically amidst a non-capitalist society. In Western Europe it is found 
at first in a feudal environment from which it in fact sprang—the system of bondage in rural areas and the 
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arose by dissolving other non-capitalist class processes—thus releasing means of 
production and labor power employed in the latter—than on exogenous supplies of 
laborers and money capital.   
The essence of this primary accumulation is accordingly seen to consist, not simply in the 
transfer of property from an old class to a new class, even if this involved concentration 
of property into fewer hands, but the transfer of property from small owners to the 
ascendant bourgeoisie and the consequent pauperization of the former. This fact, which is 
so commonly ignored, is the justification of Marx’s preoccupation with the phenomena 
like enclosures as the type-form of his “primitive accumulation”: an emphasis for which 
he has often been criticized on the ground that this was one among numerous sources of 
bourgeois enrichment. Enrichment alone, however, was not enough. It had to be 
enrichment in ways which involved dispossession of persons several times more 
numerous than those enriched. Actually, the boot of criticism should be on the other leg. 
Those various factors in the process on which many writers have laid stress, such as 
indebtedness, windfall profits, high rents and the gains of usury, could only exert a 
decisive influence to the extent that they contributed to the divorce of substantial sections 
of small producers from the means of production… (Dobb ,1947:185-186) 
 
The emergence of the capital-labor relation requires both concentration of wealth in the 
hands of emerging capitalists (transformed into money capital for investment as 
productive capital) on the one hand and separation of a significant portion of the labor 
force from means of production on the other hand. In Marx’s account of primitive 
accumulation, therefore, there is an element of redistribution as well as separation. While 
the classical Marxist writings on primitive accumulation have mainly emphasized the 
aspect of separation, the contemporary debate—which I take up in the next chapter— on 
primitive accumulation emphasizes the aspect of redistribution. Things get even more 
completed when Marx includes within his notion of primitive accumulation processes as 
diverse as wage-legislations, protectionist trade policies and public debt. This has 
resulted in an extraordinarily varied application of the notion of primitive accumulation 
                                                                                                                                                 
guild system in the towns – and later, after having swallowed up the feudal system, it exists mainly in an 
environment of peasants and artisans, that is to say in a system of simple commodity production both in 
agriculture and trade. European capitalism is further surrounded by vast territories of non-European 
civilisation ranging over all levels of development, from the primitive communist hordes of nomad 
herdsmen, hunters and gatherers to commodity production by peasants and artisans. This is the setting for 
the accumulation of capital.” (Luxemburg, 2003: 348) 
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in latter Marxian literature. In our understanding, for Marx, “separation” of direct 
producers from means of production constitutes the focal point of primitive 
accumulation—but not because separation “explains” the emergence of capitalism. 
Marx’s historical account clearly points to the many different processes that converged to 
produce capitalism in England. Marx’s emphasis on separation is however consistent 
with his unique focus on class relations in theorizing society—dispossession leads to 
dissolution of existing non-capitalist class structures and the possible emergence of the 
capitalist class structure.  
In the history of primitive accumulation, all revolutions are epoch-making that act as 
levers for the capitalist class in course of formation; but, above all, those moments when 
great masses of men are suddenly and forcibly torn from their means of subsistence, and 
hurled as free and “unattached” proletarians on the labour-market (Marx, 1912: 787) 
 
At the same time, Marx’s use of class is non-essentialist, since class-effects of 
dispossession alone cannot account for the rise of capitalism.  That is precisely why Marx 
refers to so many processes in accounting for the rise of capitalism. We understand his 
extraordinary list of the “moments of primitive accumulation” as indicative of the 
complexity of the overdetermined process of emergence of capitalism. It is regrettable, 
however, that in referring to all the different identified processes—whose overdetermined 
outcome was the emergence of English capitalism—as moments of primitive 
accumulation, Marx sometimes appears to use the notion as standing for the process of 
overdetermination itself rather than processes of dispossession which form only a subset 
of the overdetermined totality.   
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Marx’s Secret of the “So-called” Primitive Accumulation 
Marx’s critique of primitive accumulation is centered on the notion of “dispossession”—
i.e. separation of direct producers from any property or control over means of production. 
For Marx, this rupture of the unity of direct producers with means of production, under 
certain conditions, precipitates an encounter between owners of capital on the one hand 
and dispossessed, i.e. “free” laborers—“freed” of means of production and of non-
capitalist class relations—on the other hand. This encounter is crucial for the emergence 
of the capitalist fundamental class relation12  
There are two sources of the proletariat—expropriation of direct producers from the 
material conditions of independent production and differentiation among “ancient” 
producers into wage-laborers and capitalists. The dispossession of direct producers could 
take place due to market forces which lead to differential outcomes across a society of 
“ancients” such that some lose out and turn into wage-laborers and others win and 
emerge as capitalists. However, Marx focused more on dispossession due to forcible acts 
of expropriation or separation, e.g. establishment of private property across commons, 
eradication of customary rights or access to means of subsistence or creation of artificial 
barriers to the union of direct producers and means of production. These instances of 
expropriation or forced separation could be legal or illegal, backed by the state or purely 
private actions. It could be also a direct or indirect, intended or unintended outcome of 
economic policies of the state like taxation, public debt, protective trade policies etc. It 
                                                 
12
  “The process, therefore, that clears the way for the capitalist system, can be none other than the process 
which takes away from the labourer the possession of his means of production; a process that transforms, 
on the one hand, the social means of subsistence and production into capital, on the other, the immediate 
producers into wage-labourers. The so-called primitive accumulation, therefore, is nothing else than the 
historical process of divorcing the producer from the means of production.” (Marx, 1912: 786. Italics 
mine)  
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will be wrong to say that Marx considered “enclosures” as the only form of primitive 
accumulation. Marx analyzed many different economic events and state policies in terms 
of their effectivity on dispossession. For example, in the context of protectionist trade 
policies, Marx writes that the “system of protection was an artificial means of 
manufacturing manufacturers, of expropriating independent labourers, of capitalizing the 
national means of production and subsistence….”(Marx, 1912: 830). The point is further 
substantiated in the following quote from Marx where he discusses public debt and 
taxation.  
The public debt becomes one of the most powerful levers of primitive accumulation. As 
with the stroke of an enchanter’s wand, it endows barren money with the power of 
breeding and thus turns it into capital, without the necessity of its exposing itself to the 
troubles and risks inseparable from its employment in industry or even in usury…... As 
the national debt finds its support in the public revenue, which must cover the yearly 
payments for interest, &c., the modern system of taxation was the necessary complement 
of the system of national loans. The loans enable the government to meet extraordinary 
expenses, without the tax-payers feeling it immediately, but they necessitate, as a 
consequence, increased taxes. …. Modern fiscality, whose pivot is formed by taxes on 
the most necessary means of subsistence (thereby increasing their price), thus contains 
within itself the germ of automatic progression………The destructive influence that it 
exercises on the condition of the wage-labourer concerns us less however, here, than the 
forcible expropriation, resulting from it, of peasants, artisans, and in a word, all elements 
of the lower middle-class. (Marx, 1912:, 827-829) 
       
The centrality of dispossession to Marx’s understanding of primitive accumulation is 
however best understood in the last chapter of Capital Vol.I, titled “The Modern Theory 
of Colonisation” where Marx talks about the “secret discovered in the new world by the 
Political Economy of the old world” (Marx,1912: 848). By colonies, Marx here refers to 
USA, Australia etc. where immigrants colonized land, rather than people. In these 
colonies, land was plenty and “every settler on it therefore can turn part of it into his 
private property and individual means of production, without hindering the later settlers 
in the same operation.”(Marx,1912: 842). Thus what was absent in the colonies was a 
steady and secure supply of wage-laborers. New wage-laborers brought in as immigrants 
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often quickly escaped the wage-relation and established themselves as ancient producers. 
Thus, in the colonies, “property in money, means of subsistence, machines, and other 
means of production, does not as yet stamp a man as a capitalist if there be wanting the 
correlative—the wage-worker, the other man who is compelled to sell himself of his own 
free-will”(Marx, 1912: 839). Secondly, just as the separation of laborer from land is 
incomplete, so is the separation of agriculture from industry. Social division of labor 
cannot develop and neither can the internal market for capitalist products. Moreover, the 
capitalists cannot depend on the production of the industrial reserve army to control 
wages and impose discipline on the workers, since the laid-off worker, or even the ill-
paid worker may simply leave the labor market and establish his own private and 
independent production. Thus a viable self-exploitative or ancient economy imposes 
limits to the expansion or even emergence of capitalist production.  
To ensure the supply of wage-laborers, this easy union of the laborer with the means of 
production has to be dissolved or at least deferred. The “secret” of primitive 
accumulation, suppressed in classical political economy13, is seen in all its nakedness in 
the colonies, when, by Acts of the British parliament, the economy of the ancients in the 
colonies is undermined by imposing an artificially high price on abundant land, defying 
all laws of demand and supply. The high price of land forced the immigrant laborers to 
work as wage-laborers for a long time before he could save enough money to buy a piece 
of land and establish himself as an independent peasant. Thus the supply of wage-
laborers was finally secured by undermining the non-capitalist mode of production.  
                                                 
13
 “It is the great merit of E.G. Wakefield to have discovered, not anything new about the Colonies, but to 
have discovered in the Colonies the truth as to the conditions of capitalist production in the mother 
country”. (Marx, 1912: 839) 
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Dispossession and the Conditions of Existence of the Capitalist Class Structure 
Dispossession alone does not guarantee that the capitalist class structure will take hold. 
Many other natural, economic, political and cultural conditions of existence are required 
to stabilize capitalist production.14 For example, Marx argued that protectionist trade 
policies were instrumental in securing the domestic market for emerging capitalists and 
protecting it from competition with non-capitalist products in the market. But this point is 
best substantiated with Marx’s discussion of legislations pertaining to conditions of 
wage-labor in Britain during the emergence of capitalism. For capitalist production to be 
viable, it is not only necessary that there exist dispossessed laborers, but that laborers are 
subjugated to the extent that they yield surplus value for the capitalist.  
It is not enough that the conditions of labour are concentrated in a mass, in the shape of 
capital, at the pole of society, while at the other are grouped masses of men, who have 
nothing to sell but their labour-power. Neither is it enough that they are compelled to sell 
it voluntarily………………. The bourgeois, at its rise, wants and uses the power of the 
state to “regulate” wages, i.e. to force them within the limits suitable for surplus-value 
making, to lengthen the working day and to keep the labourer himself in the normal 
degree of dependence. This is an essential element of the so-called primitive 
accumulation. (Marx, 1912: 809) 
  
Hence, Marx devotes considerable space to bloody legislations against labor including 
laws related to wages as well as laws related to vagabondage. Perelman (2000) mentions 
“Game Laws” in Britain that prevented the common people from hunting in the woods 
                                                 
14
 “[E]xploitation cannot be reduced to the extraction of surplus value; it can be understood only if the 
whole set of its concrete forms and conditions is treated as determinant. The whole set of these concrete 
forms does indeed include the extraction of value, but it also includes the implacable constraints of the 
labour process embedded in the process of production and, therefore, exploitation: the socio-economic 
division and organization of labour; the length of the “working-day”, a notion peculiar to the capitalist 
system, and therefore nowhere to be found before it; speed-up; compartmentalization; the material 
conditions of the centralization of labour (the factory, the workshop); work-related accidents and illnesses; 
the practice of forcing people to take jobs below or above their level of competence; and so on. And the 
process of production must in turn (less one remain abstract) be conceived as a decisive moment in the 
process of reproduction: the reproduction of the means of production, but also the reproduction of labor-
power (family, housing, children, child-rearing, schooling, health, problems faced by the couple, by the 
young people, etc.)—to say nothing of the other moment of the process of reproduction of labor-power, 
which brings the state and its apparatuses (repressive, ideological, etc.) into play.” (Althusser, 2006:43-44)   
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and thus securing any means of subsistence. E.P.Thompson (1967) brilliantly chronicles 
the cultural interventions in the life of working people to orient them to the new work 
regime under capitalism— symbolized in the ‘clock’ as the regulator and the measurer of 
a new concept of work. While dispossession destroys alternative modes of subsistence for 
the laborers and keeps them crucially dependent on wage-employment for securing their 
necessities of life, yet further social processes are required for the creation of the new 
class of wage-workers who could sustain the developing forces of production under 
capitalism. A new subjectivity of labor has to be constructed such that 
alienated/dispossessed labor not only accommodates the conditions of his 
alienation/dispossession, but also over time, tend to view them as naturalized conditions 
of labor, submitting to the compulsions of the same labor market which was created by 
their expropriation from land.15 It is only then that the conditions for real subsumption of 
labor16 are created.   
Yet, dispossession has multiple effects in securing the conditions of existence of the 
productive capitalist circuit, MCCM ′−′−− —one of the reasons why dispossession 
figures so prominently in Marx’s account of the rise of capitalism.                                                       
                                                 
15
 “Indeed living labour itself appears as alien vis-à-vis living labour capacity, whose labour it is, whose 
own life’s expression [Lebensaussserung] it is, for it has been surrendered to capital in exchange for 
objectified labour, for the product of labour itself. Labour capacity relates to its labour as an alien, and if 
capital were willing to pay it without making it labour, it would enter the bargain with pleasure. Thus 
labour capacity’s own labour is as alien to it—and it really is, as regards its direction etc.—as are material 
and instrument. Which is why the product then appears to it as a combination of alien material, alien 
instrument and alien labour—as alien property, and why, after production, it has become poorer by the life 
forces expended, but otherwise begins the drudgery anew, existing as a mere subjective labour capacity 
separated from the conditions of its life.” (Marx, 1973: 462-463, Italics in the original)   
16
 Marx makes a distinction between formal and real subsumption of labor. The immediate consequence of 
primitive accumulation is formal subsumption of labor—separation allows the capitalists to unite 
dispossessed labor power and means of production in an essentially unchanged labor process, but a 
different fundamental class process. Real subumption of labor takes place when capitalists revolutionize 
existing labor processes, requiring reorientation of the subjective relations of the workers to the conditions 
of work. Marx identified formal subsumption with production of absolute surplus value and real 
subsumption with production of relative surplus value and considered the latter to be the “true” capitalist 
form. 
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Dispossession—expropriation of peasants from their lands, establishment of private 
property over commons, acquisitions of Church land etc.—directly enriched the emerging 
capitalists through concentration of (landed) wealth, which could be converted into 
profitable investment in capitalist industries. As a result of dispossession, direct 
producers (peasants) divorced from means of production (land, primarily) become sellers 
of that special commodity—labor power. On the other hand, once the peasants are 
expropriated from the land, the agricultural raw materials which once served as means of 
independent production now flow into the market as commodities sold by capitalist 
farmers to the manufacturing capitalists. Thus, there is development and polarization of 
the market for means of production and the market for labor power, which enables 
transformation of capitalists’ money into constant and variable capital. Again, 
dispossession directly creates the home market for V-goods produced by the capitalist 
enterprises by robbing the direct producers of control or ownership over means of 
production and hence means of independent subsistence. The subsistence of “freed” 
laborers now depends on their employment in capitalist factories where they receive a 
wage with which to buy their means of subsistence. The food items produced on land 
from which they have been expropriated are now capitalist commodities, which they 
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must purchase in the market. On the other hand, agriculture partly absorbs the products of 
capitalist industry as C-goods in agricultural production. Thus emerges the home market 
for the commodities produced in capitalist enterprises. Finally, dispossession creates the 
dependence of the worker on the capitalist for subsistence. This dependence allows the 
capitalists to impose their controls and disciplinary mechanisms on the workers, 
transform the labor process and create conditions for real subsumption of labor.  
The results of enclosures in England, which took place throughout the transition process, 
were according to Marx, not only the creation of purely private property in agriculture, 
but also the creation of a landless labour force, an expanded food supply to feed this 
labour force, a home market for agricultural and manufacturing products, and the 
concentration of landed wealth” (Lazonick, 1974: 5) 
 
However, it needs to be emphasized, at the risk of repetition, that dispossession remains 
central to Marx’s critique of primitive accumulation not because he thought it was the 
only process by which the conditions of existence of the capitalist class process were 
created, but because dispossession—though itself not a class process17— enables Marx to 
inscribe class at the heart of primitive accumulation. This is of course a specific reading 
of Marx, which animates the present work. Other readings are possible and exist within 
the Marxian tradition. In later sections of this chapter, I will contrast my reading with 
some of those alternative readings of Marx’s idea of primitive accumulation. Partly, the 
proliferation of different readings is facilitated by the extraordinarily rich account of 
primitive accumulation one finds in Vol.I of Capital. In contrast, the notes on “original 
accumulation” in Grundrisse are restricted almost entirely to a theoretical elaboration of 
the conditions of existence of capitalist production. Marx hardly deals with the concrete 
history of primitive/original accumulation in Grundrisse, while he devotes considerable 
                                                 
17
 By “class process”, we understand production, appropriation and distribution of surplus labor. See 
Resnick and Wolff (1987).   
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space to conditions of existence—primarily forms of property relations—of non-capitalist 
production, which have to be dissolved for capitalist production to prevail in any society. 
I argue that if one reads Marx’s chapters on primitive accumulation in Capital in 
conjunction with his notes in Grundrisse, Marx’s own class-reading of primitive 
accumulation emerges all the more clearly. Once we recognize class as the entry point for 
Marx’s theoretical analysis, we can then understand how the complex interaction between 
many different class and non-class processes—which Marx refers to as so many moments 
of primitive accumulation in Capital—produced conditions of existence of capitalist 
production on a considerable scale, while dispossession itself—partly determined by 
those processes and partly determining them—constituted the moment of class-
transformation.   
 
An Essentialist Reading of Primitive Accumulation 
I argued in the previous section that in his critique of the notion of primitive 
accumulation, Marx contested the eternalized and naturalized representation of capitalism 
in classical political economy. He achieved this by a) emphasizing the specificity of the 
capitalist class process, distinguishing it from other non-capitalistic class processes 
(ancient, feudal, communistic etc.) and b) historicizing and locating the rise to dominance 
of the capitalist class process in a particular social formation, i.e. Britain, in the sixteenth 
through the nineteenth century. In so doing, he criticized classical political economy for 
failing to ‘see’ this transition from non-capitalism to capitalism in Western Europe18 and 
                                                 
18
 “Political economy confuses on principle two very different kinds of private property, of which one rests 
on the producers’ own labour, the other on the employment of the labour of others. It forgets that the latter 
not only is the direct antithesis of the former, but absolutely grows on its tomb only. In Western Europe, the 
home of Political Economy, the process of primitive accumulation is more or less accomplished……..To 
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the class effects of primitive accumulation in such a transitional conjuncture. However, 
several related epistemological issues can be raised in the context of an essentialist 
reading of Marx.    
 
The Teleology of Historical Materialism and the Universal Dominance of Capital 
 
In historicizing primitive accumulation, Marx unfortunately also prepared the ground for 
the subsumption of primitive accumulation to the Marxian theory of transition. The latter 
is a product of essentialist Marxian historiography—which we know as “historical 
materialism”—that periodizes history in terms of the dominant mode of production of a 
society. In its most essentialist version, historical materialism claims that auto-
development of the forces of production provides the motor force of history, forcing 
those changes in relations of production and corresponding changes in the superstructure 
that are best suited to the development of the forces of production. In its most teleological 
version, historical materialism presents a certain law of linear succession of modes of 
production culminating in communism—each succeeding mode of production being 
more technologically advanced than the one before.  
The dominant understanding of Marx’s notion of primitive accumulation, grounded in 
historical materialism, runs as follows. Primitive accumulation precipitates an encounter 
between owners of capital on the one hand and dispossessed laborers on the other hand. 
Once created, capital reproduces this separation/ dispossession on an expanded scale. The 
teleology inherent in the historical materialist framework leads to the conclusion that 
                                                                                                                                                 
this ready-made world of capital, the political economist applies the notions of law and of property 
inherited from a pre-capitalist world with all the more anxious zeal and all the greater unction, the more 
loudly the facts cry out in the face of his ideology”. (Marx, 1912: 838) 
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primitive accumulation has a singular, irreversible outcome—it prepares the path for the 
emergence of capitalism and the inevitable destruction of non-capitalist production based 
on petty private property as well as communal property19. With the development of 
capitalist production based on exploitation of wage-labor, with the real subsumption of 
labor, the radical transformation of the labor process in capitalist production and 
introduction of machinery, capitalist production creates the conditions for its final 
victory.  
Under these conditions the factory rules, and the days of handicraft, of independent 
production, are numbered. What remains is carried on chiefly by unfortunates who cannot 
find places in the factory system. (Kautsky, 1910: 17).  
 
The assumption of continuous and irreversible development of forces of production 
dictates that lower forms of production must yield to higher forms.20 Unlike an open-
ended history of capital—which must recognize the contingency of any social 
conjuncture—historical materialism presents a logical history of capital in which a) the 
capitalist mode of production is superior to pre-capitalist modes in terms of the 
development of the forces of production and therefore b) history is fated to unfold in 
                                                 
19
 According to Marx, at the time of writing of Capital, in “Western Europe…the process of primitive 
accumulation is more or less accomplished. Here the capitalist regime has either directly conquered the 
whole domain of national production, or, where economic conditions are less developed it, at least, 
indirectly controls those strata of society which, though belonging to the antiquated mode of production, 
continue to exist side by side with it in gradual decay.” (Marx,1912: 838) 
20
 “This [petty] mode of production pre-supposes parceling of the soil, and scattering of the other means of 
production. As it excludes the concentration of these means of production, so also it excludes co-operation, 
division of labor within each separate process of production, the control over and the productive application 
of the forces of Nature by society, and the free development of the social productive powers. It is 
compatible only with a system of production, and a society, moving within narrow and more or less 
primitive bounds. To perpetuate it would be…. “ to decree universal mediocrity”. At a certain stage of 
development it brings forth the material agencies for its own dissolution. …….but the old social 
organization fetters them and keeps them down. It must be annihilated; it is annihilated. Its annihilation, the 
transformation of the individualized and scattered means of production into socially concentrated ones, of 
the pigmy property of many into the huge property of the few, the expropriation of the great mass of people 
from the soil, from the means of subsistence, and from the means of labour, this fearful and painful 
expropriation of the masses of the people forms the prelude to the history of capital.” (Marx, 1912: 835, 
italics mine) 
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favor of capitalism so long as it supports the continuous development of the forces of 
production. The historical journey through modes of production—rationally ordered by 
developing forces of production—endows capital with a universal face. As a higher form 
of production, capital is pre-destined to enfold the entire space of production by 
dissolving the pre-capitalist “outside”.  
If and whenever non-capitalist production appears within a capitalist social formation, the 
dominant tendency within the Marxian tradition has been to treat it as a i) resilient pre-
capitalist residue (in a conjuncture of ‘blocked’ transition), ii) a transitional feature or iii) 
a non-capitalist articulation of the circuit of productive capital (for example, non-capital 
as source of cheap labor-power and raw materials). Historical materialism does not 
recognize radical differences at the level of the economic, or in other words, does not 
admit any intrinsic limits of capital.    
 
The Being-Becoming Distinction and the “Metaphysics of Full Presence” 
In the scheme of historical materialism, primitive accumulation plays a very distinct role. 
Primitive accumulation refers to those processes within a non-capitalist social formation 
that produced the conditions of existence of the capitalist mode of production and thus 
belongs to the pre-history of capital, or in Marx’s words, forms “the prelude to the history 
of capital”. In so far as primitive accumulation is the condition of the arising or becoming 
of capital, i.e. the historic presupposition of the capitalist class relation, it ceases to exist 
once that relation has arisen.21  
                                                 
21
 This Hegelian being-becoming distinction has dominated latter Marxist writings on primitive 
accumulation. Marxists have generally tended to treat primitive accumulation as a concrete historical 
process that has no theoretical bearing on the ontology of capital. The concept of “primitive accumulation” 
has thus long come to be confined to the field of economic history, except occasional application in studies 
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The conditions and presuppositions of the becoming, of the arising, of capital 
presupposes precisely that it is not yet in being but merely in becoming; they therefore 
disappear as real capital arises, capital which itself, on the basis of its own reality, posits 
the conditions for its realization. (Marx 1973: 459) 
   
According to this Hegelian understanding, primitive accumulation is the becoming of the 
capitalist mode of production, which once become, can secure its conditions of existence 
by itself, in accordance with its immanent laws. That is, capital-as-being is self-positing 
(the profits of capital constitute new funds for investment), self-reproducing (expanded 
reproduction based on mutual interaction between Departments I and II) and self-
subsisting (its natural, economic, political and cultural conditions of existence are secured 
through payments out of the expanded surplus value possible in capitalist production). 
Marx’s treatment of primitive accumulation is thus fraught with what Cullenberg and 
Chakrabarty calls the “metaphysics of full presence”, i.e. a notion of capital as a “closed 
totality” fully comprehensible in and by itself. Capital can exist and reproduce itself 
independent of its “outside”—i.e. non-capital has no constitutive determination on 
capital. Let me give two examples from Marx.   
In the chapter titled “The General law of Capitalist Accumulation” in Vol. I of Capital, 
Marx introduces the notion of relative surplus population and industrial reserve army and 
these concepts help him develop a “law of population peculiar to the capitalist mode of 
production” (Marx, 1912:692-693). Marx argues that the industrial reserve army provides 
a crucial condition of capitalist accumulation by securing additional supplies of wage-
laborers when accumulation leads to a sudden increase in demand for laborers. Capitalist 
accumulation does not have to depend on natural population growth for its supply of 
                                                                                                                                                 
of capitalism in developing economies, and that too only because it is assumed that the history of the rise of 
capitalism in the West is replicated in the developing countries experiencing capitalist development. 
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laborers22. Neither does it have to depend on external supplies of laborers, i.e. it does not 
require dispossession to “free” laborers from non-capitalist class processes. The industrial 
reserve army makes available for capitalists any additional supplies of workers needed 
for rapid accumulation. The industrial reserve army itself is periodically replenished by a 
rise in the organic composition of capital, which in turn is related to capitalist 
accumulation and competition among capitalists. Thus capital-as-being secures its labor 
power in accordance with its immanent laws of self-expansion. It is in this sense that the 
industrial reserve army belongs “to capital quite as absolutely as if the latter had bred it at 
its own cost” (Marx, 1912: 693). It is otherwise during the transitional conjuncture. 
Capital-in-arising secures its supplies of “free” proletariat from the “outside”—by 
dispossessing direct producers in non-capitalist class structures. 
Similarly, the “metaphysics of full presence” also pervades the distinction between 
primitive accumulation and capitalist accumulation in the Marxist literature. Capitalist 
accumulation is the capitalization of surplus vale created in the capitalist fundamental 
class process. In terms of the productive capitalist circuit MCCM ′−′−− , the profit of the 
capitalist is equal to MM −′ . When a part of this profit is converted into additional 
constant and variable capital—thus leading to expansion of capitalist production—
capitalist accumulation takes place. Primitive accumulation, on the other hand, is 
appropriation of existing means of production (say, land) previously employed in non-
capitalist production. Thus, capital-as-being creates its own wealth once it is born, while 
capital arises by appropriation of wealth outside it, i.e. by fraud and robbery.  
                                                 
22
 “Capitalist production can by no means content itself with the quantity of disposable labor-power which 
the natural increase of population yields. It requires for its free play an industrial reserve army independent 
of these natural limits” (Marx, 1912: Pg 696). 
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One consequence of this essentialist reading of Marx is that the notion of primitive 
accumulation is exorcised from Marxian political economy, since Marxian theoretical 
categories are not deployed in producing an understanding of the notion. In so far as 
primitive accumulation belongs to the pre-history of capital, it has no bearing on the 
ontology of capital. It belongs to the dark realm of force, which is not a category of 
Marxian thought. Though the notion of primitive accumulation was deployed by Marx to 
bring in class in the writing of a history of capitalism, the notion itself is not constituted 
by the categories of class. This is the symptom of an essentialist reading—the cause is 
always untainted by the effect.        
 
The Return of the Primitive: Contemporary Debates, Contested Meanings 
In this section, I engage with the contemporary debate on primitive accumulation, which, 
I argue, makes significant theoretical departures from the classical Marxian position on 
primitive accumulation. To identify the theoretical significance of the contemporary 
debate, I strategically engage with the essentialist Marx, portraying it as the Marx. In this 
section, I emphasize the distinctiveness of contemporary positions vis-a-vis the 
essentialist Marxian position on primitive accumulation and articulate the theoretical 
issues posed in the contemporary debate within the essentialist problematic of primitive 
accumulation. However, the very formulation of the problems—the way I formulate it, 
even if within the essentialist problematic—is purposive. It is meant to produce nothing 
less than a rupture in the essentialist problematic, making way for the emergence of a 
non-essentialist understanding of primitive accumulation, which I put forward in the next 
chapter.  
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The contemporary debate23 on primitive accumulation has rescued the notion from its 
marginal position in the Marxian discourse and placed it right at the heart of 
contemporary capitalism. But more importantly, the contemporary debate has also 
displaced the notion from its familiar terrain and posed new theoretical problems—partly 
articulated, partly latent—before the Marxian tradition. Let us take a last look at the 
classical terrain of primitive accumulation before we leave it. Primitive accumulation 
belongs to the transitional conjuncture that produces capitalism. It is a historical 
convergence of many different processes, out of which emerges the system of capitalist 
production—most importantly, the incipient social classes of capitalists and wage-
laborers themselves. The crux of primitive accumulation—what Marx referred to as the 
“secret” of primitive accumulation—was the processes of dispossession that produced 
“free” laborers on one side and enriched the ascendant capitalists on the other. By 
dissolving the unity of direct producers with the means of production, by enabling the 
transformation of means of production and labor-power into commodities and finally by 
enabling the transformation of these commodities into elements of constant and variable 
capital, dispossession created the essential conditions of existence of the “productive” 
capitalist class relation. Once capitalist production has socially consolidated itself, it 
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 My engagement with the contemporary literature is selective. See Footnote 26. I leave out some 
traditions of critical thought that have direct or indirect bearing on the Marxist discourse on primitive 
accumulation. For example, I leave out—given the scope of the present essay—the feminist deployment of 
the concept of primitive accumulation. Feminist critics have pointed out the transformation of women into 
house-wives as an act of primitive accumulation by which women are “separated from their work and 
production means, their culture, their knowledge, and their skills, and from control over their own labor and 
even their bodies because of their reproductive capacities” (Werholf, 2000: 731). See Mies (1986), Federici 
(2004) and Glassman (2006). Another critical tradition—the post-development school (Sachs, 1992;  
Latouche, 1993; Escobar, 1995; Rahneman and Bawtree, 1997)—has increasingly brought attention to what 
they call development-induced displacement. Escobar (2004) equates “displacement” with modernity per se 
and identifies “development” as the exemplary project of modernization.  Development projects in the third 
world, including construction of dams, highways, power plants etc. by the government involved large-scale 
displacement and eviction of traditional communities. See Perspectives (2008) for such displacement in 
India.   
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maintains and expands the “separation” of the direct producers from means of 
production, by dissolving the pre-capitalist outside and conquering the terrain of social 
production. The notion of “primitive accumulation” applies to the initial24 separation of 
direct producers from means of production on a scale large enough for capitalism to 
emerge and involved private and state acts of violence and coercion. Primitive 
accumulation thus belongs to the pre-history of capital in so far as it secures “initial” 
conditions of existence for capitalist production, while the latter, once born, can secure 
the same conditions through normal economic processes peculiar to capitalism itself, 
without involving force or any extra-economic state power.  
Marx—as well as those after him, who more or less confined themselves to the classical 
context of primitive accumulation25—bequeathed a notion of primitive accumulation that 
is historicist (primitive accumulation belongs to the pre-history of capital) and a notion of 
self-subsistent capital that is autonomous of its “outside” (capital can fully secure its 
conditions within itself). The contemporary debate on primitive accumulation26 breaks 
new grounds within the Marxian tradition in two ways. First, some of the contemporary 
Marxists view primitive accumulation as an ongoing process and not as a process limited 
to the transitional conjuncture leading to the establishment of capitalism. According to 
these Marxists, primitive accumulation is a process that secures crucial conditions for the 
reproduction and expansion of the capitalist mode of production. Second, some of the 
Marxist authors explicitly reject the idea of a purely internal reproduction of the capitalist 
                                                 
24
 De Angelis (2001) calls it ex novo separation.   
25See Kautsky (1910, 1925), Lenin (1967), Dobb (1947), Lazonick (1974).  
26
 See Niggle (1995), Perelman (2000), Werlhof (2000), De Angelis (2001), Harvey (2003, 2006), Arrighi 
(2004) Glassman (2006), Andreasson(2006), Sanyal (2007), Basu(2007), etc.. In particular, see the 
September, 2001 issue of The Commoner (available at http://www.commoner.org.uk/index.php?p=5). Also 
see Historical Materialism, 14(4), 2006, especially the contributions by Robert Brenner, Sam Ashman, 
Alex Callinicos and David Harvey.  
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system. Instead, they argue that capitalist production requires a non-capitalist space 
outside it for its reproduction—an “outside” that is marked by the violence of primitive 
accumulation. Despite these important theoretical contributions, in my reading, 
contemporary interventions largely fail to escape the essentialist logic or to retain the 
class-perspective that Marx uniquely brought to bear on the study of capitalism.   
The contemporary literature on primitive accumulation can be read in many different 
ways. The reading I offer is of course motivated by the theoretical objective of this 
dissertation—to produce a non-essentialist (class) focused Marxian notion of primitive 
accumulation. This purposive reading enables me to identify the two distinct ‘departures’ 
mentioned above—namely, the understanding of primitive accumulation as an ongoing 
process and the recognition of an “outside” of capital. Once we accept primitive 
accumulation as an ongoing process within capitalism, we have to further specify how 
primitive accumulation is related to the process of accumulation of capital. Similarly, 
once we recognize an “outside” of capital, we must investigate how capital is related to 
this theoretical “outside. Therefore, I locate various contributions to the contemporary 
debate as distinct theoretical positions on these two questions.       
Accumulation and Dispossession 
The first departure constitutes a novel intervention in Marxian political economy because 
it locates primitive accumulation right at the heart of the dynamics of capitalism. The 
contemporary debate constitutes a “break” from the Marxian tradition which understands 
primitive accumulation as a historical process and which, therefore has, so far, restricted 
all reference to primitive accumulation to capitalist development in the third world 
where, it was argued, the transition to capitalism is yet to be “completed”. In contrast, 
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contemporary critics argue that primitive accumulation takes place even in social 
formations where the capitalist class process has long been dominant.27 To substantiate 
their view, these authors draw from Marx’s rich analysis of primitive accumulation in 
Capital Vol. I. In particular they draw attention to the many different processes Marx 
referred to as moments of primitive accumulation and conclude that ‘[a]ll the features of 
primitive accumulation that Marx mentions have remained powerfully present within 
capitalism’s historical geography up to now’ (Harvey,2003: 145).  
According to these authors, privatization—which has been vigorously unleashed in 
developed as well as developing countries in the last three decades of “neoliberal” 
capitalism—is considered an outstanding example of primitive accumulation. The 
significant presence of the state in production and distribution of economic goods and 
services, supported by particular political institutions and cultural norms that were 
erected in welfare-states of richer countries, had created social “commons” that are now 
being destroyed by commoditization and privatization under what is referred to as 
“neoliberal capitalism” (De Angelis, 2001; Harvey, 2003, 2006)28. Outside the developed 
world, the integration of former Soviet Bloc countries and China to global capitalist 
relations constitutes an act of “primitive accumulation” in the classical sense in so far as 
huge assets are transferred from the state sector to the (global) private capitalist sector 
(Harvey, 2003). Basu (2007) draws a direct parallel between English enclosures of the 
                                                 
27
 “The disadvantage of these assumptions [in the traditional understanding of primitive accumulation] is 
that they relegate accumulation based on predation, fraud, and violence to an ‘original stage’ that is 
considered no longer relevant or, as with Luxemburg, as being somehow ‘outside of’ capitalism as a closed 
system.” (Harvey, 2003: 144) 
28
 “The rolling back of regulatory frameworks designed to protect labour and the environment from 
degradation has entailed the loss of rights. The reversion of common property rights won through years of 
hard class struggle (the right to a state pension, to welfare, to national health care) into the private domain 
has been one of the most egregious of all policies of dispossession pursued in the name of neoliberal 
orthodoxy. All of these processes amount to the transfer of assets from the public and popular realms to the 
private and class-privileged domains”. (Harvey ,2006: 153)  
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17th and 18th century and forcible acquisition of farmland by the Indian government for 
setting up of Special Economic Zones in the last decade29. However, Harvey (2003, 
2006) argues that novel forms of privatization emerged and consolidated under 
neoliberalism.  
The corporatization, commodification and privatization of hitherto public assets has been 
a signal feature of the neoliberal project. Its primary aim has been to open up new fields 
for capital accumulation in domains hitherto regarded off-limits to the calculus of 
profitability. Public utilities of all kinds (water, telecommunications, transportation), 
social welfare provision (social housing, education, health care, pensions), public 
institutions (such as universities, research laboratories, prisons) and even warfare (as 
illustrated by the ‘army’ of private contractors operating alongside the armed forces in 
Iraq) have all been privatized to some degree throughout the capitalist world (Harvey, 
2006: 153) 
 
Similarly, Andreasson (2006) points to an expanding sphere of dispossession based on an 
extension of private property regimes not only by traditional means, but also, and 
increasingly so, by more sophisticated and novel means like “intellectual property 
rights”30.  
Harvey’s influential and provocative account of “accumulation by dispossession” —a 
term he prefers to “primitive accumulation”— remains at the center of the contemporary 
debate. In Harvey’s understanding, the operations of “accumulation by dispossession” 
exceed the sphere of privatization. For example, the operations of financial markets—
characterized by speculation, fraud and predation—facilitate large-scale redistribution of 
wealth in favor of global corporate capital.  
                                                 
29
 These SEZs are literally described as “foreign territory” outside the purview of the laws of the country. 
Business enterprises in SEZs are exempt from tax and other financial payments to the state in the same way 
that owners of enclosed land in England were spared all their obligations to the state. Further, labor laws 
are relaxed in these SEZs to allow increased exploitation of labor—enhancing coercive power of the 
capitalists vis-à-vis workers and constituting new versions of “bloody legislations” against labor. 
According to Foreign Trade Policy (2004-09) of India,, ‘SEZ is a specifically delineated duty free enclave 
and shall be deemed to be foreign territory for the purposes of trade operations, duties and tariffs’ 
(Government of India, 2004: §7.1).   
30
 Also see Harvey (2006), Basu (2008). Boyle (2002) refers to "the enclosure of the intangible commons of 
the mind" as the “new kind of enclosure movement”.   
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Stock promotions, ponzi schemes, structured asset destruction through inflation, asset 
stripping through mergers and acquisitions, the promotion of levels of debt incumbency 
that reduced whole populations, even in the advanced capitalist countries, to debt 
peonage, to say nothing of corporate fraud, dispossession of assets (the raiding of pension 
funds and their decimation by stock and corporate collapses) by credit and stock 
manipulations – all of these became central features of the capitalist financial system 
(Harvey, 2006: 154) 
 
Further, the “neoliberal” state itself engages in redistributive policies— from lower 
income to upper income social classes as also from public to private domains—through 
privatization but also through tax incentives and subsidies to business coupled with a 
reduction in social expenditure. Internationally, carefully manipulated debt traps (Latin 
American countries in the 1980s and 1990s) and financial crises (Asian crisis in 1997-
1998) have resulted in transfer of wealth from poorer to richer countries. Crises lead to 
devaluation of assets, which are subsequently seized by corporate capital. Nation-states 
and international organizations like World Bank, IMF etc. work in tandem to enable 
“accumulation of dispossession” through careful management of crises. 
These authors, who argue that primitive accumulation is an ongoing process integrated to 
the processes of accumulation of capitalism, have taken up a variety of theoretical 
positions. Marx’s notion of primitive accumulation combined both the aspects of 
redistribution (enrichment) and dispossession (separation). However, for Marx, in the 
context of classical transition, the emphasis was on enrichment as a means of separation. 
Contemporary positions can be distinguished on the basis of relative emphasis placed on 
either of these two aspects of primitive accumulation. De Angelis (2001), for example, 
argues that “separation” of the direct producers from the means of production is a central 
category of Marx’s theory and pervades the entire space of capital. According to De 
Angelis, both capitalist accumulation and primitive accumulation can be understood in 
terms of the category of separation. Primitive accumulation is the ex novo production of 
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the separation while capitalist accumulation is the reproduction of separation on a greater 
scale. The crucial point De Angelis emphasizes is that capitalist accumulation is, in the 
final analysis, a reproduction of capital-labor relation itself—on an expanded scale. For 
capitalist accumulation, it’s crucial not only to maintain initial “separation”, but also raise 
it to a higher degree. De Angelis goes on to say that “the difference between 
accumulation and primitive accumulation, not being a substantive one, is a difference in 
the conditions and forms in which this separation is implemented” (De Angelis, 2001: 5).  
Harvey’s concept of “accumulation by dispossession” focuses more on the “enrichment” 
aspect than on the “separation” aspect—prompting Brenner (2006) to argue that Harvey’s 
position is closer to Smith’s (“enrichment” or previous accumulation of stock) than 
Marx’s (“separation” or creation of “free” labor power). In fact, Harvey seems to focus 
more on separation as a means of enrichment, contrary to Marx.  
If the main achievements of neoliberalism have been redistributive rather than generative, 
then ways had to be found to transfer assets and redistribute wealth and income either 
from the mass of the population towards the upper classes or from vulnerable to richer 
countries. (Harvey, 2006: 153)  
 
A position somewhat similar to Harvey’s but with a rather distinctive theoretical 
articulation is found in Basu (2007, 2008). Basu argues that through primitive 
accumulation, global capital acquires exclusive control over markets, resources of 
production etc. By virtue of these exclusive property rights, global capital occupies the 
position of a landlord (or any monopolist owner of conditions of production) who earns 
“ground rent” by providing access to such monopolized item. Dispossession does not 
necessarily imply an expansion of capitalist class structure. Capital might well leave 
production outside itself while securing ground rent from such a non-capitalist production 
space by providing access to monopolized means of production used in it. 
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Sanyal (2007) articulates a third position in the context of postcolonial capitalist 
development. He argues that capitalist accumulation includes the moment of primitive 
accumulation. But primitive accumulation may not lead to an exploitative relation—
capitalist class exploitation based on appropriation of surplus value from wage-laborers— 
but to the emergence of a “surplus” labor force dispossessed yet excluded from the 
capitalist class relations. Political conditions for continued capitalist accumulation then 
require that the “surplus” population be addressed in terms of welfarist governance— 
which takes the form of specific interventions to ensure livelihoods for the excluded labor 
force and requires a flow of surplus from the domain of capital to its outside to re-unite 
excluded labor with means of production in subsistence economic activities. Thus 
conditions of existence of capitalist accumulation are secured through two simultaneous 
and contradictory processes—primitive accumulation, which enables a flow of means of 
production from the non-capitalist space to the capitalist space, and welfarist governance 
that necessitates a flow of surplus31 in the reverse direction. In Sanyal, both the aspects of 
enrichment and separation are important because together they account for a basic 
inescapable dualism in the postcolonial economy—the dualism between the capitalist and 
the non-capitalist sub-economies. However, both enrichment and separation are 
contradictory moments in Sanyal. Redistribution of means of production in favor of 
capitalists—the substance of primitive accumulation— is contradicted by the transfer of 
surplus value from the capitalist to the non-capitalist economy enabling the latter to gain 
                                                 
31
 From a class-analytic point of view, strictly speaking, there cannot be a flow of surplus from one class-
structure to another. What Sanyal means is that surplus value appropriated by the capitalists may be taxed 
by the state to provide some of the conditions of existence of non-capitalist class processes and the non-
capitalist appropriators of surplus then receive such benefits from the state as non-class revenues. 
Alternatively, the capitalists may themselves use a part of the surplus value appropriated within the 
capitalist fundamental class process to provide certain conditions of existence of non-capitalist enterprises 
without involving the state.  
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some access to means of production. The dispossession of non-capitalist producers—the 
effect of primitive accumulation—is contradicted by the subsequent re-unification of 
dispossessed producers with means of production, within the non-capitalist economy, 
under welfarist governance.  
The dominant32 tendency in the contemporary literature on primitive accumulation is to 
emphasize the predatory as opposed to the (class) exploitative face of capital. Predatory 
capital seizes the resources that act as means and conditions of non-capitalist production, 
whereas (class) exploitative capital seizes the dispossessed non-capitalist producers and 
transform them into wage-laborers in order to pump surplus value out of them. According 
to the classical Marxian position, primitive accumulation creates the institution of wage-
labor market, which is a condition of existence of the capitalist fundamental class 
process. The contemporary literature points to a new problematic—how primitive 
accumulation can be understood independent of its labor-market effects.  
 
The Limits of Capital 
Let us now turn to the second critique of the traditional notion of primitive accumulation 
thrown up in the contemporary debate. What emerges in the contemporary debate is 
recognition of the “limits of capital”—the constraints on the self-reproduction of capital. 
Central to the contemporary debate on primitive accumulation is the notion of the 
“outside”33. The “outside” is the non-capitalist social space (economy, politics and 
culture) in a capitalist social formation. There are at least three different notions of the 
“outside” in the contemporary literature. First, there is the given “outside” of capital—for 
                                                 
32
 Exceptions are De Angelis (2001), Kawashima (2005), Chandra and Basu (2007) etc. 
33
 Harvey (2003), De Angelis (2006), Sanyal (2007) 
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example, non-capitalist production spaces based on surviving traditional community 
rights over means of production and subsistence, the peasants’ continued attachment to 
land etc. Second, there is the “outside” that is a product of resistance to capital. This 
notion of a resistant “outside” includes state welfare institutions created under public 
pressure to provide direct use-values to the citizens, “commons” created by radical 
communities, squatter settlements or slums in urban metropolises that are also production 
hubs of mainly self-employed producers, legal barriers to exploitation achieved through 
militant workers’ movements etc34.  
The third notion of “outside” is more complicated—since it requires us to recognize that 
capital may actively produce this outside as a result of its own development. Capital may 
not be able to secure its conditions of existence internally. Capital may require a 
facilitative “outside” to stabilize itself, particularly in moments of crisis of reproduction. 
In this sense, capital may even manufacture it, “create” the “outside” at one point only to 
destroy it at another point when capital hits its own limits. As Brenner observes, “ what 
makes the primitive accumulation and accumulation by dispossession such essential 
concepts is precisely the implied recognition that capital is powerfully limited in the 
degree to which it can create the conditions for its own expansion”(Brenner,2006: 99-
100, Italics mine). This “outside” itself provides conditions for capitalist accumulation. 
According to Harvey (2003),  
                                                 
34
 “The entitlements and rights guaranteed by the post-war welfare state for example, can be understood as 
the institutionalisation in particular forms of social commons. Together with high growth policies, the 
implementation of full employment policies and the institutionalisation of productivity deals, the welfare 
state was set to accommodate people's expectations after two world wars, the Soviet revolution, and a 
growing international union movement. Therefore, the global current neoliberal project, which in various 
ways targets the social commons created in the post war period set itself as a modern form of enclosure, 
dubbed by some as “new enclosures” (DeAngelis, 2001:19).  
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capitalism necessarily and always creates its own ‘other’. The idea that some sort of 
‘outside’ is necessary therefore has relevance. But capitalism can either make use of 
some pre-existing outside…….or it can actively manufacture it…….capitalism always 
requires a fund of assets outside of itself if it is to confront and circumvent pressures of 
overaccumulation. If those assets, such as empty land or new raw material sources, do not 
lie to hand, then capitalism must somehow produce them  (Harvey (2003: 141,143), 
italics mine) 
 
In Harvey’s analysis, capitalism in advanced countries has been undergoing a crisis of 
profitability since the 1970s. The dominant strategy to overcome the crisis, according to 
Harvey, has been primitive accumulation because “[w]hat accumulation by dispossession 
does it to release a set of assets (including labour power) at very low (and in some cases 
zero) cost. Overaccumulated capital can seize hold of such assets and immediately turn 
them to profitable use” (Harvey, 2003: 149). In contrast, Sanyal argues that Marxist 
theorists have generally located the articulation of capital with its “outside” at the level of 
the economic. Instead, he argues that the “outside” may simply be non-functional for the 
economic reproduction of the capitalist economy.  The logic of the articulation of capital 
and its “outside”, in that case, has to be located at the level of the political and the 
ideological/cultural.  
There is a long lineage of all three notions of “outside” in the Marxist literature.35 Rosa 
Luxemburg’s under-consumptionist theory of the capitalist mode of production famously 
argued for the necessity of a non-capitalist space for the realization of the surplus 
component of the value of a capitalist commodity. Though her theoretical arguments 
have been challenged and contradicted by latter Marxists, her idea that a purely internal 
reproduction of capital is impossible remains influential. Lenin’s theory of imperialism 
provided another role of the “outside” as the absorber of ‘surplus’ capital of the 
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 See Bradby (1975) for a detailed discussion of the various Marxist positions mentioned here.  
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imperialist countries— where ‘surplus’ capital refers to a situation where it is relatively 
unprofitable to invest within the capitalist economy due to a falling rate of profit, thus 
necessitating an outward flow of capital to non-capitalist colonies36. Some writers like 
Meillassoux (1972) and Wolpe(1972) argued that a non-capitalist “outside” is required to 
cheapen the value of labor power in so far as a part of the reproduction costs of labor 
power is borne by the “outside”.  
Irrespective of whether the “outside” is resistant, facilitative or both at the same time, the 
resilience of the “outside” gives primitive accumulation its enduring character. Primitive 
accumulation is unleashed either i) to overcome the resistance the “outside” poses to the 
reproduction of capital or ii) to secure the conditions of reproduction and expansion of 
capitalist class processes by appropriating the space of the “outside”, whenever it is 
impossible to do so internally. It is in this sense that primitive accumulation is crucial not 
only for the emergence of the capitalist mode of production, but also in securing the 
conditions of its reproduction. The recognition of a resilient “outside” forces the Marxian 
theorist to accept the inescapable and indissoluble heterogeneity of the economy. At the 
same time, the notion of universal capital that underpinned classical Marxian ontology of 
capital makes way for a notion of capital that must negotiate with its “outside” in order to 
secure its conditions of reproduction. The theoretical challenge before the Marxian 
tradition is, therefore, to produce an understanding of primitive accumulation that 
accounts for the reproduction of both capital and its “outside”.    
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 Harvey’s use of the notion of “outside” takes as a point of departure the Luxemburg thesis, though he 
locates the problematic of the “outside” in the context of over-accumulation of capital rather than the 
under-consumption problem. In this sense Harvey’s argument is closer to Lenin’s. 
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The contemporary literature has helped clear a new theoretical field for situating the 
problem of primitive accumulation, even if the delineation of the field remains 
ambiguous. I have so far placed and pitted contemporary positions against the classical 
Marxian view, showing how the boundaries of the essentialist Marxian problematic are 
stretched and strained by contemporary interventions and how the cracks in the walls 
allow us a peek into what lies beyond. In this section I offer a critical reading of the 
debate from a non-essentialist Marxian standpoint. Specifically, I try to identify the 
elements of continuity and discontinuity between the classical and the contemporary 
views on primitive accumulation.  
 
The Essentialist Trappings of the Contemporary Debate 
The contemporary debate brings together quite a number of disparate theoretical 
positions on primitive accumulation. Given the limits of the present dissertation, it is not 
possible to bring out the nuances of all the different theoretical positions. What is of 
interest to us, however, is to understand to what extent contemporary interventions break 
away from the essentialism of the classical view of primitive accumulation. Some of the 
positions, Harvey’s and Sanyal’s in particular, problematize the process of reproduction 
of capitalism. In my understanding, their main contribution is the foregrounding of the 
notion of an inescapable “other” or “outside” of capital, which allows them to theorize 
primitive accumulation as a process constitutive of capitalist production. Does this 
theoretical move—the recognition of an inescapable “outside” of capital—constitute an 
exit from the essentialist ontology of capitalism? Before I answer this question, I must 
make clear what I mean by an essentialist ontology of capitalism.  
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As I have already argued, the essentialist framework of historical materialism consists of 
a chain of reductionist arguments. All non-economic aspects of the society are reduced to 
the economic, the economy itself is reduced to the class structure and the class structure 
is reduced to the forces of production—which, in the last instance, is the essence of all 
processes. Particular manifestations of reductionist arguments abound in the essentialist 
Marxian literature. In Chapter I, I have already uncovered strains of essentialist thinking 
in Marx’s own writings. Here I try to understand how the “outside” is accommodated 
within the essentialist problematic.   
Historical materialism breeds an image of universal capital. Since the capitalist mode of 
production enables and pre-capitalist modes of production constrain further development 
of forces of production, the former is pre-destined to dissolve the latter on the basis of its 
economic superiority. Historical materialism thus predicts a teleological dissolution of 
the pre-capitalist “outside”.37 Marxian theories, when they do recognize the heterogeneity 
of the economy, often tend to view such heterogeneity as functional to the reproduction 
of the prevalent (capitalist) class structure. In these capitalocentric38 theories non-
capitalist class relations may be reproduced alongside capitalist class relations within a 
social formation, where the reproduction of the non-capitalist “outside” is explained by 
the particular roles it plays in the reproduction of capitalist mode of production. For 
example, it is argued that the non-capitalist “outside” exists because it cheapens the value 
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 It is often assumed that such dissolution has been completed in developed countries. Thus developed 
countries (Japan, West European countries, North American countries etc.) are predominantly represented 
as fully capitalist. Societies in developing countries, on the other hand, are yet to achieve full and universal 
capitalism even where capitalist mode of production is dominant. It is quite possible that non-capitalist 
modes of production may survive or even emerge in these social formations. However the existence of non-
capitalist production is explained by lower rates of accumulation of productive capitalist accumulation in 
these societies (Baran (1957). In course of time, if capitalist accumulation picks up and continues long 
enough, the developing societies will also achieve universal capitalism. Thus, the development of the 
economy is reduced to the development of the forces of production. 
38
 See Gibson-Graham and Ruccio (2001) for a critique of “capitalocentrism”.  
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of labor power, reinforces the “reserve army of labor”, acts as vent for over-accumulated 
capital etc39. In this view, the capitalist mode of production is not constituted by its 
“outside”—it unfolds according to principles of change internal to it, i.e. the development 
of the capitalist mode is purely endogenous. However, the capitalist mode of production 
constitutes the “outside”; i.e., the “outside” develops in response to ‘capital’s needs’.40 
The capitalist class structure then serves as the essence of a social formation and other 
class structures in the social formation are “explained” as its effects. Capital serves as the 
cause of itself and its “outside”, in other words, the social formation itself. These theories 
often also admit the theoretical possibility—even the inevitability, in the long run—of a 
“full” capitalism41. Any deviations from “full capitalism” are then explained as effects of 
the capitalist mode of production itself. What is important for us to note is that the 
economy, in this case, is reduced to the prevalent capitalist class structure. 
I have argued before that the essentialist logic of historical materialism endows the 
capitalist mode of production with its self-subsistent character. Self-subsistent capital is 
explained by the essence of history—the developing forces of production. If developing 
forces of production render pre-capitalist modes of production obsolete and their 
dissolution inevitable, then capitalist mode of production has to be self-subsistent in order 
to supersede pre-capital. Thus, full transition logically requires that capital be self-
subsistent. This logocentric notion of capital—an image of capital untainted by its 
                                                 
39
 The “outside”, according to this theoretical position, exists because capital “needs” it, either to secure 
markets for final products or sources of means of production (Luxemburg, 2003), or new fields of 
profitable investment (Lenin, 1916; Harvey, 2003), or a reserve army of labor (Kawashima, 2005; Chandra 
and Basu, 2007), or sources of cheap labor power (Wolpe, 1972; Meillasoux, 1972). 
40
 See Sanyal(2007) for a critique of ‘capital’s need’-based arguments.  
41
  See the discussion of Pierre-Philippe Rey in Bradby (1975). 
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outside, the idea of capital as a pure and full category—holds that capital can secure its 
conditions of existence by itself, independent of its “outside”.  
The argument that capital needs an “outside” for its reproduction does not undermine the 
notion of self-subsistent capital. It is important to recognize that the notion of self-
subsistent capital is compatible with the notion of a resilient “outside” as long as the 
“outside” is structurally subsumed to the needs of capital. Self-subsistent capital can 
secure its conditions of existence in a world of difference. For example, capitalocentric 
Marxian theories hold that non-capitalist modes of production are created, maintained or 
dissolved by the capitalist mode of production in accordance with its specific needs. Such 
an “outside” is a derived “other” of the capitalist mode of production and hence belongs 
fully to the latter. A classic example of such an “outside” is the reserve army of labor, 
which is outside the capitalist class structure and yet fully subjugated to the rhythms of 
the latter. As I have argued in Chapter I, the “reserve army of labor” is considered by 
Marx to be the product of self-subsistent capital.42 In fact, it is the “reserve army of 
labor” that makes capital self-subsistent with respect to its requirements of labor-power, 
since capital does not have to depend on natural increase in labor force or non-capitalist 
economies for its requirements of labor power. Capitalocentric theories retain the notion 
of self-subsistent capital. Going further, I argue that the notion of self-subsistent capital 
serves as the basis of capitalocentric explanations of the social totality.   
A stronger version of self-subsistence holds that the capitalist mode of production, once it 
has taken hold, can reproduce itself entirely at the economic level, independent of extra-
economic (political or cultural) interventions. Reproduction and expansion of the 
                                                 
42
 Sanyal (2007) argues this point extensively.  
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capitalist mode of production are fully secured in and through economic processes like 
production and distribution of surplus value, exchange processes, investments in new 
technology, accumulation and competition, etc. Neither force nor coercion, particularly 
that exercised by the state, are required for expanded reproduction of self-subsistent 
capital. It is otherwise during the arising of capital, when violence and coercion was 
instrumental in securing the ascendance and prevalence of capital. Thus, it is fairly 
common among Marxists to distinguish primitive accumulation (which applies to the 
arising of capital) as an extra-economic process and capitalist accumulation (which 
applies to self-subsistent capital that has already arisen) as an economic process.  
I now take up three different authors who, in their contemporary works on primitive 
accumulation, have offered the notion of an inescapable “outside” of capital. An 
inescapable “outside” resists any final dissolution and is thus a constitutive site of 
capitalism. This notion of the “outside” stands in contrast to the historicist notion—pre-
capitalist modes of production—prevalent in the Marxian tradition. Secondly, the 
inescapability of the “outside” also signals the impossibility of universal capital. I now 
pose the following question—how far does this theoretical move go in inscribing radical 
differences on the economic?       
Harvey’s notion of the “outside”—as I have already pointed out—belongs to the strand of 
Marxian thought that stresses the inherent obstacles to a purely internal reproduction of 
capital43. For Harvey, the impossibility of internal reproduction of capital stems from 
what he considers the fundamental problem of capitalism—the tendency towards 
overaccumulation of capital (Harvey (2003). For valorization of overaccumulated capital, 
                                                 
43
 See Luxemburg (2003) and Lenin (1916). 
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new areas of profitable investment have to be secured. This is where “accumulation by 
dispossession” comes in. Accumulation by dispossession enables overaccumulated 
capital to secure “cheap” assets from the “outside” and use them as productive or 
unproductive capital to generate profits. But since surplus capital can be profitably 
employed only by producing/appropriating greater surplus, the problem of 
overaccumulation keeps coming back. This is because, “if surplus capital moves from A 
to B in a desperate search for profitable outlets, then at some point B will become a 
producer of surplus capital”(Harvey, 2006:162). Therefore, capitalism continuously 
needs to create its “outside” in order to overcome the problem of overaccumulation. 
There are two instances of reductionist arguments here. First, the contradictory process of 
reproduction of the capitalist class process is reduced to a single aspect of the 
contradiction—namely, overaccumulation. Second, Harvey contests the idea of universal 
capital, but presents a capitalocentric notion of the “outside” and hence retains the notion 
of self-subsistent capital, in the sense I have discussed before. Capital creates its 
“outside” in order to dissolve it in moments of overaccumulation. Thus the “outside” is 
subsumed to the laws of capitalist mode of production. Therefore, the far-reaching 
theoretical implications of positing an “outside”, which is constitutive of the capitalist 
class process, are lost on Harvey as soon as he subscribes to a capitalocentric concept of 
the “outside”. The centered social totality in Harvey’s analysis—centered on the notion 
of self-subsistent capital—ultimately reinforces the hegemonic representation of 
capitalism as a social system fully subsumed to the imperatives of capital; what gets 
suppressed is that other notion of capitalism as a social formation fractured by the 
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contradictions between a capitalist economy and its radical outsides44. Hence, in 
Harvey’s analysis, anti-capitalist resistance becomes an external intervention, bereft of 
any materiality in the body economic.       
Sanyal (2007) dislodges the notion of primitive accumulation from the transition 
framework, confronting, in the process, the underlying Hegelian categories of being and 
becoming. Sanyal argues that in the Hegelian reading of Marx, capital in being is self-
subsistent capital. However, Sanyal criticizes the Marxian tradition for embracing an 
economistic notion of self-subsistence—i.e. the notion that capital becomes self-
subsistent when it can secure its economic conditions of existence internally. Sanyal 
argues that political and cultural conditions of existence45 are left outside the definition of 
self-subsistence—the implicit assumption being that “when capital’s economic conditions 
of existence are created and can be reproduced, the political and ideological conditions of 
existence are automatically ensured” (Sanyal, 2007:59). According to Sanyal, it is quite 
possible that capital is self-subsistent at the economic level and yet fails to be so at the 
political and cultural levels. Postcolonial capital in India can secure its political-cultural 
conditions of existence only by positing a non-capitalist “outside” and thus “ceases to be 
self-subsistent even though it is capable of creating and reproducing its economic 
conditions of existence on its own” (Sanyal, 2007:59) 46. However, as soon as the 
“outside” is constituted, as soon as means of production get ‘locked’ in non-capitalist 
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 See Gibson-Graham, J.K. and David Ruccio (2001) for the politics of decentering capitalism. 
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 Sanyal poses the question in the context of postcolonial India, where he argues that the political and 
cultural conditions of existence of capital have to be secured within a functioning formal democracy and 
within a cultural space dominated by discourses of “human rights” and “basic needs”.     
46
 In Sanyal’s understanding, the non-capitalist “outside” emerges in order to meet political-cultural 
exigencies of primitive accumulation. To distance his position from capital’s needs-based arguments, 
Sanyal makes a careful distinction between those non-capitalist production units tied to the circuit of capital 
through subcontracting and putting-out relations (“informalization within the accumulation economy”) and 
those that are constituted by “developmental governmentality”. He considers the latter to be the “outside” 
of capital.  
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production, the economic conditions of existence of capitalist production are constrained. 
This necessitates fresh bouts of primitive accumulation and the whole process is repeated. 
The lack of self-subsistence at the political-cultural level gives rise to its lack at the 
economic level, necessitating primitive accumulation, which in turn destabilizes the 
political-cultural conditions of existence and so on. Primitive accumulation reflects the 
endless becoming of capital. Thus, in Sanyal’s analysis, the process of becoming of 
capital forecloses the possibility of its self-subsistent being—“the postcolonial capital 
never becomes in the Hegelian sense” (Sanyal, 2007: 61). He urges Marxists to go 
beyond the Hegelian categories of being and becoming and understand that capital’s 
“arising is never complete, its universality never fully established, its being is forever 
postponed” (Sanyal, 2007: 61). 
In Sanyal’s understanding, the non-capitalist “outside” of capital is a product of welfarist 
governmentality, deeply anchored in the problematic of the political and cultural 
reproduction of capital’s dominance. 47 Sanyal, like Harvey, retains a capitalocentric 
notion of the “outside”. Harvey subsumes the “outside” to economic reproduction of 
capital, while Sanyal subsumes it to its political-cultural reproduction. Contrast this with 
an alternative non-essentialist reading, in which the very process of becoming of capital 
is also the process of becoming something other than capital; the latter overflows and 
exceeds the reach of governmentality. What gets suppressed, in Sanyal’s reading, is the 
possibility that the reproduction of capital may engender non-capital as a pure externality, 
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 This has led Basu (2008) to argue, with some justification, that Sanyal’s characterization denies the 
“outside” its anti-capitalist political face. To be fair to Sanyal, his objective is to problematize the social 
reproduction of capital in a decentered economic space—to show how capital negotiates differences in a 
way that neutralizes or appropriates such anti-capitalist resistance through governmentality. 
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it being impossible for capital to contain within itself or internalize fully, economically or 
politically, the contradictory effects of its own development. It is unfortunate that, in 
Sanyal’s otherwise highly complex, innovative and illuminating analysis, non-capital is 
reduced to the political conditions of existence of capital and hence to a capitalocentric 
“outside”.  
Though I have so far presented Sanyal’s arguments in terms of the Marxian categories of 
capital and non-capital, he himself uses a pair of distinct but related categories—the 
“accumulation-economy” and the “need-economy” respectively. The “accumulation-
economy” is roughly equal to the “formal” capitalist sector in developing countries 
consisting of relatively larger capitalist enterprises. It is governed by the logic of 
accumulation and engages in primitive accumulation to secure its conditions of 
accumulation. The “need-economy” refers to that part of the “informal” or “unorganized” 
economy—de-linked from the “accumulation-economy”—  which “holds” the victims of 
primitive accumulation in different fundamental class processes (non-accumulating 
ancient and tiny capitalist enterprises) and is mainly driven by the economic motive of 
self-sustenance. The “need-economy” is a product of exclusionary expansion as well as 
governmentalized intervention of the “accumulation-economy”.    
Behind any capitalocentrism lurks the centered notion of capital. In Sanyal, accumulating 
capital is reduced to productive capital; other unproductive forms of capital and their 
effectivity on class processes—particularly noncapitalist class processes—are ignored. 
This centered notion of capital then acts as the centering notion of the entire economy. In 
a chain of causal relations, accumulation of productive capital necessitates primitive 
accumulation; primitive accumulation requires welfarist governance to address the social 
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problem of exclusion; governmentalized interventions create an “outside” of capital. The 
entire economy gets structured by the accumulation of productive capital.  
In my understanding, accumulation of capital cannot be reduced to accumulation of 
productive capital and hence primitive accumulation is not the only form of expansion of 
the “accumulation-economy”. In a capitalist social formation, merchant-capitalists and 
money-capitalists may be subsumed to both capitalist as well as fundamental class 
processes. Unproductive capitalists may provide conditions of existence of non-capitalist 
fundamental class processes, irrespective of the economic, political and cultural 
requirements of productive capitalist class process. Accumulation of unproductive capital 
may take place on the basis of non-capitalist production. Thus the “accumulation-
economy” may both support and destroy the non-capitalist economy at the economic 
level. While Sanyal’s contribution is important because he departs from the economism 
of Marxian theories, his analysis suffers from an insufficient theorization of the economy 
due to his deployment of a centered notion of capital.    
De Angelis’s notion of the “outside”, contra Sanyal and Harvey, is a non-capitalist space 
constituted by radical social practices and political struggles48. De Angelis avoids the 
capitalocentrism of both Harvey and Sanyal in so far as his “outside” is not subsumed to 
the economic, political or cultural conditions of existence of capital; rather, De Angelis’s 
“outside” is brought into life by “value practices” in opposition to and distinct from that 
which sustains the capitalist economy and as a social alternative to it. Like Sanyal, De 
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 “When we reflect on the myriad of communities struggles taking place around the world for water, 
electricity, land, access to social wealth, life and dignity, one cannot but feel that the relational and 
productive practices giving life and shape to these struggles give rise to values and modes of doing and 
relating in social co-production (shortly, value practices). Not only, but these value practices appear to be 
outside correspondent value practices and modes of doing and relating that belong to capital” (De Angelis, 
(2006: 1).  
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Angelis (2006) argues that primitive accumulation may produce a mass of dispossessed 
producers who are excluded from the capitalist class relations—De Angelis calls it the 
detritus, a term he picks up from Chari (2005). 
The outside thus turns from the object of expropriation into, to use Chari’s term, the 
detritus, which I understand to be a space in which the problematic of social reproduction 
is uniquely in the hands of the dispossessed, and dramatically depends on the 
effectiveness, organisational reach and communal constitution of their struggles and 
ability to reclaim and constitute commons (De Angelis, 2006: 6-7).  
 
This detritus is also the site of the flowering of Deleuzian desires, and some of these 
desires “do not reproduce the reality of the circuits of capital” (De Angelis, 2006: 13). 
Instead, they produce the reality of “social commons” and communities as subjects. De 
Angelis essentializes politics in theorizing his “outside”49. 
The “outside” created by struggles is an outside that emerges from within, a social space 
created by virtue of creating relational patterns that are other than and incompatible with 
the relational practices of capital. This is our outside that is the realm of value practices 
outside those of capital and, indeed, clashing with it. The value practice of Indian women 
defending an African’s family (and thus contributing to the creation of a common and the 
reformulation of identities) versus the value practices of a debt collector evicting another 
African family in the name of “respect of property, rule of law and contract.” Our outside 
is a process of becoming other than capital, and thus presents itself as a barrier that the 
boundless process of accumulation and, in the first instance, processes of enclosures, 
must seek to overcome. (De Angelis, 2006: 3-4) 
 
Implicitly, De Angelis also seems to accept an essentialized notion of capital, dominated 
by the drive to maintain the “separation of the direct producers from the means of 
production”—of which capitalist accumulation and primitive accumulation are only two 
forms—and hence always destructive of any “outside” which supports association of 
direct producers with means of production. Thus, De Angelis, like Sanyal, reduces capital 
to its productive form. His “outside” is a pristine outside of capital—forged in radical 
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 “Thus, struggles against intellectual property rights opens up the questions of knowledge as commons. 
Struggles against privatization of water, education and health, opens the question of water, education and 
health as commons. Struggles against landlessness open up the question of common land. Struggles against 
environmental destruction open up the question of environmental commons. In a word, struggle against 
actual or threatened enclosures opens the question of commons. . . .” (De Angelis, 2003: 7-8) 
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opposition to it and resisting any determination by it. De Angelis pits two autonomous 
and independent social spaces against each other, without any mutual determination or 
constitutivity50. In effect, he pits two essences against each other—the essence of capital, 
i.e. separation of direct producers with means of production, versus the essence of the 
“outside”, i.e. the communitarian ethics and politics constitutive of the “commons”.     
 
A Class-Critique of the Contemporary Debate 
In preceding sections, I argued that, despite the essentialist and historicist strains in his 
writing, Marx maintained a class-based understanding of primitive accumulation. 
Contemporary Marxist interventions, on the other hand, have generally avoided Marx’s 
historicism, but have often failed to retain the class perspective in their analyses. Marx 
applied the notion of primitive accumulation to an extraordinarily wide range of 
processes and, at the same time, focused the notion on the process of “separation”. I 
argue that this apparent contradiction can be resolved if we understand the expanse of the 
notion to be indicative of the complex overdetermination of the process of emergence of 
capitalism and its focused-ness to reflect the partisan class-standpoint of Marx. In 
rethinking primitive accumulation as an ongoing process, the contemporary literature has 
often seized on the expanse rather than the focused-ness of Marx’s notion. The 
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 Commons and communities do not necessarily designate a space that is free of class-exploitation, 
capitalist or non-capitalist, in the Marxian sense of the term. Communist class relations, on the other hand, 
may thrive on commons and communities, but do not necessarily follow from the latter. Similarly, non-
separation of direct producers from means of production may be a condition for communist class process, 
but is not a necessary condition. On the other hand, unity of direct producers with means of production may 
be a condition of existence of exploitative class relations. It should be clearer from the next chapter how my 
understanding of primitive accumulation and “outside” differs from De Angelis’s.  .  
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consequent broadening51 of the notion of primitive accumulation has the unfortunate 
consequence of foreclosing its class-based understanding.      
This is most clearly seen in the way primitive accumulation or accumulation by 
dispossession is so often identified with the great drive towards privatization that 
accompanies the current (neoliberal) regime of capitalism. From the class point of view, 
this leads to unfortunate results when, for example, privatization of public sector 
enterprises and destruction of independent (ancient) farmers are both clubbed together as 
accumulation by dispossession in Harvey’s influential analysis (Harvey, 2003). From a 
Marxian class standpoint, privatization of state capitalist firms in many countries is a 
transfer of property rights, not a change in the class process, which remains capitalist 
through the change of property regime. This has been noted by several authors. 
Ownership doesn’t indicate the nature of class process in enterprises and similarly all 
forms of dispossession do not constitute primitive accumulation. 
Another instance of the same phenomenon of restructuring is provided by the 
privatisation of what used in Britain to be called the nationalised industries. British Steel 
and Telecom and Rail and the National Coal Board were organized as large capitalist 
enterprises, with managerial hierarchies, multi-branch structures, and workforces largely 
composed of subordinate wage-labourers, despite being publicly owned. Their financial 
autonomy from the Treasury varied; some competed in national and global markets (for 
example, the first and last corporations listed), others enjoyed national monopolies (that, 
in the case of telecommunications and rail in Britain, have still only partially been 
dismantled). Whatever has changed with such corporations’ privatisation, it is not that 
they have moved from being ‘outside’ capital to becoming part of it. They have moved 
from being state to private capitals. As such, this is a sideways move, from one form of 
capitalism to another, as with the collapse of the former USSR. (Ashman and Callinicos, 
2006: 122-123) 
 
In a similar way, dispossession occurs within the capitalist economy as a consequence of 
capitalist accumulation. For example, in the process of monopolization, capital gobbles 
up smaller firms or drives other firms out of business. However, that is within the space 
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 Ashman and Callinicos note “how broadly Harvey casts the net of accumulation by dispossession, to the 
detriment of more precise analysis” (Ashman and Calllinicos, 2006:121) 
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of capital and releases means of production and labor power from smaller capitalist units 
to larger capitalist units. This kind of dispossession is distinct from primitive 
accumulation, which destroys non-capitalist class processes, as in the case of destruction 
of independent farmers who are employed in ancient class processes. It is interesting to 
note that Part VIII of Capital Vol I, which contains Marx’s chapters on primitive 
accumulation, also includes a chapter where Marx writes about concentration and 
centralization of capital. He argues that while expropriation of ancients leads to the 
emergence of capitalist enterprises, capitalist accumulation in turn may lead to the 
expropriation of many small capitalists by a few large enterprises—a process which he 
refers to as the centralization of capital. However, this chapter is titled “Historical 
Tendency of Capitalist Accumulation” (Italics mine) and he is clearly distinguishing the 
processes of centralization of capital from primitive accumulation. Thus not all 
redistributive processes are considered as primitive accumulation by Marx. Contrast 
Marx’s position with Harvey’s when the latter argues that “speculation, predation, fraud 
and thievery” (Harvey, 2006: 154) in financial markets—which constitutes a large-scale 
redistributive process—is one of the more prominent acts of primitive accumulation in 
recent times. Yet, as some critics (Brenner (2006), Ashman and Callinicos (2006) etc.) 
pointed out, such redistribution, to a significant degree, takes place between capitalists 
themselves and to refer to it as primitive accumulation would erase the class-specificity 
of the concept. 
I would like to emphasize two aspects of contemporary interventions of Harvey’s kind. 
First, class is often understood in property terms. Thus, privatization of state or public 
sector enterprises—those that are, in our understanding, state capitalist enterprises—is 
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often understood as a movement from the “outside” to the interior of capitalist 
production. This is distinct from the surplus-based concept of class—put forward most 
clearly in Resnick and Wolff (1987)—which I use in this dissertation. Second, primitive 
accumulation is understood more in terms of enrichment than separation.  To the extent 
separation matters to this understanding, it matters as a means to enrichment. This is in 
sharp contrast to Marx’s understanding, which I have argued, focuses on enrichment as a 
means to separation, where separation itself is understood in its class-transformative 
aspect. Theoretical positions leaning on the “enrichment” aspect tend to emphasize the 
redistributive role of primitive accumulation, rather than its class-transformative role. 
One particular form of “enrichment” through primitive accumulation, that has been 
emphasized in the contemporary literature, is based on “enclosures” as a means of 
earning (ground) rent.52 We will engage with Basu (2008) as the representative work. 
Primitive accumulation creates private property rights over resources required for 
production; wherever such privatization creates monopolized access to those resources, it 
generates ground rent. Basu calls this “global capital’s “feudal plunder”(Basu, 2007: 
1283). The feudal character of capital is manifested in its ability to secure a part of the 
surplus produced in the society solely on the basis of exclusive control over “scarce” 
resources for production. Rent is a type of subsumed class payment. Like merchants and 
banks that get a share of the surplus produced within a fundamental class process, 
monopoly owners of certain conditions of production earn ground rent by providing 
                                                 
52
 See Basu (2007, 2008) who uses the Marxian category of ground rent in offering a new understanding of 
primitive accumulation. See Resnick and Wolff (1987:127-128) for a discussion of the Marxian notion of 
ground rent and its general applicability covering monopoly. Also, this form of primitive accumulation is 
most often associated with intellectual property rights; See Boyle (2002), Evans (2005), Andreasson 
(2006), Harvey (2003, 2006).  
 
  59
access to them. When capitalist enterprises earn ground rent by “enclosing”, they act like 
landlords.  
Rent-extracting enterprises may be subsumed to capitalist as well as non-capitalist 
fundamental class processes. Basu (2008) clearly recognizes this. 
[F]or extracting rent using the ownership of these resources it does not matter whether 
these inputs are employed in capitalist enterprises or cooperative enterprises or peasant 
agriculture. 
The point to be underlined is that there is no reason why global capital should invest in 
the project of expanding the borders of capitalist production to include all productive 
activity, when it can well appropriate surplus from other forms of production 
organization (Basu, 2008:82).   
  
Basu talks of peasant agriculture, cooperative enterprises and self-employed as non-
capitalist forms of production from which rent is extracted by “global capital”. This is an 
illustration of separation as a means of enrichment. In fact, separation is not even the 
rationale of primitive accumulation in Basu’s analysis. According to him, it might be in 
capital’s interest—in certain conjunctures—to co-exist with the unity of direct producers 
with means of production in non-capitalist enterprises as long as “capital dominates non-
capitalist enterprise and uses such dominance to extract part or whole of the surplus 
produced by them as rent” (Basu, 2008:83). Thus separation is followed by its reversal, 
i.e. union, but under transformed conditions, such that “free” union gives way to 
“conditional” union, where rent payments are necessary to secure the conditions of 
union.53 The fundamental class process may even stay the same, while its conditions of 
existence are altered, requiring a new kind of subsumed class payment that didn’t exist 
                                                 
53
 Both Basu and Sanyal view capitalism as a complex social formation whose reproduction does not 
involve teleological dissolution of non-capital. Basu’s position is different from Sanyal’s in two respects. 
First, Basu posits the articulation of non-capital with capital at the economic level whereas Sanyal locates it 
at the political-ideological level. Second, Basu emphasizes the extractive role of capital, while Sanyal 
highlights its exclusionary face.   
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before.54 This form of primitive accumulation does not constitute a moment of transition 
from non-capitalist to capitalist fundamental class process; rather, it facilitates the 
transformation of a fundamental (capitalist) class position into a subsumed (landlord) 
class position. In Basu’s definition, primitive accumulation is any process of 
dispossession that enables extraction of ground rent by otherwise capitalist enterprises—
hence, he talks of rent disguised as profit.55 In his analysis, “separation” does not indicate 
a moment of transformation in fundamental class processes, i.e. of class exploitation. 
This is different from Marx’s understanding of primitive accumulation as a process that 
enables capitalist class-exploitation of labor.  
Basu’s intervention is very important since it criticizes the theoretical tradition within 
Marxism for privileging productive capital in its representation of capitalism. He does 
this by highlighting the position of the “landlord” contra the productive capitalist. Yet, 
since the position of the “landlord”, i.e. the extractor of ground rent, is not class-
specified, Basu’s use of the notion of primitive accumulation is also not class-specified, 
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 This is different from Marx’s notion of primitive accumulation where separation is understood in its 
class-transformative aspect. In fact, Resnick and Wolff make this point in the very context of ground rent.   
Marx argues that exclusive private ownership of land effectively denies to proletarians 
the access that would enhance their option to cease being proletarians; second, that 
exclusive ownership also limits capitalists’ access to land…………… 
To gain access, that is, to induce the subsumed class [landlords] to control access in 
particular ways, capitalists distribute a portion of their extracted surplus value to 
landlords in the form of capitalist rent payments” (Resnick and Wolff, 1987:127, Italics 
mine)   
Thus, according to Resnick and Wolff, the function of the landlord—as induced by the subsumed class 
payments by the capitalists—is to constrain the possibilities of non-capitalist union of direct producers and 
means of production, even if that involves constraints on capitalists’ own access to its conditions of 
existence. Here is the contradiction. Rent is a deduction from the surplus value appropriated in capitalist 
enterprises and, in that sense, there is a conflict between the interests of the landlord and productive 
capitalists. At the same time, landlords maintain the separation of direct producers from their means of 
production and thus ensure the existence of dispossessed wage-laborers for the capitalists.   
55
 “But to my mind, any extension of private property rights which furthers future (capitalist rent extraction 
disguised as) profit accumulation through the working of the market, warrants being treated as primitive 
capital accumulation” (Basu, 2008:100). For example, Basu considers the establishment of monopoly 
control over market as a process of primitive accumulation (Basu, 2008:42).  
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in the Marxian sense. The “landlord” may occupy a subsumed class position with respect 
to both capitalist as well as non-capitalist enterprises as well as a non-class position vis-à-
vis individuals. The revenues that accrue to the “landlord” in his non-class position do 
not constitute ground rent since the “landlord” does not provide any conditions of 
existence of production in a fundamental class process. For example, when monopoly-
capitalist enterprises charge a price above the value of wage goods, they extract non-class 
revenue from productive and unproductive workers. Such non-class revenue is, however, 
considered by Basu to be a form of ground rent. According to Basu, the securing of 
exclusive control over markets, land, knowledge etc. is considered as primitive 
accumulation, irrespective of the varied class and non-class implications of such 
monopoly. 56 
Conclusion 
Let me now conclude this section by noting that the contemporary literature goes a long 
way in displacing the notion of primitive accumulation from the classical narrative of 
transition. To the extent it succeeds, contemporary interventions release the notion from 
the grip of the telos that informs historical materialism. By arguing against any 
teleological dissolution of non-capitalist production, contemporary interventions 
problematize the reproduction of capital by acknowledging a resilient “outside” of 
capital. Yet, contemporary positions often retain essentialized notions of the “outside”, 
                                                 
56
 Contrast Basu (2008) with Resnick and Wolff (1987) who also provide a decentered notion of the profits 
of a capitalist firm. According to Resnick and Wolff, the profits of a capitalist commodity-producing firm 
may include not only the surplus value appropriated from its productive laborers net of its subsumed class 
payments (rent, interest etc.) but also subsumed class receipts from other capitalist and non-capitalist firms 
as well as non-class receipts. For example, if a capitalist commodity-producing firm sells monopolized 
means of production commodity to other capitalist or non-capitalist firms, the board of directors of the firm 
enjoying monopoly power receives ground rent as a subsumed class payment. If the same firm sells 
monopolized wage commodities to workers, the board of directors receives a non-class revenue.  
See Resnick and Wolff, 1987: 156-158, 207-216, 326, n. 53.  
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including its capitalocentric versions. The problem of a resilient “outside” of capital lends 
to primitive accumulation its enduring character. Primitive accumulation belongs to the 
relation of capital to its “outside”, but primitive accumulation itself is underspecified with 
respect to class. Thus, the contemporary literature creates possibilities for, even as it itself 
falls short of—for its essentialism and lack of surplus-based-class notion—a Marxian 
intervention—that is non-essentialist and class-focused—in the emerging theoretical 
problematic.  
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CHAPTER 3 
PRIMTIVE ACCUMULTION AND THE (CONTINGENT) DOMINANCE OF 
CAPITAL: A NEW THEORETICAL PROBLEMATIC 
  
 
Introduction: The Two Readings of Marx 
The great transformations in West European societies over the long period from twelfth 
to the nineteenth century involved a series of political, economic and cultural changes. 
Marx’s unique contribution lies in tracing the class-dynamics through those changes. Of 
particular importance was the so-called transition to capitalism—however incomplete or 
localized it was. Marx broached the problem of dispossession in the context of class-
transformations that produced capitalism. In other words, his objective was to identify the 
class-effects of dispossession; in fact, he focused on dispossession only to the extent its 
class-effects can be ascertained. I retain this distinctive focus on class throughout the 
essay.   
However, I argue that Marx’s understanding of primitive accumulation carries marks of 
essentialist thought. According to Althusser, Marx’s chapters on primitive accumulation 
in Capital are exemplary instances of anti-essentialist philosophy that Marx brought to 
the study of political economy—and thus stand outside the formal essentialist 
architecture i.e. outside the “fictitious unity”, of Capital. Yet, I argue that those chapters 
of Capital are split through by the same contradiction between an open-ended historical 
analysis on the one hand and a teleological historiography on the other hand— or in 
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Althusser’s words, between “an historico-aleatory” position and an “essentialistic and 
philosophical57” one—which characterizes the rest of Capital. 58       
 
A Historico-Aleatory Reading of the Colonial Problem in Capital 
In the last chapter, I pointed out the historicism in Marx’s writings on primitive 
accumulation. However, a different, non-essentialist philosophical position can be read 
into Marx’s chapter titled “the modern theory of colonization”, to which we have already 
drawn attention in the last chapter. Marx’s application of the notion of primitive 
accumulation to the problem of capitalist development in the colonies has far-reaching 
theoretical consequences. First, in the colonies, primitive accumulation is dislodged from 
its traditional context of historical transition from feudalism to capitalism. In the colonies, 
capitalism emerges not in a social formation dominated by a non-capitalist class process, 
but in a social “vacuum” created by conquest of land and annihilation of original 
inhabitants. Into such a social “vacuum”, the capitalist class process is literally imported 
from the mother country. But the conditions of the “vacuum” are such that the capitalist 
process falls to pieces as abundant land is easily converted into private plots for “ancient” 
production by wage-workers who easily leave the labor market.59 It is the viability of the 
                                                 
57
 Althusser uses the adjective “philosophical” here to refer to those writings motivated by the 
philosophical quest for the Origin (and the End) within a model of rational abstraction. This is what he 
refers to as “traditional philosophy of the idealist tendency, the ‘philosophy of the philosophers’”. 
(Althusser, 2006:271).    
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 “Thus, Althusser draws a line of demarcation within Marx’s corpus not between the early and late Marx, 
as he so famously did earlier, but between two divergent materialisms at work in Marx’s writing: a 
materialism of the event or the encounter versus a materialism of teleology and necessity.” (Read, 2002: 
30) 
59
 “Mr. Peel, he [Wakefield] moans, took with him from England to Swan River, West Australia, means of 
subsistence and of production to the amount of £50,000. Mr. Peel had the foresight to bring with him, 
besides 3,000 persons of the working class, men, women, and children. Once arrived at his destination, 
“Mr. Peel was left without a servant to make his bread or fetch him water from the river.” Unhappy Mr. 
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“ancient” economy that undermines one of the conditions of capitalist class process—the 
existence of a wage-labor market. But, this “ancient” economy is not a pre-capitalist 
mode of production; rather it emerges simultaneously with the arrival of capitalist 
production to the colonies. Thus, the teleology of historical materialism, which predicts a 
fated journey from ancient to capitalist via primitive accumulation, is suspended in the 
colonies and is replaced by a more open-ended dynamics between ancient and capitalist 
class processes.  
[In the colonies] the capitalist regime everywhere comes into collision with the resistance 
of the producer, who, as owner of his own conditions of labour, employs that labour to 
enrich himself, instead of the capitalist. The contradictions of these two diametrically 
opposed economic systems, manifests itself here practically in a struggle between them 
(Marx, 1912: 838, italics mine).  
 
It is obvious that, in the colonies, the development of the forces of production cannot 
impose its iron laws on historical development. The “dull compulsions of economic 
relations” cannot guarantee the dissolution of non-capitalist class processes or the 
automatic dominance of the “higher” mode of production. In fact, capitalist production 
dissolves in the presence of ancient production. The inevitability of a pre-destined 
historical journey is replaced by the contingency of a transitional conjuncture where 
different class processes are vying for dominance in an emerging social formation.  
Second, the epistemological notion of self-subsistent capital, which underlies the being-
becoming distinction in Marx, falls apart too. With it falls the idea that primitive 
accumulation is confined to the pre-history of capital. Capital that has already arisen, has 
already fully assumed its being in the mother country, is transplanted in the colonies. Yet, 
the immanent laws of capital fail to assert themselves; “being” relapses into “becoming”. 
                                                                                                                                                 
Peel who provided for everything except the export of English modes of production to Swan River!” 
(Marx, 1912: 839-840). 
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It would appear that the “self-sufficiency” of capital is provisional and open to 
subversion. When capital cannot create its own supply of labor-power, it turns 
primitive—it resorts to dispossession; for example, in the colonies, exclusionary land 
regulations were passed to enforce the separation of direct producers and means of 
production. Primitive accumulation is not limited to the origin of capitalism; it comes into 
play whenever the conditions of existence of capitalism start unraveling. Extending it 
further, we can say primitive accumulation is constitutive of capitalism.  
The colonial problem points to the possibilities of a non-essentialist notion of primitive 
accumulation. It is this possibility that is explored in this essay. Marxian tradition has 
been overwhelmingly dominated by the first, i.e. the essentialist reading of Capital. I now 
turn to those works within the Marxian tradition that self-consciously break away from 
this essentialist reading of primitive accumulation in Marx.  
 
“Encounter of Contingencies”: Social Conjuncture and Primitive Accumulation 
In the rest of this chapter I explore the new ontology of capital that a non-teleological, 
non-logocentric notion of primitive accumulation promises to produce. To catch a 
glimpse of this new theoretical terrain—the sight of which is obstructed by the 
essentialist architecture of prevalent Marxian theories—I turn to those authors (Althusser, 
2006; Negri, 1996, 1999; Deleuze-Guattari, 2004)60, who have located the problem of 
primitive accumulation in the realm of radical contingency, beyond any history governed 
by telos.  
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 See Read (2002) 
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The Contingency of the “Encounter” 
Primitive accumulation is a concept born out of retrospective gaze61. It is the present, i.e. 
capital, that fixes the meaning of its past, i.e. its primitive accumulation—the present 
projected backwards, beyond its history as presence, to another history, a history of its 
non-being, its absence—i.e., its pre-history.  
The analysis [of primitive accumulation] is therefore retrospective…….. insofar as it 
depends on knowledge of the result of the movement. ………The analysis of primitive 
accumulation is therefore, strictly speaking, merely the genealogy of the elements which 
constitute the structure of the capitalist mode of production (Althusser and Balibar, 1970: 
279, Italics in the original).  
 
Within an essentialist (and hence teleological) problematic, this history of primitive 
accumulation becomes what Sanyal (2007) calls the “immanent history of capital”— read 
backwards along the arrow of time, each moment circumscribing the ontology of the last 
moment, by discursively limiting the historical possibilities of any process— by limiting, 
for example, the outcome of overdetermined class contradictions in the pre-capitalist 
social formation to the necessary emergence and victory of capitalist production. The 
significance of this observation is best understood in the context of the distinction 
Althusser draws between two different readings of Capital—a distinction between 
historical materialism and aleatory materialism. The being-becoming distinction—which 
ofzten underlies Marx’s concept of primitive accumulation— belongs to the first reading 
of Capital. According to historical materialism, the auto-development of the forces of 
production allows only one possible historical outcome—the emergence of that mode of 
production conducive to further development of forces of production and the dissolution 
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 Also see Read (2002) and Sanyal (2007) who make the same point. “These elements of dissolution, such 
as usury, often stem from the margins and pores of the old society, and only begin to occupy center stage in 
terms of their effects—the effects of constituting a new economy and a new mode of production. Whatever 
intelligibility or unity they have is produced after the fact when they retroactively become the conditions of 
the capitalist mode of production.” (Read, 2002: 32). 
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of those modes of production which act as fetters on the free development of the same. In 
this view, primitive accumulation is the necessary moment in the transition from lower 
(non-capitalist) to higher (capitalist) modes of production. The notion that becoming 
(primitive accumulation) is governed by historical laws of necessity (auto-development 
of forces of production)—the necessity which dictates its fruition into the being 
(capitalist mode of production)—implies that the being is already assumed in the 
becoming. This is a mark of any teleological reading—that becoming already 
presupposes its result, the being. Contrast this with Althusser’s own reading grounded in 
aleatory materialism.    
If we must therefore say that there can be no result without its becoming (Hegel), we 
must also affirm that there is nothing which has become except as determined by the 
result of this becoming—this retroaction itself (Canguilhelm). That is, instead of thinking 
contingency as a modality of necessity, or an exception to it, we must think necessity as 
the becoming-necessary of the encounter of contingencies. (Althusser, 2006: 193-194) 
 
As, according to aleatory materialism, there is no notion of being prior to its becoming, 
there can be no telos that governs the becoming, i.e. becoming must be thought instead as 
a series of “encounters” with all their attendant possibilities and uncertainties. An 
“encounter” is the coming together of elements of a formation. We can think of the 
“encounter”, in the context of society, as a social process (e.g. the capitalist class process) 
in formation, a social process becoming as a convergence of the various determinations of 
all other social processes. An encounter takes place in a “void” in the sense that nothing 
from the past pre-figures the “encounter”—i.e. in a “void” created by the absence of any 
telos. The notion of the encounter emphasizes the inherent openness of any social process 
in terms of its possible historical developments, i.e., the encounter itself, having occurred, 
in turn pre-figures nothing of its possible future. The encounter may not take place, may 
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not “take hold” even if it takes place, and may subsequently come undone even if it has 
“taken hold”.  
Thus, for example, the rise to dominance of the capitalist mode of production in Western 
Europe from sixteenth century onwards was neither pre-destined to occur nor survive. 
This historical event required a coming together of many elements necessary for the 
capitalist class process to “take hold”—an “encounter” or a series of “encounters” leading 
to a capitalist social formation that happened to stabilize itself, however provisionally. 
However, this coming together of elements must be thought of as a historical contingency 
itself. These elements were not fated to come together, since they “do not exist in history 
so that a mode of production may exist, they exist in history in a ‘floating’ state prior to 
their ‘accumulation’ and ‘combination’, each being the product of its own history, and 
none being the teleological product of the others or their history” (Althusser, 2006: 198). 
As opposed to the necessity or inevitability of the encounter, Althusser emphasizes its 
contingency62. 
In Althusser’s reading, the historical processes that produced the conditions of existence 
of the capitalist class structure constitute parallel and plural histories63; parallel, in so far 
as they are not united by any governing telos; plural, because each process is uniquely 
overdetermined by all other processes and cannot be reduced to any other process. The 
parallelism, in our understanding, does not preclude overdetermination; rather, it 
emphasizes the contradictions unique to each overdetermined process such that none can 
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 See Deleuze and Guattari (2004). “The only universal history is the history of contingency.” (Deleuze 
and Guattari, 2004: 244). Negri, too, makes the same point. “A fundamental feature of aleatory materialism 
is the destruction of every teleological horizon—therefore, the positive assertion of a logic of the event” 
(Negri, 1996:  61).  
63
 Althusser (2006:168-169) draws analogy with the Epicurean rain of “atoms falling parallel to each other  
in the void”—prior to the infinitesimal swerve—the clinamen—that breaks the parallelism and brings forth 
the “encounter” or the chain of encounters which results in the formation of the world.  
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be collapsed into others. In Altusser’s reading, therefore, the pre-history of capital 
fractures into multiple and particular histories.  
Let us take the “encounter” between owners of money and dispossessed laborers, the 
principal process at the heart of Marx’s class-reading of primitive accumulation. The 
emergence of the industrial capitalist was a complicated process spanning several 
centuries and undergoing several temporary as well as long-term reversals64. Marx 
mentions at least two different paths of this transition in the English context.. The 
“revolutionary” path is the transformation of petty producers into capitalists through a 
process of differentiation such that accumulation of capital by some and pauperization of 
others leads to capitalist production based on wage-labor. The second path is the 
transformation of merchant or money-capitalists into productive, i.e. industrial capitalists 
by accumulation of money through colonial plunder, monopoly rights over long distance 
trade, government debts, taxation etc. (Marx, 1909:393) 
The dispossession of the laborers in England, on the other hand, was partly a result of the 
process of differentiation of the peasantry, but more importantly was related to an entirely 
different set of processes including “disbanding of feudal retainers, the dissolution of the 
monasteries, the enclosures of land for sheep-farming and changes in methods of tillage” 
(Dobb, 1947: 224). 
The historical independence of the processes, whose mutual effectivity on each other 
produced the capitalist social formation in England, also implies that the ‘encounter’ 
between owners of money and dispossessed laborers is not a necessary outcome of 
history.  
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  See Dobb (1947) for an account of the thwarted rise of capitalism in Netherlands, Germany and Italy.  
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The encounter might not have taken place, with the free workers and the money-capital 
existing “virtually” side by side (Deleuze and Guattari, 2004: 245). 
 
Althusser emphasizes the non-teleology of the process that produces the ‘encounter’, 
exemplified in the English case by the ‘diversion’ of a peculiar development within the 
feudal social formation to a capitalist outcome. For, the immediate result of expropriation 
of rural peasants was great landed proprietors and not capitalists per se. Neither was the 
expropriation intended to create wage-laborers for capitalist enterprises. The most 
ostensible reasons for the great expropriations in England were creation of pasturage for 
sheep farming or else, for creating extensive domains of hunting. The end–result of the 
process—a mass of dispossessed laborers—“was promptly diverted from its possible, 
presumed end by ‘owners of money’ looking for impoverished manpower” (Althusser, 
2006: 199). 
This diversion is the mark of the non-teleology of the process and of the incorporation of 
its result into a process that both made it possible and was wholly foreign to it. 
(Althusser, 2006: 199, italics in the original) 
 
Moreover, the “encounter” between dispossessed laborers and owners of money is not 
sufficient to give rise to the capitalist class process unless other conditions are present. 
Althusser himself argues that such an encounter might have taken place elsewhere and in 
earlier times— he mentions thirteenth and fourteenth century Italy— yet the encounter 
didn’t “take hold” in the absence of other conditions (e.g. domestic markets for capitalist 
products). Dobb (1976:195) argues that the “sweets of foreign trade and foreign loan 
business” diverted Dutch capital into unproductive uses, thus thwarting the process of 
emergence of capitalist industries in Netherlands, “[despite] the precocious flowering of 
Capitalism in this early stronghold of the cloth industry”. A significant part of the 
accumulated merchant-capital and money-capital in Netherlands was invested in 
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speculative activity in the London stock market in the eighteenth century, while Dutch 
foreign trade merchants subverted the conditions for emergence of Dutch industries in the 
face of British competition—by resisting any protective industrial policies. Similarly, in 
the English context, even when provincial merchant capitalists showed signs of 
transformation into productive capitalists—with merchants engaging in production and 
effecting a change in the methods of production—this did not automatically guarantee the 
consolidation of the capitalist class structure. This section of merchants-turned-
productive capitalists along with ancients-turned-capitalists had to struggle against 
another class of merchants—namely, those with monopoly powers over trade, especially 
foreign trade, who exploited both producers and consumers, restricted the volume of 
trade for a higher profit margin and hindered the extension of market for capitalist 
commodities (Dobb, 1947: 161,193). Here lies the contradiction. The great monopolistic 
trading companies opened up the foreign markets for the products of capitalist factories 
and yet at the same time restricted the volume of trade in search of favorable terms of 
trade. Hence, one of the historical conditions for the arising of capitalist manufactures in 
England was that the power of the monopolistic merchant companies be undermined. 
Secondly, the existence of dispossessed laborers may not lead to the emergence of 
capitalist manufacturing units unless the monopoly of urban craft guilds is undermined 
(Dobb, 1947: 161). Thus, various other economic conditions—even as we leave out of 
discussion crucial political and cultural conditions— have to be created before capitalist 
production based on wage-labor establishes its dominance in the economy65. 
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 On other occasions, the encounter may simply end in its own negation, as in the case of ‘second serfdom’ 
in East Europe—“these free servants [Knechte] can also emerge, as e.g. in Poland etc. and vanish again, 
without a change in the mode of production taking place” (Marx, 1973: 469).  
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What therefore is required is not simply an encounter between owners of capital and 
dispossessed laborers, but an entire social context (the political, cultural and economic 
conditions) where such an encounter, when it takes place, leads to the consolidation and 
prevalence of the capitalist class process. Deleuze and Guattari (2004:246) appreciate the 
complexity of the encounter in the following words.     
 So many encounters for the formation of the thing, the unnamable! 
 
The Stability of the “Encounter” 
A second issue has to be confronted at this point. If the being is nothing more than the 
result of the process of becoming, i.e. there is no notion of a being prior to its becoming, 
what can we say about the result itself? Is it justified to speak of a “being” as opposed to 
becoming, i.e. can we assume that the becoming as a process is suspended in what has 
become? Can we assume that change governed by laws will finally take over and replace 
the indeterminacy of the ‘encounter’? In other words, does the ‘encounter’ resolve itself 
into an ‘essence’ that henceforth governs the process of change? The answer, according 
to aleatory materialism, is no. Since the “encounter” takes place in a “void”, i.e. in the 
absence of any governing telos, the existence, reproduction and stability of an 
“encounter” is always provisional.  
It will be granted that no law presides over the encounter in which things take hold. But it 
will be objected, once the encounter has ‘taken hold’—that is, once the stable figure of 
the only existing world (for the advent of a given world obviously excludes all the other 
possible combinations), has been constituted—we have to do with a stable world in 
which events, in their succession, obey ‘laws’. ……….Well, we are going to resist this 
temptation by defending ….the idea, therefore, that the necessity of the laws that issue 
from the taking-hold induced by the encounter is, even at its most stable, haunted by a 
radical instability, which explains something we find it very hard to grasp (for it does 
violence to our sense of ‘what is seemly’): that laws can change—not that they can be 
valid for a time but not eternally……, but that they can change at the drop of a hat, 
revealing the aleatory basis that sustains them, and can change without reason, that is, 
without an intelligible end. (Althusser , 2006:194-96) 
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If we recognize the contingent and overdetermined nature of the “encounter” that 
produces the capitalist class process, it follows that “the different elements of a mode of 
production—the social, technological, and political conditions—have independent 
histories and relations, and this independence threatens any mode of production with its 
dissolution or transformation” (Read, 2002: 29).  
The development of many conditions of existence of the capitalist class process took 
place as a by-product of class struggles (as well as other non-class economic, political 
and cultural processes) within the feudal social formation. For example, the complex 
struggles among fundamental and subsumed feudal classes created conditions, in Western 
Europe, for development of non-feudal class processes. Initially, ancient class processes 
rapidly expanded. A typical example of the contradictory development of the feudal 
social formation is related to the peculiar role played by the merchants, one of the 
subsumed feudal classes who supplied credit to feudal lords as well as engaged in long-
distance trade. However, these merchants also provided crucial conditions of existence of 
ancient producers like commuted peasants and craft producers struggling to free 
themselves from the feudal relations. In towns, petty producers and merchants aligned 
themselves against urban guilds, feudal lords as well as monopoly merchant houses 
controlling foreign trade. These complex struggles in turn created conditions for the 
emergence of an entirely new class structure-the capitalist class structure. 66 
                                                 
66The ancient “enterprises”, in securing their conditions of existence, enabled the development of the 
conditions of existence of a different class process—capitalist, in this case— which in turn changed the 
pattern of development of ancient class processes, by hastening the process of differentiation among the 
ancients and ultimately undermining the possibility of an ancient social formation.  
[T]he very particular struggles of the petty producers and merchants against the feudal 
lords eventuated in a social differentiation within each from which, in turn, emerged 
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In general terms, the very moment of the initial conjuncture in Western Europe when the 
feudal class process became dominant was also the very moment of its own set of 
contradictions and thus changes toward, among several possibilities, a fundamentally 
different class process and different class structure. (Resnick and Wolff, 1979: 15)  
 
In general, when we talk of a social formation, we talk of a contradictory totality whose 
development is overdetermined by the different fundamental and subsumed class 
processes as well as non-class processes in the society. Once born, the capitalist social 
formation unleashes its own particular set of contradictions and is subjected to the 
process of ceaseless change which produced it in the first place and which may in turn, as 
a possibility, undermine it. In the capitalist social formation, the capitalist class process 
coexists with other non-capitalist class processes. The particular contradictions of a 
capitalist social formation, like its feudal counterpart, emerges out of the following 
inescapable effect of overdetermination— in securing its conditions of existence, the 
capitalist class process both undermines as well as creates conditions of existence of 
other non-capitalist class processes. In this sense, capitalist class process does not 
unidirectionally destroy rival class processes as in the classical narrative of transition; it 
                                                                                                                                                 
capitalist class relations. As noted previously, within the countryside some petty 
producers (commuted to money rents) began to gain control over new lands, raised the 
productivity of labor, and produced for exchange. Within the towns petty producers and 
merchants sought new ways to invest their money in new forms of production. Here a 
non-capitalist class process and a non-capitalist subsumed class process were transferred 
into capitalist class processes. The vagaries of climate and market and tensions with the 
feudal lords operated to intensify the intrinsic tendencies of the ancient class process to 
separate large numbers of producers from their means of production. Increasingly, petty 
producers in the countryside and even in the towns were dispossessed of the very means 
that they had struggled, one way or another, to gain some control over. Dispossession 
from the mean of production and the consequent concentration of those means in other 
hands was itself one of the economic processes necessary for—i.e. a condition of 
existence of—the capitalist class process. (Resnick and Wolff, 1979: 18-19). 
It’s the “aleatory at the heart of a mode of production”, rather than the relentless pressure of the developing 
forces of production, that always threatens a mode of production it with its dissolution.  
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might even support non-capitalist class process67. The reproduction of conditions of 
existence of the capitalist class process alongside the development of the conditions of 
existence of other non-capitalist class processes yields a contradictory totality and the 
reproduction of any class process including the dominant capitalist class process becomes 
problematic from the very beginning. Thus the material basis of the dominance of the 
capitalist class structure in a social formation is itself always subject to the play of the 
aleatory.          
If we recognize the contradictory nature of change in a social formation, it becomes 
meaningless to speak of the laws of capitalist development68 one so frequently encounters 
in the essentialist Marxist literature—e.g. the final destruction of non-capitalist class 
processes, the distinctive ‘capitalist’ law of population growth, the inevitable 
transformation of competition into monopoly, the necessary emergence of the state as a 
mere functionary of capitalists, the steady decline of feudal institutions, especially 
religious ones and so on. These laws only make sense when we posit a being extricated 
from the process of becoming, hence transcendental to the latter, standing above it and 
even governing it. Instead, we must think of becoming as an endless process and “not a 
simple transition from contingency to necessity” (Read, 2002: 29). Therefore we cannot 
speak of the being even in the ex post sense, as an accomplished fact, a final product. The 
                                                 
67One can point to the large and even growing presence of ancient class processes in capitalist social 
formations like contemporary Germany, USA and Japan. This is also a very well-recognized phenomenon 
in all developing countries, including those experiencing rapid capitalist growth, e.g. India.  
68
 “In untold passages, Marx—this is certainly no accident—explains that the capitalist mode of production 
arose from the ‘encounter’ between ‘the owners of money’ and the proletarian stripped of everything but 
his labor-power. ‘It so happens’ that this encounter took place, and ‘took hold’, which means that it did not 
come undone as soon as it came about, but lasted, and became an accomplished fact, the accomplished fact 
of this encounter, inducing stable relationships and a necessity the study of which yields ‘laws’—tendential 
laws, of course…….What matters about this conception is less the elaboration of laws, hence of an essence, 
than the aleatory character of the ‘taking-hold’ of this encounter, which gives rise to an accomplished fact 
whose laws it is possible to state” (Althusser, 2006: 197). 
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capitalist social formation as a product of history is no more stable, no more governed by 
laws than the historical process itself, whose product it is. The radical instability that 
haunts capitalism—and all totalities provisionally structured or stabilized to the extent 
that their reproduction is possible—also underlines the impossibility of any 
representation of capital as a self-sufficient entity. To argue that capital is capable of 
securing its reproduction internally—i.e. by itself and in accordance with its immanent 
laws—is to deny the overdetermined nature of capital. According to the logic of 
overdetermination, the reproduction of the capitalist class structure depends on all other 
processes occurring in the society; the conditions of reproduction are literally brought 
into existence by all other processes in the society, including the non-capitalist class 
processes. Thus, capital is overdetermined, in a contradictory way, by its “outside”—non-
capital. From the epistemological standpoint of overdetermination, we also have to reject 
the position that capital-as-being can secure its conditions of reproduction and expansion 
internally, by economic means, whereas capital-in-arising requires extra-economic force 
to secure its conditions externally from within the space of non-capital. The traditional 
Marxian view which holds that primitive accumulation and capitalist accumulation are 
historically separated—the former belonging to the pre-history and the latter to the 
history of capital—can no longer be sustained once we recognize that the “encounter” 
never escapes the original realm of contingency. The reproduction of capitalism requires 
that the “encounter” take place continuously in a heterogeneous social formation whose 
contradictory development always stands to threaten the dominance of capital. Hence, we 
understand primitive accumulation as a process constitutive of capitalism.    
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The New Understanding of Primitive Accumulation 
The following theoretical problems confront us at this stage. How can we think of 
primitive accumulation as a category of Marxian political economy rather than a 
historical event? What theoretical significance can be attached to the notion of primitive 
accumulation, once it is extricated from the context of transition and further, the notion of 
transition itself is released from its historicist, teleological trappings? What are the 
consequences of such a theoretical move, given that the introduction of a new category in 
a theoretical field necessarily induces changes in the meanings of other established 
categories? How will the new theoretical concept of primitive accumulation relate to 
other categories of the Marxian political economy, specifically the Marxian concept of 
capitalist accumulation? In the rest of this chapter I seek to present a new class-based 
understanding of primitive accumulation and its theoretical significance in Marxian 
political economy.      
 
A Non-Essentialist Notion of Primitive Accumulation 
The new non-essentialist notion of primitive accumulation that is advanced in this thesis 
retains Marx’s emphasis on separation of the direct producers from means of production.  
Primitive accumulation is defined as the set of processes associated with the reproduction 
and/or expansion of the capitalist class processes by which the direct producers in non-
capitalist class processes are effectively separated from means of production.  
Our definition differs from both the traditional Marxian notion of primitive accumulation 
as well as some contemporary reformulations of the concept. In the traditional 
understanding of the notion, primitive accumulation is the historical process of the rise of 
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the capitalist fundamental class relation. According to our interpretation, primitive 
accumulation is a process associated with the reproduction and/or expansion of the 
capitalist fundamental class relation. This theoretical move, more than anything else, 
displaces the notion of primitive accumulation from the terrain of historical analysis and 
into the realm of Marxian political economy. Secondly, our definition, at the same time, 
reasserts the class-character of the Marxian theory by directly identifying the moment of 
primitive accumulation with dispossession of the direct producers engaged in non-
capitalist class processes. Thus, our concept of primitive accumulation belongs to the 
theoretical space of interaction between capitalist and non-capitalist class processes and 
emerges as a Marxian category particularly useful in theorizing capitalist social 
formations. This second element of our definition contrasts with some recent 
reformulations where the notion of dispossession has been expanded to include a host of 
economic phenomenon related to transfer or redistribution of property rights in general.     
Several qualifying comments are required at this point to bring out the substantive 
content of our concept of primitive accumulation. First, effective possession includes 
private proprietary rights, usufruct as well as private but not exclusive access to 
communal means of production and even illegal access to means of production. Such 
access may be juridically i.e. legally protected or customarily enforced by conventions. 
For example, in European feudal formation, though the feudal lords had property rights 
over lands, the peasants enjoyed various degrees of effective possession (“titles” of use) 
of means of production due to the particular cultural and political conditions of existence 
of the feudal class process which often made it difficult to estrange peasants from means 
of production. Similarly, numerous petty production activities in today’s urban slums in 
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developing countries are not based on proprietary rights over means of production— 
often they involve illegal encroachment on public land— but they enjoy moral sanction 
of the society as sources of livelihood of the poor.  
Effective possession of means of production is not however a necessary condition for 
either non-capitalist or capitalist appropriation of surplus labor. The processes of 
production, appropriation and distribution of surplus labor are distinct from processes by 
which producers gain or lose effective possession of means of production. However, 
presence or absence of effective possession of means of production does affect class 
processes. For example, dispossessed non-capitalist producers, who have lost their 
possession of means of production can still continue to engage in the same non-capitalist 
fundamental class process, but only by gaining access to such “separated” means of 
production by making various new subsumed class payments—ground rent, interest, 
license fee etc. The introduction of such subsumed class payments does affect the 
conditions of accumulation or even reproduction of labor power of the direct producers in 
non-capitalist class processes. In so far as access to means of production—with or 
without involving effective possession—is a general condition of existence of all 
fundamental class processes, conditions of access to means of production have important 
consequences for the production, appropriation and distribution of surplus labor. 
Primitive accumulation, as defined above, refers to processes that alter conditions of 
access to means of production for non-capitalist class structures through effective 
dispossession of non-capitalist producers from their means of production. 
Primitive accumulation has traditionally been understood as a process that dispossesses 
and “frees” direct producers from the non-capitalist class processes for exploitation by 
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capital. However, I want to emphasize that dispossession may not necessary lead to 
capitalist exploitation of the dispossessed—i.e. proletarianization of the dispossessed—
rather, dispossession may alter the conditions of existence of the non-capitalist class 
processes with such consequences as may undermine non-capitalist class structures even 
as they expand and secondly, may simultaneously enable and undermine the dominance 
of capital in such a heterogeneous social formation.  
In essentialist and teleological readings of history in the Marxian tradition, developing 
forces of production make final dissolution of non-capitalist class structures historically 
inevitable and this telos makes Marxists blind to the real heterogeneities that inhere in the 
social formation. However, when we step outside the teleological narrative of historical 
materialism—outside the fated journey through the stages—we uncover a different 
problematic in which primitive accumulation is an important process that has 
consequences for the way a social formation changes over time—with heterogeneous 
class structures unevenly developing and in a contradictory manner. More specifically, I 
want to explore how primitive accumulation affects the non-capitalist class processes by 
modifying their conditions of existence, specifically access to means of production, 
without assuming the necessity of any final dissolution of non-capitalist class structures, 
and how the changed conditions of existence of non-capitalist class structures in turn 
influence capitalist class structures. The purpose of this study is to introduce primitive 
accumulation into Marxian studies of social formations that emphasize heterogeneity and 
eschews all teleological dissolution of such heterogeneity.  
Our definition of primitive accumulation does not include processes like centralization of 
capital (dispossession of small capitalists), privatization of nationalized state-capitalist 
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industries (transfer of property rights from the state to the private capitalists) or 
redistribution of wealth among capitalists as well as from working class, state and other 
economic groups to the capitalist class (inequality-enhancing processes ) that are often 
emphasized in the contemporary debates on primitive accumulation. We locate primitive 
accumulation in the space where capital meets non-capital. 
We also conceptually differentiate primitive accumulation from dispossession taking 
place due to other reasons. For example, differentiation among petty producers may lead 
to separation of large number of producers from means of production; competition 
between communities over limited economic resources may erupt in ‘clan’ warfare 
leading to the separation of a whole community from their means of production; natural 
calamities may destroy means of production and dispossess direct producers. Such 
processes do not count as primitive accumulation for us. 
Contrary to the traditional reading, our notion of primitive accumulation does not involve 
functionalist arguments that seek to explain primitive accumulation by the conditions of 
existence it presumably secures for the capitalist class process. For example, we do not 
see primitive accumulation as functional to the existence of the capitalist class process 
because it creates free propertyless wage-laborers for capitalist factories. Rather, we 
understand primitive accumulation in terms of its disruptive effect on the unity of direct 
producers with means of production, irrespective of whether separated direct producers 
are exploited by capital or not. Further, primitive accumulation is not the only outcome of 
the interaction between the capitalist and non-capitalist class processes. As I have argued 
before, the adequation of the conditions of existence of the capitalist class process may 
both support and undermine those of the non-capitalist class processes at the same time. 
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The capitalist social formation is a contradictory totality. By the Marxian notion of 
contradiction, we understand the inescapable “unity of opposites”, such that primitive 
accumulation represents just one side of this opposition. The other side is represented by 
the creation or expansion of non-capitalist class processes resulting in a reversal of 
dispossession. Therefore, a Marxian analysis of a capitalist social formation involves a 
concrete analysis of the particular forms of the primitive accumulation occurring in the 
given context as well as the creation and/or expansion of specific forms of non-capitalist 
class processes.   
 
Reproduction of Capital and Primitive Accumulation 
Since we have dissociated our notion of primitive accumulation from the “origin” 
problematic in which it has been traditionally located, we must offer a notion of primitive 
accumulation that is i) constitutive of and constituted by productive capital and ii) distinct 
from the concept of capitalist (value) accumulation.    
We will first seek to show how productive capital and primitive accumulation mutually 
constitute each other. Let us revisit the circuit of productive capital. 
MC]P[CM MPLP, ′−′−−−  
Each constituent part of the circuit has natural, economic, political and cultural conditions 
of existence. Securing such conditions of existence may involve processes that lead to the 
separation of direct producers from means of production in non-capitalist class processes.     
The capitalist begins the circuit by securing means of production and labor power. The 
capitalist may purchase means of production and labor power as commodities in the 
market. Means of production may be capitalist as well as non-capitalist commodities; in 
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the latter case, the capitalists create a market for and hence provide a condition of 
existence of non-capitalist production. But capitalists may also acquire such non-
capitalist means of production as use-values through extra-economic means—such as 
forcible acts of expropriation—which lead to a dissolution of non-capitalist production. 
Primitive accumulation becomes particularly significant when some means of production 
(land) are presumedly in ‘limited’ supply to the society as a whole. In such a case, 
reproduction of productive capital may involve appropriation of non-capitalist means of 
production. Capitalists may secure supplies of commoditized labor power from the 
natural increase of the labor force, from labor force retrenched by capital itself or by 
dispossessing non-capitalist producers. What is essential for productive capital is a supply 
of labor power without access to means of production; primitive accumulation is only one 
mode of securing such supply. Further, whenever primitive accumulation is involved, 
capitalists may secure labor power minus the means of production from which it has been 
separated or secure means of production minus the labor power separated from them.  
Let us now enter the realm of capitalist production. We have already seen how separation 
is one condition of existence of capitalist surplus value. Separation from means of 
production forces direct producers to produce surplus value for the capitalists. 
Conversely, the performance of surplus labor in the capitalist fundamental class process 
may lead to separation of direct producers from means of production in non-capitalist 
fundamental class processes. Dispossession is simultaneously the cause and effect of the 
production of capitalist surplus value and thus they mutually constitute each other. One 
such mechanism involves “production externalities”—e.g. ecological changes including 
pollution and depletion of natural resources (DeAngelis (2004)). Production of “industrial 
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waste” may lead to devaluation and/or destruction of means of production of direct 
producers outside the capitalist enterprises. The numerous natural processes (chemical, 
biological, geological etc.) occurring together with the labor process in the capitalist class 
process may erode means of production in non-capitalist class processes. This 
conceptually amounts to a transfer of means of production from non-capitalist to 
capitalist class process to the extent that capitalist enterprises do not pay non-capitalist 
enterprises for such “use” of their means of production. The rate of surplus-value may be 
positively related to the rate of such unrecorded “dispossession”.  
Further, recognition of the ecological impact of capitalism in the face of a growing 
environmental movement leads to legislations that legally ban certain methods of 
production. Many production units have to be shut down if they do not conform to the 
environmental standards. In the changed situation, many small non-capitalist production 
units who are unable to make such expensive transformations in the labor process are 
shut down, even when their net contribution to such ecological damage is insignificant 
and even when the means of production causing pollution may themselves be capitalist 
commodities. This has the peculiar effect of “gentrification” of production and 
consumption—akin to the “clearing of the estates” in 18th century Britain. The point is 
not to deny the environmental problem, but to add a particular class-perspective to the 
effects of such desirable environmental legislations. Conservation of forests and wildlife 
has in fact been one of the biggest instances of primitive accumulation all over the world 
involving the abrogation of community rights over forest products69.   
                                                 
69
 In India, perhaps the single biggest act of primitive accumulation was not an act of privatization but 
rather its opposite—the establishment of state control over forests—first in the name of “scientific forestry” 
during the British rule and later in the name of “wildlife conservation” in independent India. Forests 
comprise one-fourth of the geographical area of India—and ninety-five per cent of the forest area is legally 
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The sale and consumption of capitalist commodities requires certain natural, economic, 
political and cultural conditions. Advertisement of capitalist products may erode the 
market of non-capitalist commodities through cultural devaluation of the latter. Similar 
cultural devaluation of non-capitalist commodities may occur in other ways too. For 
example, one of the cultural conditions of existence of capitalism is the exalted status of 
“science” in popular imagination maintained through the educational system, media and 
the state. One of the hallmarks of modernism is the idea of a sharp divide between the 
“age of science” and the “age of faith”—the divide coinciding often with the historic 
divide between pre-capitalism and capitalism. According to this idea, for example, 
traditional non-capitalist health commodities are devalued because they do not involve 
“scientific” analysis standardized by modern educational institutions and giant corporate 
health enterprises. One effect of such a cultural discourse is to destroy the market for 
non-capitalist health products leading to the progressive devaluation and “erosion” of 
non-capitalist means of production. It is altogether a different story that traditional non-
capitalist products may subsequently reappear as capitalist products—in the wake of a 
growing criticism of modern medicines and appreciation of traditional solutions to health 
problems. It is much like the weavers’ spindles Marx talks about—the weavers having 
lost their spindles find the same waiting for them inside a capitalist factory (Marx, 1912)    
The consumption of capitalist commodities—the process of consumption itself—may 
have “consumption externalities” which have similar effects as production externalities. 
The proliferation of capitalist commodities—whose consumption produces “waste”— has 
                                                                                                                                                 
owned by the state (Perspectives, 2008: 37). This act of appropriation of the forest land resulted in the loss 
of traditional livelihood of forest dwellers and local communities who were crucially dependent on the 
forests for their means of subsistence and production. 
  87
negative ecological outcomes including those that erode the means of production of non-
capitalist enterprises. The particular culture of consumption associated with capitalism 
accelerates the production of such waste. Consider the peculiar cultural process of 
individuation of entertainment under capitalism—the same TV program is watched 
privately by millions of individuals involving millions of separate electrical connections 
and TV sets etc. The individuation of consumption—which is the same as expansion of 
the market for capitalist commodities—also expands the production of consumption 
“waste”. Moreover, the multiplication of capitalist commodities require a particular 
expansion of the space for consumption—shopping malls, residential spreads, exclusive 
private parks and resorts, gated communities, roads for geographically dispersed 
consumption. All these require infrastructure and power, the expansion of which may 
lead to expropriation of direct producers from their means of production, most 
importantly, land.  
At this point, I must hasten to point out, at the risk of repetition, that a commitment to the 
Marxian notion of contradiction forces me to recognize that each of the constituent parts 
of the productive capitalist circuit might as well support the conditions of existence and 
even expansion of non-capitalist production. The point of the preceding analysis is not to 
prove that the reproduction of the capitalist class process necessarily involves 
dispossession, but rather to identify the moments of dispossession, when it does—having 
accepted at the very outset that reproduction of capital is a contradictory process 
involving both expansion and destruction of the non-capitalist outside.    
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Capitalist Accumulation and Primitive Accumulation 
The distinction between the Marxian concepts of primitive accumulation and capitalist 
accumulation has been the bone of much contention in the contemporary debate. In our 
understanding, both primitive accumulation and capitalist accumulation are conditions of 
existence of the productive capital, yet a conceptual distinction exists between the two. 
At the very outset, we reject any distinction that harks back to any of the following 
traditional oppositions between 
i) being of capital versus becoming of capital 
ii) economic versus extra-economic forces 
iii) market versus state 
In the dominant reading, the first and the second terms in each of the oppositions serve as 
the markers of capitalist accumulation and primitive accumulation respectively. In 
contrast, in my understanding, each term can be identified with both primitive and 
capitalist accumulation and hence the dichotomy cannot be sustained. Let us take the first 
opposition. In the dichotomous understanding, primitive accumulation belongs to the 
becoming of capital, whereas capitalist accumulation comes into play when capital has 
arisen. However, capitalist accumulation itself hastens the conditions of the arising of 
capital. For example, in Marx’s “revolutionary path to transition”, the initial process of 
differentiation of petty agricultural producers into capitalist farmers and the agricultural 
wage-laborer leads to accumulation by the nascent capitalist farmer with further 
dissolution of petty agricultural production and the final emergence of capitalist 
agriculture. On the other hand, capitalist class structure—fully arisen in England— falls 
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apart when transported to the settler-colonies and requires primitive accumulation to 
reproduce itself.  
Let us consider the second opposition between economic and extra-economic processes. 
Capitalist accumulation implies capitalization of surplus value produced in a capitalist 
class process involving increase in constant and variable capital. But, securing additional 
means of production may involve primitive accumulation when, for example, means of 
production are diverted from non-capitalist enterprises by force involving the state and 
secured through SSCP payments to the state. Conditions of capitalist accumulation may 
involve big infrastructural projects like power plants, dams and highways etc. which 
involve dispossession of non-capitalist producers. Political processes like legislations 
(Industrial Acts) may be required for capitalist expansion projects—e.g. Land Acquisition 
Acts may be invoked by the state to acquire land under the “eminent domain” clause for 
the industrial project. Economic processes of distributing surplus value to the state are 
undertaken to secure these extra-economic (i.e. political) processes of dispossession. 
Similarly, cultural processes like advertisement, which introduce new lifestyles by 
displacing existing modes of consumption (thus, possibly undermining the markets for 
non-capitalist commodities) are necessary for capitalist accumulation. Therefore, 
conditions of capitalist accumulation are secured in many different ways, possibly 
involving extra-economic processes of dispossession. On other hand, economic processes 
may themselves lead to dispossession. Consider land as a scarce means of production. If 
the capitalist surplus is higher than the non-capitalist surplus, the capitalists can pay 
higher ground rent to the landlord and thus bid away land from non-capitalist producers 
and block their access to an essential means of production. These arguments also show 
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why the third opposition between the state and the market is similarly not sustainable 
when drawing the distinction between primitive accumulation and capitalist 
accumulation. The state provides certain conditions of existence/expansion of the 
capitalist surplus value and is thus involved in capitalist accumulation. The market may 
devalorize non-capitalist means of production and thus facilitate primitive accumulation. 
Our commitment to overdetermination forces us to recognize that both capitalist 
accumulation and primitive accumulation, like all other process in the society, are 
overdetermined by all other economic, political, cultural and natural processes occurring 
in the society. They cannot be distinguished by the prevalence of any particular type of 
process. Moreover, capitalist accumulation and primitive accumulation are not to be 
thought in isolation but in terms of their mutual effectivity on each other. The task of the 
Marxist theoretician is to posit the conceptual distinction between primitive accumulation 
and capitalist accumulation precisely to ascertain and identify the instances of their 
mutual constitutivity.  
Primitive accumulation and capitalist accumulation cannot be distinguished by the nature 
of processes involved (economic or extra-economic etc.), unless a class-angle is imposed 
on it. Capitalist accumulation is one condition of existence of the capitalist fundamental 
class process, involving investment of appropriated surplus value. Primitive accumulation 
is another condition of existence of the capitalist fundamental class process, involving the 
separation of non-capitalist producers from means of production. While capitalist 
accumulation belongs to the internal conditions of existence of the capitalist enterprise 
(production of surplus value and its distribution for accumulation), primitive 
accumulation belongs to the external conditions of existence of the capitalist enterprise 
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(involving interaction with non-capital). Capitalist accumulation leads to a scaling up of 
the productive capitalist circuit and hence accelerates all those processes of dispossession 
that are associated with securing the conditions of the circuit in general.  
 
Dominance of Capital and Primitive Accumulation: A New Theoretical Problematic 
To inaugurate a new theoretical problematic—in the Althusserian sense—is to pose 
questions which cannot be articulated within the old problematic. The question that is 
invisible in the old Marxian problematic, and therefore the posing of which also signals 
the emergence of a new Marxian problematic, namely reproduction of capitalism, is itself 
called forth by the new understanding of primitive accumulation developed in the present 
essay. We can present the question in the following form—how does the capitalist class 
structure prevail in an economy with a resilient and autonomous non-capitalist “outside”? 
In historical materialist interpretations, the prevalence or dominance of capital is ensured 
by the teleological dissolution of capital’s “outside”. In capitalocentric views, such 
dominance is a non-problem since the existence of the “outside” is an effect of capital’s 
dominance itself. If, in contrast, we admit a radical “outside” of capital, which is a 
product of contradictory and uneven development of the capitalist social formation and 
which is not subsumed to the reproduction of capital, we must, then, theorize capital’s 
dominance over such a social formation where everything is possible, including the 
dissolution of capital’s prevalence. The theoretical problem of dominance emerges as 
soon as we recognize the uniquely overdetermined nature of the non-capitalist 
“outside”—the overdetermination of capital being different from the overdetermination 
of its “outside”—which makes the latter relatively autonomous and independent of 
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capital and hence potentially subversive of capital’s dominance. If primitive 
accumulation belongs to the relation between capital and its “outside”, that relation needs 
to be further specified in terms of dominance of capital over its “outside” in the context 
of a capitalist social formation, i.e. in a social formation where the capitalist class 
structure prevails. 
Capital, and not capitalism, constitutes the traditional Marxian theoretical problematic. 
The historical rise, durability and eventual demise of capitalism are fore-ordained by the 
auto-development of the forces of production. The latter is the essence of historical 
materialism and thus, like all essences, stands outside the theoretical problematic itself. 
Within the traditional Marxian problematic, there is no theory of a capitalist social 
formation70—i.e. a theory of the dominance of capital in a social formation. The 
teleology of historical materialism forecloses the emergence of the problematic by 
positing pre-destined dissolution or subsumption of non-capital by capital. The moment 
we reject historical materialism, we must lay bare what we mean by a capitalist social 
formation. Not only do we need a Marxian theory of capital, we need a Marxian theory of 
the dominance of capital in a social formation.  
In our understanding, a capitalist social formation is constituted by many different class 
structures—capitalist as well as non-capitalist (feudal, ancient, communist and so forth), 
each with its associated conditions of existence. The capitalist social formation is a 
contradictory totality with each class process—overdetermined by all other processes in 
the society—subjected to “pushes and pulls” in contradictory directions. Further the 
                                                 
70
 Capitalism is identified with the fullness of capital. Whenever such fullness or universal expanse of 
capital does not exist, the social formation is considered to be less than capitalist. USA is capitalist since 
non-capital is the “insignificant other” of full capital, while India is yet to be capitalist since non-capital 
presents an obstacle to the fullness of capital. Such is the traditional understanding of capitalism. But see 
Sanyal (2007) for an elaborate discussion and critique of this traditional understanding.  
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development of any class structure has contradictory effects on other class structures—
undermining and supporting them at the same time. One effect of the contradictory and 
overdetermined dynamics of a capitalist social formation is the “uneven development” of 
different class structures.71 Such uneven development may take the classical form in 
which capitalist production expands by dissolving spaces of non-capitalist production. On 
the other hand, it’s quite possible that non-capitalist class structures proliferate faster than 
capitalist class structures within a capitalist class formation. Moreover, such proliferation 
of non-capitalist production may occur together with low as well as high rates of 
capitalist accumulation. Furthermore, such social conjunctures may be transitional as well 
as non-transitional.  
Our notion of a capitalist social formation as a contradictory totality, characterized by 
uneven development, recognizes the irreducible heterogeneity of any social formation 
and does not “explain” such heterogeneity as an effect of any particular process—say, the 
capitalist class process—which therefore acts as the essence of the social formation. 
Neither does such a non-essentialist Marxian theory admit any teleological dissolution of 
such heterogeneity. The act of naming such a contradictory totality is a theoretical gesture 
by itself. Specifically, what do we mean by a “capitalist” social formation? Is this naming 
conjunctural, in the sense that it is justified wherever we find overwhelming masses 
engaged in the capitalist class process? 
A conjuncture is the social formation at a specific time and place. When a conjuncture 
involves the overwhelming masses of the population in one type of class relation, say 
feudal, then the entire formation takes the name of the primary relation: a feudal social 
formation. (Resnick and Wolff, 1979: 10)    
 
                                                 
71
 “Overdetermination implies uneven development” (Resnick and Wolff, 1979: 10). 
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Yet a different, more theoretical stance by the same authors makes use of the notion of 
“prevalence” of a class process in a social formation. 
What we call prevalence will be constructed differently depending on the analyst’s 
theoretical framework. For us, it is possible for the majority of people in a social 
formation to be engaged, say, in a noncapitalist fundamental class process and yet for a 
capitalist fundamental class process to be prevalent by virtue of its effectivity upon the 
non-class processes of that formation.” (Resnick and Wolff, 1987: 310).  
 
If we accept prevalence/dominance as “effectivity” of a class structure, we can attach a 
theoretical significance to primitive accumulation hitherto unarticulated in Marxian 
theory and which at the same time provides a theoretical understanding of such 
“effectivity”. The contradictory nature of the social formation is what we understand by 
the play of the “aleatory”. Just as the “encounter” that produced capitalism was 
complexly overdetermined by the entire historical context of the encounter, so is 
“dominance” itself subject to the aleatory effects of its overdetermination. In other words, 
both the “encounter” and the “dominance” such an encounter apparently resolves into, 
are contradictory processes, always threatened by their own possible unraveling.  Just as 
the encounter may not have happened and may not have lasted, so is dominance itself a 
provisional position forever open to subversion and reversal. The contradictory 
development of a heterogeneous social formation may have the effect of creating 
conditions for dissolution of the dominance of one class structure and the possible 
ascendance of a different class structure. In our understanding, dominance itself is a 
complexly overdetermined “encounter” between the dominant and other class structures. 
In a capitalist social formation, primitive accumulation secures the “effectivity” for the 
capitalist class structure in the face of this radical contingency. In other words, primitive 
accumulation secures the conditions of the “dominance” of the capitalist class structure 
through a series of non-teleological “encounters”. This, we emphasize, is a radically new 
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understanding of primitive accumulation we present here. Contrary to the dominant 
reading, we do not understand primitive accumulation as the process that enables the rise 
to dominance of the capitalist class structure, while such dominance, once secured, is 
self-reproducing by virtue of the essence of capital. Primitive accumulation, in our 
understanding, is continuous processes that reproduces—and may simultaneously 
undermine— this dominance of productive capital in a heterogeneous social formation.   
Consider a capitalist social formation where the majority of the labor force is engaged in 
non-capitalist class structures. The adequation of the conditions of reproduction of the 
capitalist class structure may be constrained by that of non-capitalist class structures, 
resulting in social tension that threatens to undermine the prevalence of the former. Since 
each class structure has its unique conditions of existence and since in any given context, 
the social space of reproduction of class structures is finite, there is always a conflict 
between class structures over means of production, labor power, markets, credit etc.; over 
the political space for power over formation of state policies; and over the cultural space 
for construction of meanings and world-views. I hasten to add that development of 
conditions of existence of the capitalist class structure may have the peculiar effect of 
creating conditions of expansion of non-capitalist class-structures—and hence the 
adequation of the conditions of existence of the capitalist class structure invariably leads 
at the same time to the contested nature of such adequation .  
Furthermore, the conditions of existence are arenas for, as well as targets of, class 
struggles. This is part of what overdetermination means. Within and between all the 
fundamental and subsumed classes of any social formation, complex contradictions 
emerge and class struggles ensue over their respective economic, political and cultural 
conditions of existence. Class struggles swirl around each aspect of the social formation. 
Class struggles involve the taking and defending of economic and political positions as 
well as religious, artistic and scientific positions. (Resnick aand Wolff, 1979: 11, italics 
mine) 
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How can we understand effectivity of the capitalist fundamental class process over other 
class and non-class processes in such a social formation? By “effectivity” of a class 
structure, we understand its ability to secure the conditions of its reproduction in a 
contested social space. Such effectivity has to be secured at the economic, political and 
cultural levels. At the political level, legislations are to be secured that favor the 
reproduction of the capitalist class structure at the cost of other class-structures whenever 
such a conflictual situation arises—e.g. land acquisition acts, intellectual property rights 
etc. At the economic level, fiscal (taxation, subsidies etc.), monetary (interest rate, 
inflation-targeting etc), trade (exchange rate regulation, protectionist or laissez faire 
policies, etc) and infrastructure policies (highways, dams, power plants, railways etc.) are 
manipulated to the advantage of the capitalist class processes and against rival non-
capitalist class processes. At the cultural level, advertising, public as well as public 
education, research and development, media discourses, state welfare projects help create 
a representation of life that valorizes the capitalist class structure as the forces of 
“Progress”.  
Partly, these conditions of dominance are secured through subsumed class payments out 
of the surplus produced in the capitalist class structure. From a class standpoint, the 
dominance of the capitalist class structure depends crucially on the surplus commanded 
by it relative to other class structures. While a theory of capital focuses on surplus 
produced and appropriated within the capitalist class structure, a theory of capitalist 
social formation must take into account the distribution of surplus between contesting 
class-structures.  The magnitude of surplus commanded by the capitalist class structure 
determines its ability to secure prevalence over contested political, economic and cultural 
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spaces. The different fundamental class structures struggle over conditions of existence 
and their ability to succeed depends on the surplus produced and or secured by them. For 
the dominance of the capitalist class structure in a social formation, what is required, 
therefore, is a particular (unequal) distribution of surplus across class-structures such that 
conditions of existence of the capitalist class structure are ensured at the expense of 
others. This particular unequal distribution of surplus may obtain in many different ways.   
First, capitalist production may enable a faster growth in technical and/or value 
productivity of labor—and consequently higher rate of exploitation and possibly a greater 
mass of surplus—compared to non-capitalist production. Such presumed superiority of 
the capitalist fundamental class process vis-à-vis its non-capitalist counterparts is 
premised on continuous and radical transformations in the labor process under capitalist 
class relations, generalized commodity production leading to specialization under 
capitalism, competition between capitalists, accumulation of productive capital that such 
competition may occasion etc. This view underlies the classical belief in the inevitable 
victory of capitalist over pre-capitalist forms relations of production.  
Second, the capitalists may secure a flow of value from non-capitalist class processes 
through unequal exchange and monopoly pricing. Variants of this view have dominated 
the Marxian discourse on underdevelopment. When capitalist commodities meet non-
capitalist commodities, the terms of trade may deviate from equal exchange price ratios. 
Equal exchange between capitalist and non-capitalist commodities takes place when 
terms of trade are such that each class structure as a whole exactly retains its appropriated 
surplus. However, terms of trade may differ from such ideal exchange ratios, depending 
on the bargaining power of capitalists vis-à-vis non-capitalist surplus appropriators. In 
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case of unequal exchange, there may be a flow of value as subsumed class payments to 
the capitalist enterprises from non-capitalist enterprises.72 A similar situation arises when 
capitalist C-goods enterprises are monopolistic while non-capitalist enterprises buying 
those capitalist C-commodities are competitive. Again, a part of the labor process 
involved in the production of a capitalist commodity may be sub-contracted out to non-
capitalist enterprises. Such non-capitalist enterprises may or may not be dependent, i.e. 
tied to the parent capitalist enterprise, depending on whether the latter is the sole 
purchaser of the non-capitalist product or not. In case of dependence, the capitalists may 
be able to obtain value-flows from non-capitalist enterprises to which they subcontract 
parts of their production process as subsumed class payments through unequal exchange. 
Third, conditions of existence of non-capitalist enterprises may be so modified within 
capitalism and as a result of reproduction of capitalist production itself that the 
(expanded) production of surplus within the non-capitalist fundamental class processes 
may be thwarted. This third case exemplifies the role played by primitive accumulation in 
securing the dominance of the capitalist class structure in social formations. Primitive 
accumulation leads to the separation of labor power from means of production in non-
capitalist fundamental class processes. But such separation may not imply dissolution of 
the non-capitalist class structures. Such separation may primarily take the form of a flow 
                                                 
72This was the basic idea behind Preobrazhensky’s (1926) notion of “primitive socialist accumulation” in 
the context of industrialization in Soviet Russia. Resnick and Wolff (2002) argue that industrial enterprises 
in Soviet Union were state capitalist enterprises. In the 1920s, when Preobrazhensky presented his 
arguments, agriculture was largely ancient in Soviet Russia. In that context, the transfer of already 
appropriated value from agriculture to industry constitutes a transfer of value from non-capitalist to 
capitalist class structures as subsumed class payments. Also see Chaudhury, Chakrabarti and Das (2000) 
for a theoretical model of how the “ancient” economy may actually end up losing its value to the capitalist 
economy via the pricing mechanism. Further, see Chakrabarti and Cullenberg (2003)—a work that belongs 
to the “overdetermination” school of Marxism—who define primitive accumulation as the transfer of labor 
time from non-capitalist to capitalist class process. Although the present dissertation belongs to the same 
school of Marxism, my differences with Chakrabarti and Cullenberg should be obvious.  
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of means of production from the non-capitalist to the capitalist class processes, whether 
or not capitalist accumulation absorbs the separated labor power. One effect of primitive 
accumulation is thus a more difficult and precarious access of non-capitalist producers to 
means of production. Hence, in so far as access to means of production is one condition 
of production/expansion of surplus labor, primitive accumulation depresses non-capitalist 
surplus. At the same time, by enabling capitalists to gain access to means of production, 
primitive accumulation enables a higher production of capitalist surplus. Thus primitive 
accumulation secures an unequal distribution of surplus across class-structures.  
It is this significance of primitive accumulation that places it right at the heart of 
reproduction of capitalism. This understanding of primitive accumulation is explored in 
greater details in the rest of the thesis. It is clear that Althusser’s notion of the 
“encounter” looms large in this particular understanding of primitive accumulation. 
Reproduction of capital requires an “encounter” of elements in their constitutive 
capacities—i.e. a coming together of constitutive processes—that reproduces the 
conditions of existence of capital. Such “encounter” is contingent and open to subversion 
by other “encounters” constitutive of something other than capital, i.e. non-capital. 
Primitive accumulation is the process that partly contributes to the “encounter” 
constitutive of capital by subverting “encounters” constitutive of non-capital—in other 
words, primitive accumulation contributes to the “encounter” constitutive of the 
dominance of capital.         
The arguments presented so far in this chapter contribute to the production of a new 
understanding of primitive accumulation that is very different from what prevails in the 
Marxian tradition. In Chapter III, I will present a more elaborate exposition of the basic 
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theoretical position presented here. However, I emphasize the following points regarding 
this new understanding of primitive accumulation. First, primitive accumulation is 
displaced from the context of transition and is re-conceptualized as a continuous process 
constitutive of capitalism. Second, the problem of primitive accumulation is situated 
within a theoretical framework that accepts overdetermination as the basic ontological 
principle. Finally, we retain the unique Marxian perspective by focusing on the class-
effects of dispossession and by problematizing the notion of primitive accumulation in 
the context of class-dominance of capital in a social formation.  
 
Capital, Primitive Accumulation and Labor 
I have argued, in chapter I, that the contemporary literature on primitive accumulation 
poses the following theoretical problem before the anti-essentialist Marxian tradition. It is 
clear that to understand primitive accumulation as a continuous process, one must posit a 
resilient “outside” of capital. Hence, one must identify the problem of primitive 
accumulation, not as a moment of teleological dissolution of the “outside”, but as a 
process that occurs alongside the reproduction of both capital and its “outside”. Of 
course, the problem is not posed as such in the contemporary literature. What we read in 
the contemporary literature is the difficult and uncertain emergence of the problem. Let 
me emphasize what in my understanding constitutes the fundamental discontinuity 
between the classical and contemporary views on primitive accumulation.  
In the final analysis, Marx’s emphasis on dispossession/separation stems from his 
specific views of labor (as a source of surplus value) and non-capital (as antithetical to 
capital). First, for Marx, labor power in capitalist production is the source of surplus 
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value. The capitalists purchase labor power as a commodity in the market and appropriate 
surplus labor of the wage-workers as surplus value. This is the specific form of class 
exploitation in capitalist production. The conditions of existence of the specifically 
capitalist form of exploitation include i) commodity-producing labor and ii) 
commodification of labor power itself.  Second, the antithetical nature of non-capital is 
understandable once we recognize that non-capital presents possibilities of 
decommodification of labor-power, particularly when the non-capitalist space allows re-
unification of the laborer with means of production. For example, the ancients’ economy 
in white settler-colonies (North America, Australia etc.) prevented the consolidation of 
the wage-labor market.   
In a specific reading of the contemporary literature—aligned with the theoretical 
objective of this dissertation—I argue that contemporary thoughts on primitive 
accumulation have displaced the notion of primitive accumulation from this classical 
theoretical context. I have argued in the previous chapter that several of prominent 
contemporary interventions have emphasized the “enrichment” aspect of primitive 
accumulation. In doing so, they have often posited the non-capitalist “outside” as a 
source of non-capitalist surplus labor—to be extracted as rent or other kinds of subsumed 
class revenues by otherwise productive capitalist enterprises—or as a condition, in the 
sense Luxemburg, Lenin, Harvey etc. understand it, for realization of expanded capitalist 
surplus value. At the same time, the classical objective of primitive accumulation—the 
creation of dispossessed proletarians—drops out of the picture. As my reading of Sanyal, 
Basu and De Angelis shows, the social outcome of primitive accumulation, in certain 
social conjunctures, is not the class of capitalist wage-workers, but a “surplus population” 
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(Sanyal) or the detritus (De Angelis). The “surplus population” gets engaged in non-
capitalist class structures—either as a result of welfarist interventions or through their 
own political struggles. However may the non-capitalist space emerge, its emergence at 
the same time makes it a target of primitive accumulation with similar consequences. 
What we have, then, is a ceaseless dissolution and creation of a non-capitalist space while 
the “surplus population” itself traverses the entire history of change. The problem before 
the Marxian tradition is to present a new ontology of labor in capitalism that does not 
essentialize its role as the producer of surplus value for the capitalists. In short, we have 
to face the condition of the laborer in circumstances of her possible redundancy vis-à-vis 
the capitalists.  
 
The Reserve Army of Labor 
Marx had a very specific approach to the problem of overpopulation in capitalism, 
distinct from the popular Malthussian view on the subject. Contrary to Malthuss’s 
universal and natural law of overpopulation, Marx asserted that, “[i]n different modes of 
social production there are different laws of the increase of population and of 
overpopulation” (Marx, 1973: 604). Marx’s writings on the problem of overpopulation or 
surplus population—more precisely, his notion of a reserve army of laborers—
subsequently had an enormous impact on Marxian analyses of capitalism. For Marx, the 
reserve army of laborers is a form of surplus population historically specific to 
capitalism. In later Marxist theories, however, the reserve army came to be interpreted as 
the only rather than a specific form of surplus population in capitalism. One consequence 
of this theoretical displacement was an extremely capitalocentric notion of labor in 
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capitalism. Marxists tended to subsume the labor force as a whole to capital. According 
to this capitalocentric view, the active part of the labor force is exploited by capital, while 
the inactive part of it—the reserve army of labor—provides certain conditions of 
existence of such exploitation, by depressing wages to the level of the value of labor 
power. Thus, the entire labor force is subsumed to the capitalist exploitative class 
relations. 
In Capital Vol. I, Marx’s use of the concept of surplus population or reserve army of 
labor presupposes a steady dissolution of all non-capitalist class relations and the 
universal spread of capitalist class relations over the social formation, so that Marx could 
then talk of the labor force as entirely subsumed to capital in its active and inactive 
forms.  When such universalization of capitalist class relations is absent, the concept of 
surplus population—in the specific manner Marx used it in Capital Vol.I—should be 
understood in its abstractness in relation to capital and not in its concreteness in the 
context of a social formation. In a capitalist social formation, both capitalist and non-
capitalist class structures are present. The conceptualization of a surplus population—i.e. 
a part of the labor force that is “surplus” relative to capital—becomes more difficult in 
such a context. One dominant tendency within the Marxian tradition has been to subsume 
a part or whole of the non-capitalist economy—along with the usual unemployed—to the 
reserve army of labor. However, I argue that such a characterization of non-capital robs 
the latter of its radical otherness, unless we transform the very meaning of surplus 
population in the given context.  
Marx considered three forms of surplus population—latent, stagnant and floating. The 
“latent” relative surplus population is typically associated with capitalist transformation 
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of agriculture. A part of the traditional non-capitalist agricultural labor force is rapidly 
transformed into a redundant labor force in capitalist agriculture. This redundant labor 
force is always looking to migrate to non-agricultural, primarily urban, employment. The 
steady migration of laborers from rural to urban areas “pre-supposes, in the country itself, 
a constant latent surplus-population, the extent of which becomes evident only when its 
channels of outlet open to exceptional width” (Marx, 1912: 705). The “floating” form of 
the relative surplus population is really the industrial reserve army of laborers—
periodically repelled and attracted by capitalist factories. Both the latent and floating 
forms of surplus population exist as unemployed or under-employed labor force. As 
unemployed, they are dependent for subsistence on the wages of the proletariat as well as 
other subsumed class-incomes of the capitalist class-structure. As under-employed, they 
may find occasional unproductive or productive employment in capitalist economy or 
they may temporarily sustain themselves as ancients.  
The “stagnant” part of the relative surplus population forms a part of the active labor 
force. This labor force is typically active as home-based workers under sub-contracting or 
putting-out relationship with capitalist manufacturers. Typically, a part of the labor 
process in which capitalist commodities are produced, is contracted out to laborers 
working outside the factory, within their household premises. Marx refers to “domestic 
industry”—characterized by extremely irregular employment and inhuman work-
conditions—as the chief form of the stagnant part of the relative surplus population73. 
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 See Kay (1989). “This modern so-called domestic industry has nothing, except the name, in common 
with the old-fashioned domestic industry, the existence of which pre-supposes independent urban 
handicrafts, independent peasant farming, and above all, a dwelling-house for the labourer and his family. 
That old-fashioned department has now been converted into an outside department of the factory, the 
manufactory, or the warehouse. Besides the factory operatives, the manufacturing workmen and the 
handicraftsmen, whom it concentrates in large masses at one spot, and directly commands, capital also sets 
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Marx talks about domestic industries as the “last resorts of the masses made “redundant” 
by Modern Industry and Agriculture” (Marx, 1912: 505).  
The third category of the relative surplus-population, the stagnant, forms a part of the active 
labour army, but with extremely irregular employment…….We have learnt to know its 
chief form under the rubric of “domestic industry”. It recruits itself constantly from the 
supernumerary forces of modern industry and agriculture, and specially from those 
decaying branches of industry where handicraft is yielding to manufacture, manufacture to 
machinery. (Marx, 1912: 705). 
  
In class terms, domestic industry may include i) dependent labor force in putting-out 
relationship with capitalist manufacturers ii) ancient producers in sub-contracting 
relationship with capitalist manufacturers and iii) capitalist units in sub-contracting 
relationship with parent capitalist manufacturers. All three cases are instances of 
production within the household premises74. 
Under putting-out relationship, the homeworker may or may not be required to provide 
for her own instruments of labor while the capitalist supplies raw materials, specifies the 
design and volume of the product, and pays an amount to the homeworker sufficient to 
reproduce her labor power.  
In the outside department of the factory, of the manufactory and of the warehouse, the so-
called domestic workers, whose employment is at the best irregular, are entirely dependent 
for their raw material and their order on the caprice of the capitalist, who, in this industry, is 
not hampered by any regard for depreciation of his buildings and machinery, and risks 
nothing by a stoppage of work, but the skin of the worker himself. (Marx, 1912: 524) 
 
The homeworker in the putting-out relationship is neither a wage-laborer supervised by 
managers within a factory nor is an ancient who has independent access to means of 
production as well as the market for the final products and who thus can appropriate her 
surplus value. The laborer in putting-out relationship is a hybrid of an ancient and a 
                                                                                                                                                 
in motion, by means, of invisible threads, another army; that of the workers in the domestic industries, who 
dwell in the large towns and are also scattered over the face of the country”. (Marx, 1912: 504).   
74
 Sanyal (2007) discusses all these three cases as informalization within the circuit of capital and which 
therefore, for him, belong to the accumulation-economy.  
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capitalist wage-worker and is often commonly referred to as “disguised proletariat”. In 
the putting-out relationship, the capitalist appropriates the entire surplus product of the 
home worker.   
In case of ancient and capitalist sub-contractors, we have ancient and fundamental class 
processes articulated to a third (parent) capitalist fundamental class process.  
The lace finishing is done either in what are called “mistresses’ houses, or by women in 
their own houses, with or without the help of their children. The women who keep the 
“mistresses’ houses” are themselves poor. The workroom is in a private house. The 
mistresses take orders from manufacturers, or from warehousemen, and employ as many 
women, girls, and young children as the size of their rooms and the fluctuating demand of 
the business will allow.(Marx, 1912: 510-511) 
 
In case of ancient and capitalist sub-contractors, the parent capitalist enterprise often 
secures a part of the surplus value appropriated by ancient and capitalist sub-contractors 
as subsumed class revenue through unequal exchange, depending on the bargaining 
power of the parent capitalists vis-à-vis ancient and capitalist sub-contractors. The ability 
of the parent capitalist enterprises to secure subsumed class revenues from ancient and 
capitalist sub-contractors depends on the nature of the sub-contracting relationship itself. 
If the ancient and capitalist sub-contractors are dependent on orders from the parent 
capitalist enterprises and do not have independent access to commodity markets and 
hence the power to negotiate prices, they have to make a subsumed class payment to the 
parent capitalist enterprise by selling their commodities below their values. It seems that 
Marx did consider the dependent form of sub-contracting where employment was 
extremely irregular and wholly subjugated to the “business model” (degree of vertical 
integration, nature of technology, contracts with workers’ unions etc.) followed by the 
parent capitalist enterprises. Other than these three categories of surplus population, Marx 
mentions paupers and the “dangerous classes” of the society. The paupers include able-
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bodied adults, adults whose labor power are no longer suitable for capitalist employment, 
“orphans and pauper children”, widows etc. The “dangerous classes” include vagabonds, 
criminals etc. 
Ignoring natural growth of labor force, there are two major reasons for the emergence of 
a relative surplus population—the nature of capitalist accumulation and primitive 
accumulation. Usually, capitalist accumulation with an increasing average organic 
composition of capital (i.e. with technological improvement) reduces75 and capitalist 
accumulation with a constant average composition of capital (i.e. on the same technical 
basis) expands the productive labor force. On the other hand, primitive accumulation 
dissolves non-capitalist enterprises and releases dispossessed producers who may swell 
the ranks of the surplus population. It should be obvious that, for Marx, surplus 
population is not equal to the unemployed or inactive part of the labor force. It also 
includes a part of the active labor force in both agriculture and industry. Further, the 
surplus population may be located in a variety of class and non-class processes. But, in 
Marx’s presentation of the subject, the surplus population as a whole and in all its 
heterogeneity is subsumed to capital.  
First, the relative surplus population is subsumed to capital in the sense that it provides a 
mass of laborers at disposal of the capitalists. The “floating” part of the relative surplus 
population is directly subjugated to the dynamics of capitalist accumulation—being 
recruited and retrenched periodically by the capitalist industries engaged in competition 
and accumulation. The “latent” part of the relative surplus population is a product of both 
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 “The positing of a specific portion of labor capacities as superfluous, i.e. of the labour required for their 
reproduction as superfluous, is therefore a necessary consequence of the growth of surplus labor relative to 
necessary. The decrease of relatively necessary labour appears as increase of the relatively superfluous 
labouring capacities—i.e. as the positing of surplus population” (Marx, 1973: 609). 
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capitalist accumulation and primitive accumulation in agriculture and is “therefore 
constantly on the point of passing over into an urban or manufacturing proletariat, and on 
the look-out for circumstances favourable to this transformation” (Marx, 1912: 705). The 
stagnant part of the surplus population, mainly homeworkers in “domestic industries”, is, 
in effect, a dispersion of capitalist production and has no autonomous conditions of 
existence other than that of the ‘parent’ capitalist industries. In this sense, the stagnant 
segment of the relative surplus population “furnishes to capital an inexhaustible reservoir 
of disposable labor-power” (Marx, 1912: 705). Finally, even the paupers are exploited by 
capital at times of rapid accumulation76.  
Both the latent and the segment of the relative surplus population have often been 
assumed to be transitional in nature77. Industrial capitalist accumulation absorbs the rural 
surplus labor power in the long run and the productivity of labor power under the factory 
regime finally makes sub-contracting to “domestic industries” an inefficient business 
model for capitalists. However, there is no necessity to assume that latent and stagnant 
segments of the relative surplus population are transitional forms. Latter Marxian 
scholarship on the so-called informal or unorganized sector in both developed and 
developing countries has documented how domestic homeworkers and surplus rural 
labor-power may co-exist and even expand with capitalist accumulation in the long run.  
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 “One need only glance superficially at the statistics of English pauperism to find that the quantity of 
paupers increases with every crisis, and diminishes with every revival of trade. Second, orphans and pauper 
children. These are candidates for the industrial reserve army, and are, in times of great 
prosperity….speedily and in large numbers enrolled in the active army of labourers……pauperism forms a 
condition of capitalist production, and of the capitalist development of wealth.” (Marx, 1912: 706-707)   
77
 See Nun (2000), Kay(1989) etc. 
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The second sense in which the relative surplus population is subsumed to capital is that it 
is maintained directly or indirectly by class and non-class incomes generated in capitalist 
production78.  
If the latter [the surplus population] is supported, then this comes not out of the labour fund 
but out of the revenue of all classes. It takes place not through the labour of the labour 
capacity itself—no longer through its normal reproduction as worker, but rather the worker 
is maintained as a living being through the mercy of others; hence becomes a tramp and a 
pauper; …..secondly: society in its fractional parts undertakes for Mr. Capitalist  the 
business of keeping his virtual instrument of labour—its wear and tear—intact as reserve 
for later use. He shifts a part of the reproduction costs of the working class off his own 
shoulders and thus pauperizes a part of the remaining population for his own profit (Marx, 
1973: 609-10).     
 
This aspect of subjugation of the surplus population to capital—i.e. its maintenance 
through charity—becomes most visible in latter-day welfare-states, in which all class and 
non-class incomes in the capitalist economy are taxed by the state to maintain and 
reproduce the labor-power of the unemployed.      
The subsumption of surplus population to capital presupposes either the ultimate 
dissolution of non-capitalist fundamental class processes in the process of capitalist 
accumulation or their subsumption to capitalist class processes. Once the surplus 
population is thus subsumed to capital, its movements are solely determined by the 
dynamics of capitalist accumulation.  
The law, finally, that always equilibrates the relative surplus population, or industrial 
reserve army, to the extent and energy of accumulation, this law rivets the labourer to 
capital more firmly than the wedges of Vulcan did Prometheus to the rock. (Marx, 1912: 
709) 
 
In these conditions, the reserve army of laborers and the surplus population are 
synonymous—since the entire surplus population is maintained by capital as a reserve for 
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 This is not true for all categories of surplus population. For example, the ancient sub-contractor may earn 
his subsistence through performance of labor. But in so far as her performance of labor is at the mercy of 
the (parent) capitalist enterprise, she is dependent on capital for the maintenance of her labor power.   
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use during rapid accumulation. The reserve army of labor is redundant at one point of 
time and necessary at another point of time, for reproduction of capitalist fundamental 
class processes. Strictly speaking, the reserve army of labor is not redundant / superfluous 
with respect to capital—its redundancy at one point of time being a condition of its 
necessity at another point of time. The reserve army of labor is thus a condition of 
existence of the capitalist fundamental class process.   
 
Surplus Population vs. the Reserve Army of Labor 
The condition of redundancy of labor power with respect to capital implies that the 
redundant surplus labor power is a condition of existence of something other than capital, 
i.e. non-capital. This notion of a surplus labor power is more adequate in the context of a 
capitalist social formation in which capitalist and non-capitalist fundamental class 
processes co-exist. In such a social context, the reserve army of labor has to be 
distinguished from surplus population and the latter has to be invested with a new 
meaning. Such a distinction already exists—though not widely used—in the Marxian 
tradition.  
The Latin American “marginalist” school of thought79 has argued that developing 
countries, particularly in Latin America, are characterized by a “marginal mass” of 
laborers that is quite distinct from the traditional reserve army of labor. This distinction 
has been most consistently held by Jose Nun (2000), according to whom the reserve army 
of laborers is that part of the surplus population which is functional to the accumulation 
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 See Nun (2000), Quijano and Westwell (1983). See Kay (1989) for a discussion of the “marginalist” 
theory. 
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of productive capital, while the “marginal mass” is the “non-functional” part of the 
surplus population.       
[M]y marginal mass thesis was meant to question a left hyperfunctionalism, wherein even 
the last landless peasant in Latin America (or Africa) was considered to be functional to the 
reproduction of capitalist exploitation. On the contrary, I tried to show that in many places a 
surplus population was growing that in the best of cases was simply irrelevant to the 
hegemonic sector of the economy and in the worst of the cases endangered its stability. This 
presented the established order with the political problem of managing such nonfunctional 
surpluses to prevent them from being dysfunctional (Nun, 2000: 12, italics mine)   
 
By the “hegemonic” sector, Nun refers to the technologically dynamic monopolistic 
capitalist sector in developing countries while the marginal mass is composed of “(1) part 
of the labour employed by competitive industrial capital; (2) the majority of the workers 
who take refuge in low income activities in the service sector; (3) the majority of the 
unemployed; and (4) all the labour force which is secured by commercial capital, thereby 
lacking mobility” (Kay, 1989: 103).  
Anibal Quijano’s earlier position closely resembles Nun’s, though in his latter writings he 
regarded marginal mass as a particular form of reserve army of labor80 (Kay, 1989: 110). 
Closely following Nun, Quijano maintains a distinction between the hegemonic and 
marginal ‘poles’ of the economy. According to Quijano, the competitive industrial 
capitalist sector will decline in the long-run due to the operations of monopoly capital and 
the “marginal pole” will expand through an increase in the number of “marginal petty 
bourgeois” (the self-employed) and the “marginal proletariat” (who get temporary and 
irregular productive and unproductive employment in the lower circuits of the capitalist 
sector). The marginal mass is not directly functional to the expanded production of 
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 Both Kay (1989) and Nun (2000) argue that Quijano’s use of the notion of marginal labor force in his 
latter writings is close to Marx’s categories of stagnant surplus population. 
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surplus value in the hegemonic sector, though they may play a role in the realization of 
surplus value—i.e. as a market for commodities of the hegemonic sector.  
Similarly, Sanyal (2007) argues, in the Indian context, that surplus population should be 
emphatically distinguished from the reserve army of labor. The latter is internal to 
accumulating capital, while the former constitutes the outside of accumulating capital. 
The surplus population belongs to the “need-economy” in Sanyal’s analysis and they are 
the victims of primitive accumulation and exclusion by the “accumulation-economy”. 
Sanyal’s “need-economy” consists of both ancient and small non-accumulating capitalist 
enterprises. The “need-economy” is redundant as far as the economic conditions of the 
“accumulation-economy” are concerned, though it is crucial—in its role as a space for 
rehabilitation of the surplus population—for political and cultural conditions of existence 
of the “accumulation economy”.  
It is interesting to see that two different theoretical positions, developed independently 
and in the context of different social formations, converge so closely on a basic dualistic 
understanding of the social formations in developing countries—the dualism captured 
either in terms of a hegemonic/marginal or accumulation/need distinction. However, the 
dualism in both cases is not class-specified. The marginal mass and the need-economy 
are locations of heterogeneous class and non-class positions of the surplus population, 
including those specific to capital. In my understanding, in both these theories, the 
surplus population is defined in relation to accumulation rather than capital. One probable 
reason for this is that these theoretical positions stress the non-functionality of the surplus 
population with respect to accumulation in contrast to its functionality as stressed by 
Marx. 
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But, more importantly, what these theoretical positions point to is a non-capitalist—
predominantly ancient—location of the surplus population. Hence, one outcome of both 
accumulation of productive capital and primitive accumulation is the emergence of new 
non-capitalist fundamental class processes. The emergence of surplus population captures 
the contradiction that inheres in the reproduction of the capitalist class structure—the 
contradiction being that the reproduction of capital is at the same time the production of 
conditions of existence of non-capital. In order to identify such contradiction, we 
however need to understand surplus population in relation to capital rather than its 
accumulation. Furthermore, in so far as we are concerned with the “outside” of capital 
and the problematic of the “dominance” of capital in the presence of such an “outside”, 
we define surplus population as that part of the labor force—rendered surplus by capital 
relative to itself, i.e. in excess of a “notional” or “real” reserve army of laborers, through 
both labor-saving accumulation of capital and primitive accumulation—which inhabits a 
non-capitalist “outside” of capital. 
The moment we posit a non-capitalist outside of capital, the problematic of primitive 
accumulation arises. Surplus population is subsumed to capital in Marx and hence does 
not constitute an “outside” of capital. Surplus population is literally a reservoir of labor 
power maintained by the value created in the capitalist class structure and therefore 
doesn’t belong to an autonomous non-capitalist production space 
However, as soon as we understand non-capitalist class structures as locations of surplus 
population, we admit that the surplus population is maintained by value (or use-values in 
case of non-commodity production) created in non-capitalist class structures. Hence, we 
have means of production united with labor power outside the domain of capital. But this 
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is precisely the moment of the emergence of the problematic of primitive accumulation. 
In Marx’s conceptualization, the surplus population belongs to the problematic of 
capitalist accumulation, primitive accumulation having completed its historic role of 
dissolving non-capital. In our understanding, the surplus population, by inhabiting a non-
capitalist “outside”, inscribes primitive accumulation at the heart of the problematic of 
capitalist accumulation. This is the difference between Marx’s notion of the surplus 
population and the notion deployed here.  
In the context of non-capitalist locations of surplus population, we can still talk of a 
reserve army of laborers subsumed to capital, i.e. a part of the surplus population directly 
maintained by capital as an inactive reserve army for its accumulation. This is possible at 
particular conjunctures in capitalist social formations in richer societies, where a reserve 
army of unemployed is maintained through official welfare policies, while the surplus 
population—that is a part of the labor force rendered redundant by capital relative to 
itself, i.e. in excess of the reserve army—belongs to the non-capitalist class structures. 
Certain economic conditions must prevail for this social conjuncture to emerge. First, the 
size of the capitalist surplus value must be such relative to the inactive unemployed labor 
force as to make possible the maintenance of the latter through welfare policies81. 
Second, the non-capitalist class structures must have a certain viability and hence pose a 
certain barrier to capitalist accumulation, so that securing additional labor power or 
means of production from non-capitalist class structures in times of rapid accumulation 
becomes uncertain, thus forcing capitalists to maintain a reserve army at their own 
expense. However, the subsumed class payments required to maintain the reserve army 
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 We make the simplifying assumption that unemployment benefits are funded by taxing surplus value. 
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may be quite high in the presence of prosperous non-capitalist class structures, thus 
threatening one or several conditions of existence of the capitalist class structure. In such 
a situation, the capitalists may get rid of the welfare mechanisms and with it the 
subsumed class payments associated with it. This action by capitalists gives birth to new 
contradictions and problems for the capitalists, as discussed below. 
In capitalist social formations of certain poorer societies—the kind considered by Nun or 
Sanyal—the reserve army of laborers is purely “notional”. The potentially inactive labor 
force is too large relative to the capitalist surplus value to be maintained as an actually 
inactive labor force. Secondly, the potential size of the inactive labor force is larger than 
the portion of it required as reserve laborers for accumulation. The costs of maintenance 
of the potential inactive labor force exceed what is required to secure the conditions of 
accumulation. This cost—to be defrayed as a subsumed class payment—will jeopardize 
other conditions of existence of the capitalist class structure, including accumulation 
itself. Therefore, it makes sense for capitalists to get rid of such costs by shifting the 
weight of the inactive labor force to the non-capitalist class structures. Such an action by 
capitalists has contradictory implications for their own reproduction. On the one hand, the 
capitalists get rid of the subsumed class payments required for maintaining the inactive 
labor force and thus expand the part of the surplus value available for accumulation. On 
the other hand, the expansion of non-capitalist class structures as a result of an influx of 
surplus population expands at the same time non-capitalist claims on means of production 
and labor power and this may undermine the conditions of expansion of capitalist surplus 
value, including the capitalists’ access to labor power and means of production. 
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Therefore, reproduction of the capitalist surplus value via the production of a surplus 
population has contradictory effects on the conditions of reproduction.  
As my reading of Marx’s “colonial” problem illustrates, the presence of a prosperous 
non-capitalist economy may deny the capitalists access to commodified labor power and, 
I may add here, means of production (say, land). Just as the development of towns within 
the feudal social formation led to a flight of serfs from the country-side, so might the 
development of non-capitalist class structures—particularly of the non-exploitative 
type—allow workers to escape capitalist exploitation. This is particularly possible if 
workers see an opportunity in non-capitalist class structures to appropriate and control the 
surplus they themselves produce. Hence, the reproduction of the capitalist class structure 
in the presence of expanding non-capitalist class structures is possible and secure only if 
the conditions of expansion of the latter are such as to depress the surplus produced 
relative to the magnitude of subsumed class payments necessary for the existence of such 
surplus, so that the reproduction of the entire non-capitalist class structure, including the 
reproduction of the labor power of the direct producers, may be threatened. In such 
circumstances the non-capitalist space ceases to present any effective barrier to the 
commodification of labor power that is so crucial to the existence of the capitalist 
fundamental class process. It is precisely here that primitive accumulation acquires 
theoretical significance as one among several processes that may have such effectivity on 
the non-capitalist surplus and hence may play a crucial role in securing the dominance of 
capital.  
As I have argued before, primitive accumulation may take the primary form of 
appropriation of means of production from non-capitalist class structures without a 
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proportionate absorption of the “separated” labor power, producing a surplus population 
in the process. If we add to it labor-saving modes of capitalist accumulation, then non-
capitalist class structures may expand at the same time that their access to means of 
production is undermined by primitive accumulation. This is probably what prompts 
Quijano to define the “marginal pole” of the economy as “a set of occupations or 
activities established around the use of residual resources of production” (Quijano quoted 
in Nun, 2000: 26). Thus the conditions of existence and prosperity of the non-capitalist 
class structure are undermined by the very processes of primitive accumulation that 
secure conditions of expansion of the capitalist class structure on the one hand and 
produce a surplus population on the other hand. The surplus population itself continues to 
belong to non-capitalist class structures with a more precarious access to means of 
production than before, as a result of primitive accumulation. The pressure of the surplus 
population on the non-capitalist class structures has the effect of depressing the 
appropriated surplus relative to what is necessary for their reproduction and hence 
undermines the ability of the non-capitalist appropriators of surplus to contest the 
capitalists over political, economic and cultural conditions of existence.    
The notions of primitive accumulation and surplus population thus enable us to theorize, 
in class terms, the dominance of capital in social formations where expansion of capital 
occurs alongside an expansion of non-capital, i.e. the dominance of capital over a 
resilient “outside”.  
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Conclusion 
To sum up, I claim to make the following contributions to Marxian theory with the new 
understanding of primitive accumulation advanced in this chapter. First, the notion of 
primitive accumulation is de-historicized, defined in a new and precise sense (in class-
terms) and introduced to the field of Marxian economic theory. I claim that the new 
notion addresses the conceptual problems, encountered in the contemporary literature, in 
positing it as a continuous process constitutive of capitalism. Second, the distinction 
between capitalist accumulation and primitive accumulation—a thorny problem in the 
contemporary debate— is clearly etched out in the new understanding. The idea that 
capitalist accumulation and primitive accumulation mutually constitute each other is a 
departure within the Marxian tradition which has so far treated them as alternate modes 
of expansion of capital. Third, the dominance of capital in a social formation is 
introduced as a theoretical problematic and a new significance of primitive accumulation 
is uncovered within this problematic. Fourth, a new perspective is developed for the 
study of certain social formations with significant presence of non-capitalist class 
structures and surplus population. In the process, a conceptual distinction between the 
surplus population and Marx’s notion of the reserve army of laborers is delineated. The 
concepts of surplus population and primitive accumulation are deployed together to 
account for the dominance of capital in such a social formation.  
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CHAPTER 4 
 
PRIMITIVE ACCUMULATION, SURPLUS POPULATION AND THE 
CONTRADICTIONS OF CAPITALISM: A MARXIAN ANALYSIS OF A 
SOCIAL FORMATION WITH CAPITALIST AND ANCIENT CLASS 
STRUCTURES 
 
Introduction 
Reproduction of capitalism is reproduction of dominance of the capitalist class structure 
over a heterogeneous social formation. In Chapter II, I presented a new theoretical 
understanding of primitive accumulation as a process, among others, that secures such 
dominance. Primitive accumulation—itself not a class process—has crucial class-effects 
that secure such dominance. There are as many forms of such dominance as there are 
kinds of capitalism. Consequently, primitive accumulation itself takes different forms in 
different capitalist social formations. Hence, the determinate class-effects of primitive 
accumulation can be specified only in a concrete social context. I presented a general 
theoretical analysis of the class-effects of primitive accumulation in a particular class of 
social formations (e.g. certain postcolonial societies) characterized by a “surplus 
population”. I argued that in such a social formation dispossession may not lead to any 
final dissolution of non-capitalist class structures; rather, it may entail their ceaseless 
destruction and creation. In such a scenario, the class-effects of primitive accumulation 
can be theorized in terms of the latter’s peculiar effectivity on the surplus produced in 
capitalist and non-capitalist class structures, namely, a skewed distribution of surplus 
between class structures and in favor of the capitalists. Further determination of the class-
effects of primitive accumulation requires specification of such a social formation in 
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terms of its determinate class-structures, the specific class and non-class locations of the 
surplus population and the particular modes of articulation of different class-structures.  
In this chapter, I make an attempt to theorize, i.e. concretize further, the class-effects of 
primitive accumulation in a social formation characterized by capitalist and ancient class 
structures, and where the surplus population predominantly inhabits the ancient economy. 
I consider the scenario where the ancient economy dominates in terms of labor force, but 
the capitalist economy dominates in terms of surplus. Such a specification still rests at a 
relatively abstract level, in so far as it assumes away other non-capitalist class structures 
(e.g. feudal, communist, slave etc.) as well as other possible class and non-class (e.g. 
state and non-state welfare) locations of surplus population. This abstraction enables me 
to theorize a social conjuncture that has some general relevance in studying many 
developing societies.  
Once again Marx’s analysis of the “colonial problem” haunts and inspires the theoretical 
endeavor in this chapter. To repeat, in my understanding, Marx’s colonial problem points 
to the theoretical problematic of the dominance of the capitalist class structure over a 
heterogeneous economy. For Marx, the prosperity of the ancients in the settler-colonies 
undermined the conditions of dominance of the capitalist class structure. Primitive 
accumulation played a crucial role in undermining the conditions of existence of ancient 
enterprises and in the development of capitalism.  
More generally, in surplus terms, the prosperity of the ancients depends on the production 
and use of their surplus. In this chapter I theoretically argue how primitive accumulation 
may undermine the prosperity of the ancients without their final dissolution. Like the 
colonial problem in Marx’s Capital, here, I try to understand how the dominance of 
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capital is reproduced in the presence of an economy of the ancients. Unlike the colonial 
problem, I consider how such dominance is secured without any dissolution of the 
ancient class structures. Thus the kind of capitalism I consider is different from that in the 
colonies Marx talks about. Hence, the determinate class-effects of primitive accumulation 
are different too. Despite such differences, Marx’s basic theoretical insight carries over to 
the specific social context I choose to study.        
 
A Capitalist Social Formation with Surplus Population 
We consider a simple ‘model’ of a capitalist social formation with capitalist and ancient 
enterprises embedded in an exchange economy. The ancient economy dominates in terms 
of labor force. The capitalist economy dominates in terms of surplus value. We consider a 
closed economy—i.e., international exchange of commodities as well as movements of 
labor power and means of production is assumed away. To begin our analysis, let us 
assume that the labor force or the total mass of labor power in the economy is constant, 
i.e. growth rate of labor force is zero. Further, some indispensable means of production 
are presumed to be in fixed supply to the economy as a whole. Let us give the name 
‘land’ to such scarce means of production. Expansion of the capitalist output may require 
additional supplies of either or both of labor power and means of production separated 
from each other. Primitive accumulation takes place when the expanding capitalist 
economy secures additional labor power or additional quantities of land by dispossessing 
the ancients.     
At this point, I distinguish between the terms “class structure”, “economy” and “social 
formation” as they will be used in this study. A class structure is an ensemble of a 
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specific fundamental class process and its unique set of subsumed class processes. A 
social formation consists of different class structures subjected to uneven development, 
ceaseless transformations and ubiquitous contradictions both within and between class 
structures. When one class structure dominates in a social formation, the social formation 
derives its name from the dominant class structure. In this model, the capitalist class 
structure is dominant.  
An “economy” is defined around a specific class structure, yet it is a broader concept. An 
economy is a sub-set of the social formation organized around the value created in a 
particular class structure. More precisely, an “economy” is the entire set of class and non-
class processes that are sustained by the total value-added in a particular class structure. 
In our model, for example, the total value-added in all ancient enterprises sustains a 
certain share of the total labor force in ancient fundamental and subsumed class positions 
as well as non-class positions. Likewise, we can think of a capitalist economy. Therefore, 
the simplified ‘model’ of the capitalist social formation we study here consists of a 
capitalist and an ancient economy.   
The value-added in an enterprise is the value of the commodities produced in the 
enterprise minus the value of means of production used up in the production of the 
commodities. When we aggregate the value-added of all enterprises with a specific class-
structure, we get the total value-added in the specific class-structure. 
 For the ancient economy, 
VA(A) = ∑ VA(Ai) = ∑ [W(Ai) – C(Ai)] = ∑ [V(Ai) + S(Ai)]=V(A)+S(A).  
For the capitalist economy,  
VA(K) = ∑ VA(Ki) = ∑ [W(Ki) – C(Ki)] = ∑ [V(Ki) + S(Ki)]=V(K)+S(K).  
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The value-added sustains, first of all, the producers of value—the wage-workers in 
capitalist enterprises and the ancients in ancient enterprises. Second, the value-added 
sustains people in various subsumed class positions specific to each class structure—the 
landlord, the money-lender, the shareholders, the managers etc. Indirectly, subsumed 
class payments also sustain unproductive workers engaged in non-class processes 
securing the conditions of the particular fundamental class process—for example, clerks 
in merchant enterprises and banks. Third, the recipients of non-class and class payments 
arising out of the value-added in the class-structure may in turn sustain other people—
e.g. receivers or appropriators of private value transfers within and outside family. 
Therefore, an “economy” refers to a sub-group of the labor force sustained out of the 
value-added in a particular class structure.  
The distinction between class structure and the economy is useful to underline the social 
effects of primitive accumulation and capitalist accumulation in our ‘model’. For 
example, when ancients are dispossessed, along with them, some unproductive laborers 
also lose a part of their economic sustenance secured out of the value-added in those 
ancient enterprises. The social effects of primitive accumulation are greater than the 
dispossession of the ancients. At the same time, it is possible that productive capitalist 
accumulation takes place without a corresponding expansion of the labor-size of the 
capitalist economy. Coupled with the effects of primitive accumulation on the ancient 
economy, such implosive growth of the capitalist economy may lead to the emergence of 
what we understand as surplus population.   
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The Location of Surplus Population 
Let us now conceptually locate surplus population in such a social formation. Let the 
total labor force be L. The labor force secures livelihood in various fundamental and 
subsumed class as well as non-class processes. In this ‘model’, we consider four main 
categories of livelihood. A part of the labor force is employed as productive workers in 
capitalist enterprises. A second segment of the labor force is the unproductive labor force 
in the capitalist economy. A third part of the labor force consists of ancient producers. 
The remaining part of the labor force is constituted by other categories of unproductive 
labor force in the ancient economy, excluding the ancients themselves.82 Let KPL , KUL , 
AL  and A-UAL  be the size of the labor force in the four categories respectively.  
                                                     L A-UAAKUKP L  L L  L +++=   
 
                                                     L =       LK        +    LA 
 
LK is the part of the labor force sustained out of the value-added in the capitalist 
fundamental class processes VA (K). LA is the part of the labor force sustained out of the 
value-added in the ancient fundamental class processes VA (A).  
The absence of the category of “reserve army of labor” in the above equation reflects the 
specificity of the social conjuncture analyzed here. As argued in the Chapter II, the 
presence of a sizable non-capitalist economy allows the capitalists i) to shift the major 
part of the economic burden of maintaining the reserve army of labor on to the former 
and ii) thus undermine the conditions of accumulation and/or prosperity of the latter. In 
these circumstances, the entire ancient economy acquires the character of the surplus 
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 Here I adopt the definition of productive and unproductive labor presented in Resnick and Wolff (1987: 
132-141). Productive laborers are workers in capitalist fundamental class processes. All other kinds of 
labor are defined as unproductive. Unproductive laborers may occupy other (non-capitalist) fundamental, 
(capitalist and non-capitalist) subsumed class positions and non-class positions.   
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population. The ancient labor force acquires the character of the “latent surplus 
population” Marx talks about in connection with agricultural labor force. Like the latent 
surplus population, the labor force in the ancient economy is always on the point of 
migrating to the capitalist economy whenever opportunities arise. It is not however any 
intrinsic desire to be employed in the capitalist economy or any perceived superiority of 
employment in the capitalist economy that drives such migration. Rather, the combined 
processes of primitive accumulation and creation of surplus labor power undermines the 
conditions of prosperity of the ancient class structure and thus destabilizes the 
reproduction of labor power in various social processes in the ancient economy. Hence, a 
significant part of the labor force in the ancient economy is always seeking secure 
reproduction of their labor power in the capitalist economy.  
In representing the ancients as surplus population, it appears that the present essay 
espouses an extremely capitalocentric view of the ancients as victims of capitalist 
accumulation. It might be argued that the growth of ancients is partly fuelled by the 
desire of the producers to be independent and reject wage-slavery under capitalism. Yet, 
such desires and class-consciousness are precisely what undermine the dominance of the 
capitalist class structure in a social formation. What I propose to show is how primitive 
accumulation secures the dominance of the capitalist class structure by undermining the 
prosperity of the ancients and the formation of such desires.         
In such a context, the category of the “reserve army of labor”—i.e. the unemployed labor 
force maintained by the capitalist economy through poverty management—must give 
way to the notion of surplus population. Let me restate the significance of the concept of 
reserve army of labor in Marx’s theory. The reserve army is the mass of dispossessed and 
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unemployed labor power which allows accumulating capitalist enterprises to secure 
additional supplies of labor-power without being dependent on either the natural growth 
of the labor power or primitive accumulation of labor power from non-capitalist 
economy.83 The cost of maintaining a reserve army is a particular subsumed class 
payment by the capitalists as a whole (generally through a state policy of unemployment 
management, financed by taxing capitalist surplus value), each individual capitalist 
shouldering a portion of the cost proportional to his or her profits. On the one hand the 
reserve army of labor enables accumulation and hence acts as a condition of existence of 
the capitalist class structure. In conditions of high rate of accumulation, as the reserve 
army is exhausted, the direct costs of maintaining the labor power of the reserve army 
vanish, though other costs persist, like the administrative costs of maintaining 
unemployment bureaus, salaries of the personnel of the welfare state etc. In conditions of 
low rate of accumulation, the costs of maintaining the reserve army may rise so much— 
depending on the political and cultural context as well as the absolute size of the reserve 
army— as to reduce the surplus value available for other subsumed class payments and 
thus threaten one or several conditions of existence of the capitalist fundamental class 
process.  
In the present context, the capitalists either do not maintain a reserve army of labor so as 
to unburden themselves of the costs of its maintenance out of their surplus value or the 
capitalists cannot maintain it if the cost is prohibitively high relative to the capitalist 
surplus value. In this case, the costs of maintenance of the reserve army are either borne 
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 The reserve army of labor also has a disciplinary effect on the capitalist work force and a depressive 
effect on their wages and is thus a condition for expanded reproduction of the capitalist fundamental class 
process.    
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by the workers in the capitalist class structure—when reserve army is maintained by 
taxing the wages—in which case the reproduction of their labor power is threatened. We 
ignore this possibility assuming that workers in the capitalist enterprises are unionized 
and thus are able to avoid such costs84. The other possibility is that the economic burden 
of the surplus labor power falls on the non-capitalist economy (ancient, in this case) 
whose conditions of existence are consequently threatened. We assume that the surplus 
population enters the ancient economy as an active labor force. A part of the surplus 
population sets up ancient enterprises and the remaining part populates other categories 
of unproductive employment in the ancient economy. Thus, in our model, there is no 
category of the labor force called “unemployed”. Rather we have what is commonly 
referred to as the “working poor” in developing countries with surplus population. Later 
in this chapter, we will try to understand how the ancient economy accommodates the 
surplus population as an active labor force and what the consequences of such 
accommodation are for both the ancient and the capitalist class structures.  
Since the capitalists no longer have a reserve army of labor, how do they secure 
additional supplies of labor power for accumulation? Either the capitalists have to depend 
on the natural increase of labor force or secure additional labor power from the ancient 
economy, with or without dispossession. We have assumed away the natural increase of 
labor force at the very beginning. Therefore, the ancient economy is the only source of 
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 Historically unionized workers have pushed the state for unemployment insurance programs for the 
reserve army through taxation of wages, profits as well as subsumed class incomes flowing from capitalist 
surplus value. However, I am considering a situation where the size of the surplus population is so large 
that state welfare programs funded by taxes on profits or wages are resisted by both capitalists and 
unionized workers. Presumably the standard of living of the unionized workers in capitalist industries is 
above that given by the average value of labor power in the economy. The presence of a large surplus 
population poses constant threats to a reduction in the standard of living of the unionized workers to the 
average level, thus prompting them to resist taxation of their incomes for any large-scale state welfare 
programs for the surplus population.   
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additional labor power in our model.  The justification for such an assumption is provided 
by the very understanding of the ancient economy as a location of surplus population. I 
have argued that in such circumstances, the conditions of prosperity of the ancient 
economy are undermined.  The precarious and unstable reproduction of the mass of labor 
power in the ancient economy implies that a portion of this labor power is always 
available for employment in the capitalist economy.  
But there is one more justification for assuming away natural rate of growth of the labor 
force. Capitalist accumulation requires additional land which is presumed to be in fixed 
supply. The supply of additional land to the capitalists as a whole must come from the 
ancient economy. This requires separation of ancients from land. Such separation may be 
voluntary or forced. For example, the poor peasant—unable to reproduce herself as an 
ancient— may give up his land for immediate reproduction of her labor power. The same 
peasant might also cling tenaciously to her land as the last means of independent 
production and subsistence, however minimal the latter may be. In this case, force is 
applied, which implies a certain cost of primitive accumulation for capitalists—
“enclosure” costs of expropriating the peasant, fencing and guarding the enclosed land 
etc. The “enclosure” costs are a kind of subsumed class payments that secure one of the 
political conditions of existence of the capitalist fundamental class process, namely 
private property rights over means of production. Whatever the case may be, acquisition 
of additional means of production for accumulation at the same time creates additional 
supplies of labor power, irrespective of any demand from the accumulating capitalists. 
Hence, reproduction of the capitalist economy, which requires primitive accumulation, 
produces additional supplies of “separated” labor power, independent of the natural 
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growth of the labor force. For all these reasons the ancient economy acts as a source of 
additional labor power for accumulating capitalists. Therefore, to keep matters simple, I 
have assumed a constant labor force in my ‘model’. 
If labor force is constant, the sum of the growth rates of employment in all categories 
must be zero. That is, 0
dt
dL
dt
dL
dt
dL
dt
dL AUAAKUKP =+++ − . Let the rate of primitive 
accumulation, i.e. the rate of dispossession of the ancients be P. The rate of primitive 
accumulation is positive when the rate of accumulation of productive capital (Ω) is 
positive. In the traditional teleological understanding of primitive accumulation, P>0, 
0
dt
dLKP >  and 0
dt
dLA <  (also 0
dt
dLKU > and 0
dt
dL AUA <− )—i.e. the ancient economy is 
dissolved and unproductive laborers sustained by the ancient economy are transformed 
into productive and unproductive laborers sustained by the capitalist economy. The 
particular social conjuncture I study, however, is one characterized by following 
conditions—P>0 and 0
dt
dLA ≥ . This is a situation where primitive accumulation and 
hence accumulation of productive capital is taking place without, however, a decline in 
the number of ancients. This implies that new ancient enterprises are set up at an equal or 
greater rate than that at which existing ancient enterprises are dissolved. Let us consider 
the situation where this happens along with a stagnant or falling capitalist share of the 
labor force, i.e. 0
dt
dL
dt
dL KUKP ≤+ . Therefore, we have a particular kind of capitalist 
accumulation associated with a stagnant or declining capitalist share of total mass of 
labor power. 
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Many Forms of Capitalist Accumulation 
Let us look closely at capitalist accumulation itself to identify when such specific 
conditions may prevail—i.e. Ω> 0 and 0
dt
dL
dt
dL KUKP ≤+ . Capitalist accumulation is an 
expansion of productive capital ∆K =∆(C+V). The rate of capital accumulation is defined 
as 
V)(C
V)∆(C
K
∆K
+
+
==Ω . An increase in total capital may or may not involve a change in 
the organic composition of capital 
VC
Cq
+
= . We may consider accumulation under 
conditions differing with respect to organic composition of capital, productivity of labor 
and intensity of labor. The technical productivity of labor (a) is the number of units of 
use-value produced per labor hour. More productive labor power produces a larger 
number of units of use-value per hour compared to less productive labor power. On a 
daily basis, let UV be the number of use-values produced per day, h be the length of the 
work-day and KPL be the number of productive workers.   
.hL
UV
a
KP
=  
When technical productivity rises, the same quantity of living labor is distributed across 
greater number of units of commodities. As a result, generally, unit values of 
commodities fall85.  
Intensity (I) of labor—or the value-productivity of labor— is defined as value-added per 
labor hour.  
                                                 
85
 Whether unit value of commodities falls with rising technical productivity of labor depends on what 
happens to the quantity of means of production (embodied labor) needed to secure such increase in 
productivity (e.g. new machines, enhanced use of raw materials etc.). When, total (socially necessary 
abstract) labor— the sum of living and embodied labor— rises less than proportionately with the number of 
units of commodities produced, then unit value of the commodity falls. 
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.hL
S)(VI
KP
+
=  
Intensity can be increased by drawing more labor out of a given labor power in a given 
work-day (through close monitoring, incentives, ‘speed-ups’ etc.). Intensification of labor 
is similar to the lengthening of the work-day and is related to the production of absolute 
surplus value. Intensity of labor has no effect on the unit-values of commodities. More 
intensity leads to more units of use-values produced per labor hour, but also more 
expenditure of living labor per labor hour and proportionately more quantity of embodied 
labor (means of production). Thus, more units of use values incorporate more labor and 
hence unit values remain same.  
The distinction between technical or value productivity of labor can also be specified in 
terms of their effect on value-added and the rate of surplus value. The total income, in 
value terms, that sustains a class structure, is given by the value-added across all 
enterprises with a specific fundamental class process. Capitalist value-added VA (K) is 
the total living labor incorporated in capitalist commodities, divided between variable 
capital and surplus value.  
VA (K) = V (K) +S (K) = .hI.LKP  
 
Value-added increases when either intensity, number of productive laborers or the length 
of the work-day increases. If sk denotes the rate of capitalist surplus value and v  denotes 
hourly wage rate, then, we may rewrite the relation in the following way.  
 
.hv.LV(K) KP=  
S (K) = sk.V (K) 
VA (K) = (1+sk) .hv.LKP  
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When intensity increases, other factors remaining constant, the increased depreciation of 
labor power requires more means of subsistence per unit labor power and hence hourly 
wage rate increases. But the rate of surplus value may nevertheless increase if the greater 
subsistence basket of the workers requires an increase in necessary labor, but the increase 
in necessary labor is less than the increase in surplus labor.  
                                           ↑VA (K)= (1+ ↑sk)( ↑v. h.LKP ) 
Conversely, when intensity, number of productive laborers and the length of the work-
day remain constant, value-added remains constant, irrespective of changes in 
productivity. If productivity increases, other factors remaining constant, nothing happens 
to the value added. If productivity of labor increases in the wage-goods industry, the rate 
of surplus value may increase (relative surplus value) if the necessary labor time is 
shortened relative to surplus labor time, the length of the work-day remaining constant. 
This is a change in the relative magnitudes of variable capital and surplus value—i.e. an 
increase of surplus labor time relative to its necessary counterpart, the total living labor 
and hence value-added remaining constant.    
VA (K)= (1+ ↑sk)(↓v. h.LKP ) 
 
Or, 0.h.))(v.L
dt
da
.
da
ds(h))(L
dt
da
.
da
dv)(s(1 KPkKP.k =++  
 
We can capture the effects of increases in technical and value productivity of labor on 
value-added, hourly wage rate, productive labor force and rate of surplus value and see 
how capital accumulation may affect these variables under different conditions related to 
technical or value productivity of labor.  
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Case I: Accumulation with Constant Organic Composition of Capital, Technical 
Productivity of Labor and Intensity of Labor 
 
With accumulation, the organic composition of capital remains constant when production 
is expanded on the same technical basis (e.g. replication of factories). Technical 
productivity of labor is constant and consequently the rate of surplus value and the unit 
values of commodities remain constant. If intensity and the length of the work-day 
remain constant too (i.e. there is no increase in absolute surplus value), value-added in 
the capitalist economy increases in proportion to an increase in the number of productive 
workers.  
                                       
dt
dLh).)(vs(1
dt
dVA(K) KP
k+=  
This is typically the Smithian vision of capitalist accumulation86. Marx, however, 
provides a more complicated analysis of capitalist accumulation. 
 
Case II: Accumulation with Constant Technical productivity and Increasing Value-
productivity  
 
There is another way in which the capitalist value-added may be increased and capital 
can be accumulated on the same technical basis—by increasing the intensity of labor. 
Intensification of labor requires an accumulation of both constant and variable capital—
the former because more living labor needs more means of production and the latter 
because higher intensity involves greater wear and tear of labor power and hence more 
means of subsistence for reproduction of labor power. Here, technical productivity and 
unit values of commodities remain constant. The capitalist value-added increases because 
                                                 
86
 Adam Smith (1776) envisaged a process of capital accumulation where the demand for laborers rises 
faster than the supply, causing real wages to rise.  
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intensification of labor generates more living labor. Also, as we have seen before, higher 
intensity implies higher rate of surplus value and a higher hourly wage rate—the latter 
varying inversely with the former.  
.h.))(v.L
dt
dI
.
dI
ds()h
dt
dI
.
dI
dvL
dt
dL)(v.s(1
dt
dVA(K)
KP
k
KP.
KP
k +++=  
                             
The organic composition of capital may increase when additional means of production 
required by more intense labor is greater than additional means of subsistence required 
for compensating the laborer for the higher intensity of labor87. More importantly, 
capitalist value-added may increase in this case while the number of productive laborers 
may remain constant. In fact, the latter may well decline along with a rise in variable 
capital—the decline in the number of workers being more than compensated by a more 
intense performance of living labor by the remaining workers88.  
 
Case III: Accumulation with Rising Organic Composition of Capital, Increasing 
Technical Productivity and Constant Value-Productivity of Labor  
 
The most frequently discussed case of capitalist accumulation involves a rising organic 
composition of capital89, a rise in the capitalist rate of surplus value, a change in technical 
                                                 
87
 Intensification of labor does require an increase in means of production but some elements of fixed 
capital (e.g. the factory building itself) need not increase. 
88
 “The number of labourers commanded by capital may remain the same, or even fall, while the variable 
capital increases. This is the case if the individual labourer yields more labour, and therefore his wages 
increase, and this although the price of labour remains the same or even fall, only more slowly than the 
mass of labor rises. Increase of variable capital in this case, becomes an index of more labour, but not of 
more labourers employed. It is the absolute interest of every capitalist to press a given quantity of labour 
out of a smaller, rather than a greater number of labourers, if the cost is about the same. In the latter case, 
the outlay of constant capital increases in proportion to the mass of labour set in action; in the former that 
increase is much smaller. The more extended the scale of production, the stronger this motive. Its force 
increases with the accumulation of capital” (Marx, 1912: 696-697).   
89
 A rise in the organic composition of capital occurs with accumulation, if i) both constant capital and 
variable capital increase, the former increasing more than the latter, ii) constant capital increases while 
variable capital remains same, iii) constant capital increases while variable capital declines, the decline 
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productivity of labor and a fall in the unit values of either or both C-commodities and V-
commodities90. If unit values of wage-goods fall, the value of labor power decreases and 
the rate of surplus value increases in all industries. Change in capitalist value-added is 
strictly proportional to the change in the number of productive laborers, intensity of labor 
and the length of the work-day remaining constant.  
 
.h.))(v.L
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Capital accumulation with rising organic composition of capital will lead to an increase 
in value-added only if there is an increase in the productive labor force, intensity and 
hours of labor remaining constant. Therefore, capital accumulation may take place and 
the organic composition of capital may rise with an increasing, decreasing or constant 
value-added and number of productive laborers.  
                                                                                                                                                 
being smaller than the increase and so that total capital increases. Rising organic composition of capital 
with accumulation implies that ∆C> ∆V, where ∆V can be of any sign.   
90
 A rise in technical productivity of labor in C-goods industries may even lead to a fall in the organic 
composition of capital if unit-values of means of production fall more than the increase in the volume of 
means of production.  
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Case IV:Accumulation with Rising Organic Composition of Capital, Increasing 
Technical Productivity and Intensity of Labor 
  
Intensity of labor may also increase along with productivity—for example, when new 
machines that increase technical productivity of labor also enable intensification of 
labor91. Value-added will increase relative to Case III, because intensification leads to 
more living labor spent on producing more values. However, the productive labor force 
may be constant, declining or rising with rising value-added92.  
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Exclusionary Capitalist Accumulation 
As the preceding analysis shows, accumulation of capital may take place with constant, 
rising or even falling capitalist value-added, organic composition of capital and number 
                                                 
91
 “[M]achinery becomes in the hands of the capital the objective means, systematically employed for 
squeezing out more labour in a given time.” (Marx, 1912: 450).  
92
 The effect on the hourly wage rate is complicated. The hourly wage rate is determined by the historical 
context. But here we will consider only two of the determinants of the hourly wage rate, holding all other 
factors constant. The productivity and the intensity of labor have opposite effects on the hourly wage rate. 
If the productivity of labor increases (in V-commodities department), the unit-values of V-commodities 
decline and the hourly wage rate goes down (rate of surplus value increases), the quantity of means of 
subsistence required to reproduce unit labor-power remaining constant. When intensity of labor increases, 
the quantity of means of subsistence required per unit labor-power and hence the hourly wage rate 
increases, unit-values of wage-goods remaining constant. When both productivity and intensity of labor 
increase, the net effect on the hourly wage rate depends on the relative strength of the two determinants. 
The hourly wage rate may decline, remain constant or even increase. 
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of productive workers. The rate of accumulation, the rate of change of organic 
composition of capital, the rate of technological change and the rate of change of total 
income (equals total value-added) are all related but conceptually distinct variables. 
There is no necessity for any of them to move in any specific direction with any other.  
Let us consider the possibility that with a positive rate of accumulation there is a decrease 
in the number of productive workers. This may occur as a result of an increase in 
technical productivity or intensity of labor. In fact, except for Case I (the Smithian case), 
such a possibility exists in all the other cases. It is further possible that not only total 
capital, but total income, i.e. value-added, increases with a decline in the number of 
productive laborers.93 This happens when intensity increases along with productivity. 
Even as the productive labor force declines, more labor is squeezed out of each worker in 
a given work-day so that more living labor and hence more value-added is secured with 
less number of workers. The mass as well as the rate of surplus value increase with 
decreasing productive labor force.  It is perfectly reasonable for the capitalists to engage 
in such types of accumulation where the productive labor force declines, as long as 
surplus value increases.   
In all cases of accumulation, social wealth, i.e. the total mass of different use-values, 
increases. Therefore, the capitalist class structure enables increased production of social 
wealth at the same time that the number of workers producing that wealth decreases, 
                                                 
93
 The number of productive laborers may fall with rising accumulation when, for example, machines 
replace workers. Total capital increases while variable capital falls absolutely—i.e. organic composition 
rises very rapidly—not only because the hourly wage rate falls due to increase in productivity of labor in 
V-goods industries, but also because the number of productive laborers falls. Value-added actually falls 
with accumulation in this case! When intensity increases, variable capital may rise because the wage rate 
increases, but the number of productive workers may actually decrease. In this case, the value-added will 
increase, if the effect of a rise in intensity outweighs the effect of fall in number of laborers.  
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i.e. 0
dt
dLKP < . However, even though accumulation may require less number of 
productive laborers, it might still require greater number of unproductive laborers. 
Increased capitalist output requires more merchanting, insuring, banking and advertising, 
as well as more managerial supervision, more clerical activity, more research and 
development, more tax collection etc. Therefore, unproductive laborers may increase in 
the capitalist economy at the same time that productive laborers decline. However, 
unproductive labor processes may themselves be subjected to labor-saving innovations. 
ATMs and credit card technology decrease the labor force in credit and banking 
enterprises; electronic surveillance systems reduce the demand for security personnel in 
capitalist enterprises; e-mails reduce the demand for courier personnel within capitalist 
enterprises etc. We consider the social conjuncture where the growth rate of total labor 
force sustained by the capitalist value-added is non-positive, i.e. 0
dt
dL
dt
dL KUKP ≤+ . 
In contemporary dissident discourses on capitalism, one often hears of the phenomenon 
of “jobless growth”. This is also relevant to the study of Indian economy, which we 
present in the next chapter. This is a new kind of unemployment scenario that is seriously 
disruptive of social cohesion in any society—rising wealth and rising joblessness. This 
problem is “new” because previous analyses of unemployment focused on lack of 
accumulation or growth as the cause of rising unemployment. As I tried to show, in the 
preceding analysis, the strict proportionality between accumulation and employment is a 
Smithian idea. Marxian value theory can account for rising accumulation with rising, 
stagnant or declining size of the total labor force sustained out of the capitalist value-
added. I argue that in many economies, including India, “jobless growth” may be 
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occurring because increased rate of capital accumulation is accompanied by rising 
organic composition of capital and increasing mass and rate of capitalist surplus value 
due to increasing technical productivity and intensity of labor. Capitalist value-added is 
increasing with a declining size of productive labor force and total social wealth is 
increasing with a declining size of the labor force with claims on that wealth.   
But there is another dimension of accumulation that assumes particular significance in 
this scenario. Along with the mass of use-values, the total means of production used in 
capitalist industries, including land, increases with accumulation. As the capitalist claim 
on ‘scarce’ land increases with accumulation, additional land is secured by expropriating 
ancients and enclosing the ancients’ land. Here lies the crux of the problem of surplus 
population. Capitalist accumulation involves primitive accumulation in so far as 
expanded reproduction of capital requires greater share of the ‘scarce’ means of 
production. However, such primitive accumulation releases dispossessed ancient 
producers along with enclosed land and the former stands in relative excess to the 
“average needs for the self-expansion of capital” (Marx, 1912: 691). Therefore, 
accumulation of capital is also accumulation of means of production on its side and 
accumulation of ‘separated’ and surplus labor power on the other side, i.e. outside94. 
Moreover, if the capitalist share of the labor force declines with accumulation of capital, 
then surplus labor power expands not only because of dispossession, but also because of 
                                                 
94
 “The law by which a constantly increasingly quantity of means of production, thanks to the advance in 
the productiveness of social labour, may be set in movement by a progressively diminishing expenditure of 
human power, this law, in a capitalist society—where the labourer does not employ the means of 
production, but the means of production employ the labourer—undergoes a complete inversion and is 
expressed thus: the higher the productiveness of labour, the greater is the pressure of the labourers on the 
means of employment, the more precarious therefore, becomes their conditions of existence, viz., the sale 
of their own labour-power for the increasing of another’s wealth, or for the self-expansion of capital” 
(Marx,1912: 708). 
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“repulsion” of labor power by capital. Primitive accumulation, in such a context, plays a 
role very different from that in the classical context of transition. The objective of 
primitive accumulation is the freeing of means of production rather than securing “freed” 
labor power.  
It should now be clear that the assumption of constant labor force was merely an initial 
theoretical step to highlight the basic processes at work in the production of surplus 
population. We now relax the initial assumption and let the labor force grow— say, at the 
rate N. 
dt
dL
dt
dL
dt
dL
dt
dLN AUAAKUKP −+++=  
Even if the labor force in the capitalist economy grows at a positive rate, i.e. 
0)
dt
dL
dt
dL( KUKP >+ , as long as )
dt
dL
dt
dL(N KUKP +> , the labor force of the ancient 
economy will grow too at a positive rate.  
We may now relax some of the more restrictive conditions under which surplus 
population is produced. No restrictions on the types of capitalist accumulation need to be 
assumed here as long as total labor force grows in excess of the “average needs for the 
self-expansion of capital”, i.e. )
dt
dL
dt
dL(N KUKP +> . Further, let us relax the assumption 
of a fixed supply of land. Instead, let the availability of land grow at some positive rateµ . 
Corresponding to a rate of capitalist accumulation Ω, let the capitalist claim on land as a 
means of production increase at the rateα .If α>µ , the capitalists engage in primitive 
accumulation, usurping ancient land at the rate (α -µ ).  This implies a dispossession of 
the ancients at a rate P. The rate of establishment of new ancient enterprises is therefore 
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equal to (P +
dt
dLA ). Let β be the rate of growth of the ancient claim on land as a means of 
production sufficient to sustain the growth of ancient producers at the rate
dt
dLA
, which 
implies that ancient economy falls short of its required land at the rate µ)(αβ −+ .  
The dispossessed ancients as well as the additional labor force turn to the ancient 
economy for their sustenance. Dispossession occurs with an increasing number of the 
ancients. The expansion of the ancient economy masks the flow of scarce means of 
production from the ancient to the capitalist economy. The ability of the capitalists to 
engage in primitive accumulation in this form is of course determined by the entire social 
context. If and when such a conjuncture arises, we can say that the ancient economy acts 
as a residual sector that absorbs the “surplus” population on residual means of 
production. Therefore, the ancient economy accommodates a part of the labor force in 
excess of employment in the capitalist sector. Since the growth of this “excess” labor—
surplus population, in our terminology—is partly due to dispossession of ancients, we 
have the paradoxical result that dispossessed ancients in one branch of commodity 
production may be transformed, not into wage-labor, but ancients in another or even the 
same branch of commodity production. When, in the 1970s, economists first took notice 
of the explosion of urban petty producing activities in developing countries despite rapid 
capitalist growth, the urban petty producers came to be referred to as “peasants in the 
cities” (McGee (1973). The paradox for the economists lay in the transformation of 
agricultural petty producers into urban manufacturing petty producers and not into 
capitalist laborers as conventional wisdom till then made us believe. It is this kind of 
social conjuncture that the present study addresses.   
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Contradictions of Capitalist Accumulation 
The setting up of ancient enterprises by the surplus population requires access to means 
of production which may be provided by money-lending capitalists. As far as land is 
concerned, the additional ancients are accommodated mainly through fragmentation of 
existing land under the ancients. This is for example the case with ancient farmers 
whereby the family plot gets fragmented through inheritance into smaller plots—often 
too small for farming to be economically viable. A second strategy for the ancients 
involves transforming land as means of subsistence into land as means of production or 
using land as both. This is the case of household production of commodities in both rural 
and urban areas but more strikingly observed in urban slums. Another strategy for the 
dispossessed is illegal encroachment and sharing of land under capitalist production. In 
this case, the capitalists are directly affected since encroached land is their means of 
production. In case of private capitalists, examples of certain encroachment include 
piracy of books, DVDs, music CDs, branded clothes, electronic products etc. In case of 
state capitalist enterprises (i.e. public enterprises), such encroachment may often take the 
open form of occupation of geographical land—e.g. invasion of railways land. In the first 
case, conditions of existence of ancient production are threatened. In the second case, not 
only the conditions of reproduction of ancient enterprises, but also those of reproduction 
of ancients’ labor power are threatened. In the third case, conditions of existence of both 
capitalist and ancient class processes are undermined, to different degrees. It is obvious 
that absorption of the surplus population as ancient producers requires that a part of the 
means of production flow from the capitalist to the ancient economy in the form of land 
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forcibly shared by or encroached on by the ancients—thus constituting a reversal of 
primitive accumulation. Here is the contradiction for the capitalists. To secure their 
conditions of existence, the capitalists need to engage in primitive accumulation and yet 
the social outcome of such primitive accumulation is a surplus population whose 
sustenance requires a reversal of primitive accumulation and which poses a threat to the 
reproduction of the capitalists. Let us spell out the contradiction in terms of surplus. 
Surplus value is disposed of in myriad ways—as subsumed class payments under 
different headings— to secure the conditions of existence of the capitalist class structure. 
A part of the SV(K) is used for accumulation of capital (Ω ). The reserve army of labor is 
one condition of accumulation and hence of reproduction of the capitalist fundamental 
class process. The cost of maintaining the reserve army of labor is a separate cost and 
involves a subsumed class payment, RASSCP . The cost of primitive accumulation belongs 
to the broader cost of securing a particular (politico-legal) condition of existence of the 
capitalist surplus value—namely, a social pattern of private ownership of means of 
production that exclude a section of the population from access to such means of 
production. PASSCP  is singled out as the cost of expansion of such a regime of private 
property rights over means of production. othersSSCP is the sum of all other kinds of 
subsumed class payments.    
                                     SV(K) = othersPARA SSCPSSCPSSCP +++Ω   
RASSCP and Ω  are inversely related. While the presence of an ancient economy allows 
the capitalists to get rid of RASSCP , at the same time it increases PASSCP . This is 
because the ancients “invade” the private means of production under capitalist control 
and thus undermine some of the conditions of existence of the capitalists. Further, the 
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reproduction of ancients requires “locking” some “scarce” means of production (land) in 
ancient labor processes. Both outcomes require increased expenditure on behalf of the 
capitalists to either defend or expand their exclusive access to means of production.  
It is precisely here that David Harvey misses the contradiction of the whole process. 
Harvey acknowledges an inescapable “outside” of capital, but he sees the “outside” as a 
condition of existence of capital. In my understanding, the “outside” both enables and 
undermines the reproduction of capital at the same time. This contradiction, which places 
the reproduction of capital in a climate of radical contingency, also inscribes the aleatory 
at the heart of society.  
 
Primitive Accumulation and Ancient Surplus 
Throughout the last section we have repeatedly hinted that the reproduction of the ancient 
economy is threatened by primitive accumulation and the consequent production of a 
surplus population. In this section, I will try to show how an expansion of an ancient 
economy may go hand in hand with the undermining of the conditions of prosperity of 
the ancients. We will however choose to focus exclusively on primitive accumulation and 
its impact on the ancient economy, fully aware that all other processes occurring in the 
society may add to or reverse the effects of primitive accumulation. More precisely, we 
will seek to establish the following theoretical positions in the context of the specific 
social conjuncture we are studying. 
i) Primitive accumulation enables a skewed distribution of surplus between 
capitalist and ancient class structures. 
ii) Such skewed distribution, in turn, enables primitive accumulation. 
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In other words, primitive accumulation and the resulting social distribution of surplus and 
labor power across class structures overdetermine each other. This process of mutual 
constitutivity further works as one condition of the dominance of the capitalist class 
structure.  
At the outset, I distinguish my position from two contending positions concerning surplus 
in the ancient economy. One view holds that ancients are subsistence producers who 
produce no surplus. This view is strongly held in the modernist theories of 
development95. But even in the Marxian theoretical tradition, simple commodity 
production is often represented as production for consumption as distinct from 
production for profit96. A second view holds that simple commodity production is 
characterized by production of surplus, but the production of surplus renders the simple 
commodity production unstable, in so far as there is no rule of distribution of surplus in 
the ancient economy analogous to the capitalist rule of distribution of surplus according 
to a uniform rate of profit97. Therefore, the ancient economy can only reproduce itself by 
losing its surplus to some external social sites—e.g., as tributes to the Asiatic state or 
outflow of surplus to the capitalists through unequal exchange in the market (ancient 
commodities selling at less than their values against capitalist commodities).    
The position held in this essay is different. Processes related to surplus, i.e. class 
processes, constitute the very entry point in the Marxian theoretical discourse and the 
                                                 
95
 The entire literature on “dual economy” in development economics builds on this view. See Lewis 
(1954) for the most well-known formulation of a dualistic underdeveloped economy consisting of a small, 
capitalist modern sector and a large, traditional, non-capitalist subsistence sector.  
96
 This view is often substantiated by reference to Marx’s well-known distinction between the circuits of 
simple commodity production (C-M-C) and capitalist production ( MCCM ′−′−− ). See the clearest 
formulation of this view in Sweezy (1942). 
97
 See Chaudhury, Das and Chakrabarti (2000). The problem emerges in the context of heterogeneous 
labor—i.e. different subsistence needs in different branches of ancient production. For homogeneous labor, 
a uniform rate of self-exploitation is a sufficient rule for the distribution of surplus in the ancient economy.   
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present essay, which is located within the former, is no exception. Class structures are 
distinguished not by the production or non-production of surplus, but by the specificity of 
the processes of production, appropriation and distribution of surplus. Having chosen 
class—i.e production of surplus—as the entry point, Marxian theory further recognizes 
that production of surplus in any class structure as well as the stability of any class 
structure is conditioned by the entire social context, i.e. overdetermined by all other 
processes occurring in the society. I understand stability of a class structure as its 
contingent and provisional reproduction. Specific conditions must prevail if surplus is to 
be produced and the class structure within which surplus is produced is to be reproduced, 
the conditions themselves being specific to each class structure. The conditions for 
reproduction of the capitalist class structure are different from those of the ancient class 
structure.  
Therefore, the present essay understands both ancient and capitalist production in terms 
of surplus and focus rather on the different conditions governing surplus in the two cases. 
Further, surplus and subsistence are seen as conditions of each other, rather than 
independent goals in themselves. Production of surplus—and possibly also 
accumulation—is crucial to the securing of subsistence by the ancients. In fact, 
conditions of existence of ancient production and hence subsistence of the ancients, are 
secured through distributions of surplus produced by the ancients. If sufficient surplus is 
not produced, the subsistence of the ancients is undermined. The ancient class structure is 
encapsulated in the following relation pertaining to ancient surplus—SV(A)  can be 
greater than, equal to or less than ∑SSCP(A) . We have deliberately ignored other 
sources of subsumed class (SSCR) and non-class (NCR) revenues obtained by the 
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ancients and consequently expenditures (X and Y respectively) to secure them are 
ignored.98 
From the relation, we cay say the following.  
1) The ancients perform and appropriate surplus labor. Surplus labor is appropriated 
in the form of surplus value (SV(A) ), i.e. ancients are commodity producers.  
2) The ancients have to make a variety of subsumed class payments (∑SSCP(A) ) 
to secure the conditions of production of their surplus value. 
3) The sum of subsumed class payments may be greater than, equal to or less than 
the surplus value appropriated by the ancients. Whenever, SV(A)≥∑SSCP(A) , 
the conditions of existence of the ancients are secure. The reproduction of the 
ancients is threatened if SV(A) <∑SSCP(A) . 
Let us now try to understand how primitive accumulation—as a process considered in 
isolation—may affect both sides of the relation and hence the reproduction of the 
ancients.  
 
Primitive Accumulation and the Production of Ancient Surplus 
Class, i.e. surplus, constitutes the entry point in the Marxian discourse. But 
overdeterminist Marxian theory does not essentialize surplus, i.e. it recognizes that 
surplus itself is overdetermined in its production, appropriation and distribution. The 
production of surplus has certain conditions relating to the technical nature of production, 
the productivity of the laborer, the availability of means of production, the social demand 
                                                 
98
 See Fried and Wolff (1994) and Gabriel (1990).  
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for the commodity etc. First, labor with a certain level of productivity must be combined 
with means of production to produce specific use-values, which are sold as commodities. 
In a given working-day, the laborer adds certain hours of living labor, i.e. value, to the 
product. The production of surplus value assumes that the productivity of labor is such 
that the laborer can produce the value of the means of subsistence customarily required to 
reproduce his labor-power in less than the full length of the work-day. Whether the 
laborer actually produces or realizes the potential surplus given by the productivity of 
labor depends on several factors—e.g. the availability of required quantity of means of 
production as well as the level of social demand for the commodity. Let us suppose the 
work-day is 8 hours long and the productivity of labor is such that the value of the means 
of subsistence required to reproduce unit labor power is 4 hours of socially necessary 
abstract labor time (SNALT). Therefore, surplus value per laborer per work-day is 4 
SNALT. This is the potential surplus per work-day of the ancient producer. Actual 
surplus is less than or equal to this potential surplus. Let us consider two situations—
where actual surplus may fall below the potential surplus. Both these situations exemplify 
the effectivity of primitive accumulation on the ancient surplus.  
       
Access to Land and the Production of Ancient Surplus 
We have noted how primitive accumulation involves a transfer of “scarce” means of 
production—land—from the ancients to the capitalists. The expanded production of a 
surplus labor force that accompanies primitive accumulation requires that the surplus 
labor force be united with the dwindled mass of land in ancient class processes. In 
agriculture, for example, this leads either to “fragmentation” of geographical land into 
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smaller private allocations usually through inheritance or to “overcrowding” on the same 
plot. In the first case, land commanded by an ancient on average is so small that actual 
surplus is less than potential surplus. The production of surplus, i.e. the performance of 
surplus labor, is conditional upon the availability of sufficient means of production. With 
given technology and availability of means of production other than land, the size of land 
may constrain the full performance of surplus labor time. Actual surplus falls below 
potential surplus, if for example, the ancient farmer works with lower than the average 
intensity of labor, given the length of the work-day or— which is another form of the 
same thing—works with average intensity for less than the average length of the work-
day99 or both. This is equivalent to a shortfall of the absolute surplus value below its 
potential level given by productivity. The rate of self-exploitation, i.e. the rate of ancient 
surplus value, is less than what would have obtained if size of land was sufficient to 
absorb the expenditure of surplus labor time for the average length of the work-day with 
average intensity. In this case, we may have a situation—quite common among peasants 
in developing societies—where SV(A)  <∑SSCP(A) , which implies that the ancient is 
unable to make subsumed class payments to secure conditions of existence of her surplus. 
In such a situation, the ancient is often forced to forego a part of her customary 
subsistence to meet the subsumed class payments.       
                                                 
99
 In this case, the means of subsistence required to reproduce labor power of the ancient farmer may be 
less than when the farmer works for the whole work-day with average level of intensity. Yet, there is a 
minimum below which subsistence requirements cannot fall in a given historical context. This minimum 
may be taken to be unemployment benefits decided by the welfare state, the minimum wage for agricultural 
laborers or the official rural poverty level of income, whichever may be relevant in the specific context. 
What this means is that there exists a certain floor to the necessary labor time, given the technology and the 
historical context. If the surplus labor time is less than what is possible given the necessary labor time, then 
the rate of self-exploitation is less than its potential level.    
  150
This problem is not, in any sense, specific to agriculture or social scarcity of means of 
production.  This problem emerges whenever the ancient producer lacks access to some 
means of production in sufficient quantity to fully absorb the ancient’s surplus labor at 
the potential level, irrespective of whether those means of production are available to the 
society in abundance or scarcity. The ancient manufacturer of garments may lack access 
to clothing material; the ancient manufacturer of leather goods may lack access to raw or 
tanned hide and so on. Hence, an almost universal complaint of the ancients, particularly 
in developing countries, is the lack of credit for buying means of production.  
Alternatively, we can see the problem of fragmentation as “overcrowding” on scarce 
land. Overcrowding takes place when the size of land is too little compared to the size of 
the labor force dependent on it. This is typically the situation, when, in the absence of 
alternative livelihood opportunities and social security institutions, the family harbors 
unemployed relatives. Suppose the plot of land can be farmed by one member of the 
family. Then members of the family take turn at being unemployed. This phenomenon is 
referred to, in the literature on development economics, as “disguised unemployment” or 
“underemployment” characteristic of many populous poorer societies. In Marxian terms, 
“disguised unemployment” exists when a laborer works with less than the average level 
of intensity or less than the average number of hours per year.  
Disguised unemployment thus normally takes the form of smaller number of working hours 
per head per year; for example, each of three brothers shepherding the sheep every third 
day…..It might also take the form of lower intensity of work with people “taking it easy”, 
e.g. the peasant having time to watch the birds while working. If a number of labourers 
went away, the others would be able to produce about the same output working longer and 
harder. Sen, 1968: 5) 100.    
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  See Nurkse (1957) 
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In effect, only one person of the family may be considered to be working the average 
number of hours per year with average intensity. The rest of the extended family 
members may be considered as dependent unemployed. Even if the size of land is 
adequate to bring forth a surplus sufficient to reproduce ancient farming, the presence of 
a dependent labor force requires that a part of the surplus value be distributed as 
subsistence to effectively unemployed members of the extended family. This “payment” 
may even be considered a subsumed class payment to secure access to the family plot of 
land and avoid its fragmentation. In such a case, it is possible that SV(A)  <∑SSCP(A) . 
One category of subsumed class payment—the amount that goes in reproducing the labor 
power of the effectively unemployed family members, SSCPfamily —may be so large that 
other subsumed class payments cannot be met and hence other conditions of existence of 
ancient farming may be undermined. Whether we look at the problem as fragmentation or 
as overcrowding is a matter of choice. In the former case, the effect is on the left hand 
size of the inequality, i.e. on the production and appropriation of surplus value; in the 
second case, the effect is captured by the right hand side of the inequality, i.e. subsumed 
class payments out of appropriated surplus value.   
 
Social Demand and the Production of Ancient Surplus 
Let us consider the opposite situation where the ancients have easy access to means of 
production. However, the level of social demand for use-values contained in ancient 
commodities constrains the production of ancient surplus value. Here, instead of 
overcrowding on means of production, we have overcrowding of the market. Too much 
social labor is expended in a branch of production, regardless of the social demand for the 
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particular use-values. This is possible when difficult access to the “scarce” means of 
production drives ancients to those production activities where the “scarce” means of 
production are minimally required, leading to overcrowding of the market.   
Let us assume that dispossessed ancients—the victims of primitive accumulation—
shunned by capitalist industries, secure access to some means of production and set up 
new ancient production units. The pressure of surplus labor force may lead to a 
proliferation of ancient enterprises to such an extent, relative to the market demand, that 
the resulting supply of use-values exceed market demand. Marx clearly mentioned that 
one of the conditions of existence of surplus labor is that there must be a social demand 
for the products of surplus labor.  
But the use-value of the social mass of products depends on the extent to which it satisfies 
in quantity a definite social need for every particular kind of product in an adequate 
manner, so that the labor is proportionately distributed among the different spheres in 
keeping with these social needs, which are definite in quantity.........The social need, that is, 
the use-value on a social scale, appears here as a determining factor for the amount of social 
labor which is to be supplied by the various particular specific spheres.…This point has any 
bearing upon the proportion between necessary and surplus labor only in so far as a 
violation of this proportion makes it impossible to realize the value of the commodities and 
the surplus-value contained in it.(Marx, 1909: 745)    
 
Due to excess supply of commodities in the market, market price deviates from unit 
values and ancients can’t realize their “potential” surplus value when they are forced to 
sell at lower market prices. This is often the case, for example, with pavement food-stalls 
in urban areas in developing countries. Dozens of food-stalls selling the same commodity 
are located side by side at the same street corner. Further well-known examples can be 
mentioned—the line of shoe-shine boys, the row of typists with their type-writers outside 
government offices etc. The effect in this case is same as in the case of fragmentation of 
land—a lowering of realized rate of ancient surplus value below its potential level. 
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In the first case, means of production were the limiting factor. In the second case, the 
extent of the market is the limiting factor. Still other cases are possible. But the point is 
made. The production of a surplus labor force and the consequent competition in the 
ancient economy denies the ancients the ability to produce and/or realize potential 
surplus, thus depressing the rate of surplus value.  
It is thus that primitive accumulation enables such a skewed distribution of surplus and 
labor force between the ancient and the capitalist economies. The capitalist economy 
produces a larger share of surplus but sustain a lower share of the society’s labor force 
while it is just the obverse for the ancient economy. 
 
Primitive Accumulation and Distributions of Ancient Surplus 
Let us now understand how primitive accumulation affects the right-hand side of the 
inequality, SV(A)  <∑SSCP(A) —i.e. how primitive accumulation affects the structure 
and magnitude of subsumed class payments. Even though access of direct producers to 
means of production is a condition of the ancient fundamental class process, the 
conditions of such access have a crucial effect on the distribution of surplus value. Let us 
consider the situation when ancients own their means of production or have direct, ‘free’ 
or‘open’ access to means of production. Primitive accumulation may take the form of 
forcible separation of ancients from means of production without compensation. This is 
frequently the case when ancients have insufficiently defined property rights—e.g. 
usufruct rather than ownership rights—over means of production. Secondly, primitive 
accumulation may take the form of an extension of the property rights regime by bringing 
into its domain previously ‘free’ means of production—e.g. patenting traditional seeds in 
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agriculture, enclosure of “wastes” etc. When dispossessed ancients engage in ancient 
production after primitive accumulation, they have to gain access to the same means of 
production—now privatized and of limited access—by making a new subsumed class 
payment, ground rent. Thus, primitive accumulation introduces a subsumed class 
payment where none existed before even though all other conditions of existence of 
ancient production remain exactly the same. Nothing changes except that the intervening 
moment of dispossession makes way for a new subsumed class payment to emerge. It is 
this kind of process that Basu (2008) emphasizes.   
On the other hand, for all the reasons mentioned before, the surplus value produced by 
the ancients may be very low making standard subsumed class payments infeasible. One 
way the ancients manage to survive is by forcefully evading certain subsumed class 
payments, often with formal or tacit social consent. For example, in many cases ancients 
may not pay ground rent for access to land. This is most common in urban areas where 
ancients encroach on public and even private lands, e.g. slums, squatter settlements by 
railway tracks etc. They often do not pay taxes or mandatory fees to the government. 
Sometimes they are unable to pay back their loans. It is not uncommon for the state-
owned banks to write off peasant loans. Sometimes they do not pay for use of electricity, 
water or copyright fees. In poor countries, ancients belong to what is known as the 
“informal sector” that survives on “tolerated” illegality resulting from society’s 
acceptance of their right to survival. However, the ancients have to make other kinds of 
subsumed class payments to secure their conditions of existence—like membership 
and/or entry fee to trade associations, payments to political parties to secure policies that 
protect the ancients against eviction and dispossession, bribe to police to allow them to 
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secure illegally their conditions of existence, payments to the mafia for protection etc. 
The balance of all these forces—the relative strength of each being determined by the 
entire social context—determines the quantitative relation between appropriated surplus 
value of the ancients and the sum of the subsumed class payments on the other. The 
reproduction of the ancient class structure assumes a complex form and primitive 
accumulation has a direct bearing on the reproduction of the ancients through its 
effectivity on production and distribution of surplus value.   
For all of these reasons, it is likely that net surplus of ancients is non-positive, i.e. SV(A)- 
∑SSCP(A)≤ 0. Net surplus is the discretionary fund of surplus value in the hands of 
ancients—after making all kinds of subsumed class payments—which may be used either 
for accumulation of means of production or additional “luxury” consumption to raise 
individual standard of living above the customary level. If net surplus is zero, then the 
distribution for accumulation may become zero or the prosperity of the ancients may be  
undermined. Thus primitive accumulation not only supports a skewed distribution of 
surplus value and surplus labor power between the two class structures, but also 
differential rates of accumulation. Indeed if net surplus is negative, then it is possible that 
the ancient will reduce personal consumption to increase the gross surplus so as to meet 
subsumed class payments. In this case, not only conditions of prosperity but conditions of 
existence of the ancient may be undermined.  
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The Distribution of Surplus across Class-structures and the Conditions for 
Primitive Accumulation 
 
Let me turn to the second theoretical problem which is to show how such a skewed 
distribution of surplus and labor force—between capitalist and ancient class structures— 
in turn, enables primitive accumulation. In the Marxian literature on primitive 
accumulation, force—particularly as embodied in the coercive stance of the state—is 
identified as the main instrument of dispossession. This is one of the reasons why 
primitive accumulation has so often been identified as an “extra-economic”—more 
precisely, political—process in the Marxian literature. As we have argued earlier, I depart 
from the classical Marxian understanding of dispossession as a purely “extra-economic” 
process. In my understanding, dispossession of ancients may also accompany the 
reproduction/expansion of the capitalist class structure as an outcome of economic 
processes. The distribution of surplus and labor force between class structures enables 
such economic outcome of dispossession without any coercive involvement of the state. 
We understand “enclosures” not as the definitive form of primitive accumulation, but as 
the limiting case of a more general process by which direct producers’ access to means of 
production is dissolved. It is quite possible that economic conditions are such that 
economic processes dissolve the unity of direct producers and means of production and 
enable a flow of the latter from the ancient to the capitalist economy without involving 
any coercion. In the next two subsections, I first show how such a skewed distribution of 
surplus and labor force allows the capitalist class structure to engage in dispossession via 
force (often involving the coercive apparatuses of the state). Then, I show how the same 
processes of dispossession may take place through economic mechanisms—without 
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involving force—as a result of differential conditions governing capitalist and ancient 
surplus.   
 
State and Primitive Accumulation 
A Marxian theory committed to overdetermination would admit that the political process 
in which state actions facilitate dispossession is itself overdetermined by all other 
processes in the society. Specifically, one goal of the Marxian theory is to show how one 
particular set of economic processes—class processes—affects the political process of 
policy formation in question. Our argument that the skewed distribution of surplus and 
labor force between class structures enables primitive accumulation is precisely one 
answer to the problem thus posed in Marxian theory.  
According to Marxian theory, the state, like any other social site, is overdetermined by all 
the different processes occurring in the society. The state relates to class structures in a 
social formation by providing certain natural, cultural, political and economic conditions 
unique to each class structure. A part of the cost of provision of such conditions is 
defrayed from subsumed class payments—in the form of taxes, fees and other mandatory 
payments by business enterprises to the state—out of surplus produced in each class 
structure. To the extent that a skewed distribution of surplus emerges across class 
structures, the class structures have differential effectivity in securing their conditions of 
existence in general and state policies in particular. Wherever there is conflict between 
conditions of existence of different class structures, the class structure with command 
over greater surplus and hence capable of greater subsumed class payments to the state 
  158
are in a better position to secure state policies in its favor. In our case, the capitalist class 
structure has this relative effectivity vis-a-vis the ancient class structure.    
In particular, in every social formation, ancient and capitalist class structures contest over 
state policies—related to tax, production subsidies, credit, environment, property regimes 
etc.— which may have the effect, intended or unintended, of dispossessing the ancients. 
When the expansion of the capitalist class structure involves the process of dispossession, 
the social conflict over dispossession is often resolved in favor of the capitalist class 
structure when the subsumed class payments by the capitalist class structure secure state 
policies in favor of dispossession. The ancients’ opposition to such policies is 
undermined by their inability to produce potential surplus and influence state policies 
through subsumed class processes. Moreover, subsumed class payments by the capitalist 
class structure also secure cultural conditions of primitive accumulation through 
production and dissemination of economic discourses that devalorize petty production 
and represent capitalist class structure as the vehicle of economic progress.   
Of course, the outcome of the social conflict over dispossession is only partly determined 
by the subsumed class payments to the state. Many other processes have their own 
effectivity over state policies which may modify, slow or even reverse the process of 
dispossession. Direct political agitation by ancients against such state policies may erect 
effective barriers to primitive accumulation. Moreover, cultural discourses emerge— 
particularly in social formations with a large surplus labor force—that assert and support 
moral rights to livelihood of the people in the face of predatory capitalist accumulation. 
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Market and Primitive Accumulation: Ground Rent 
Land as a scarce means of production yields ground rent to its owner, the landlord. 
Ground rent is a payment out of the produced and appropriated surplus value to the 
landlord for access to a monopolized means of production—land. The size of ground rent 
is determined by competition among appropriators of surplus value and between them 
and the landlords. But since ground rent is a payment out of the surplus value, its size is 
constrained by the mass of surplus value. As surplus value increases, so does rent as a 
component of it. Marx makes this point in the context of capitalist production. 
To the same extent that the production of commodities develops as a capitalist production, 
and as a production of value, does the production of surplus-value and surplus-products 
proceed. But to the same extent that this continues does property in land acquire the faculty 
of capturing an ever increasing portion of this surplus-value by means of its land monopoly. 
Thereby it raises its rent and the price of the land itself  (Marx, 1909: 747-748) 
 
We have already seen how primitive accumulation has the effect of depressing the rate 
and mass of ancient surplus value. It follows then that rent on land on which a capitalist 
enterprise stands will be higher than the rent on land on which an ancient enterprise 
stands. Suppose both capitalists and ancients are vying for access to “scarce” land as a 
condition of existence of their respective surplus values. Since, the rate and mass of 
surplus value is higher for the capitalists compared to the ancients, the anticipated rent 
from capitalists is greater than the anticipated rent from ancients, other things being 
equal. The price of land is anticipated rent capitalized at some “notional” rate of interest. 
The price of land is higher if it is sold to the capitalists than the ancients. At the same 
time, the capitalists can outbid the ancients in purchasing land.        
Thus the class structure has its own peculiar effectivity on the determination of the price 
of land. The price of land under ancient production is reflective of the conditions of 
ancient production—actual surplus being less than potential surplus—, which in turn is 
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an effect of ceaseless dispossession due to capitalist accumulation. The same pricing 
process yields a higher price for land under capitalist production due to the production of 
greater surplus value in the capitalist enterprise. This has the further implication that 
capitalist accumulation has contradictory effects on the price of land in the two 
economies. On the one hand, capitalist accumulation—by enabling production of greater 
surplus in capitalist enterprises—leads to a steady increase in the price of land under 
capitalist production. The same process of capitalist accumulation, through dispossession, 
continues to depress ancient surplus value below its potential level and devalorize land 
under ancient production. The price of land in the capitalist economy continues to 
increase vis-à-vis land in the ancient economy. Thus, the skewed distribution of surplus 
and labor power results in a cheapening of land in the ancient economy vis-à-vis land in 
the capitalist economy, thus making the latter an easy target of primitive accumulation. 
Consequently, capitalists accumulate by bidding out ancients from access to “scarce” 
land. 
 
The Contradictory Effects of Surplus Population on Capitalist Surplus Value 
We have so far seen how primitive accumulation and the production of a surplus 
population affect the conditions governing ancient surplus. But the same processes also 
affect production and distribution of capitalist surplus value. We have already noted one 
such contradiction in terms of the “enclosure” costs of primitive accumulation. Let us 
explore further contradictions in this context.  
It is an immediate consequence of overdetermination that conditions governing ancient 
surplus will affect capitalist surplus. We have seen how primitive accumulation may have 
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the effect of driving down the net surplus of the ancients to zero. This means little or no 
accumulation by the ancients and hence insignificant growth of productivity of ancient 
labor. The most dominant view of the ancients in developing countries is that they are 
technologically stagnant. Suppose, ancients produce the chief means of subsistence, food. 
Unless unit values of food articles decline, the value of labor power cannot be cheapened 
to any significant degree in capitalist enterprises. Expenditure on food will continue to 
dominate the workers’ budget and hence workers’ demand for capitalist means of 
subsistence (non-food items) will be constrained. Thus the expansion of capitalist V-
goods production will be undermined, or what is the same thing, the emergence of the 
“great consuming middle class” will be thwarted. Moreover, the most important of the 
capitalists’ strategies to increase the rate of surplus value—the cheapening of the value of 
labor power—will be constrained. Thus capitalist surplus value and hence rate of 
accumulation of productive capital may be adversely affected by the low accumulation 
and low productivity of ancient farmers. Capitalist accumulation maybe severely 
hampered if rising demand for food against a stagnant supply pushes up the food prices 
above their values and hence raise the value of labor power, thus reducing the 
appropriated surplus value of the capitalists and hence the amount of that surplus value 
available for accumulation. This has always been a major concern for strategists of 
economic development in developing countries.  
In such a case, the capitalists may have to take actions to increase the productivity of 
ancient farmers. Capitalist C-commodities specially produced to improve productivity of 
ancient farmers may be introduced. These include laboratory-produced high-yielding 
variety of seeds, chemical pesticides and fertilizes etc. While an increase in productivity 
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of ancient farmers and a fall in unit-values and hence prices of food articles are secured, 
this strategy of productivity improvement might further deteriorate the condition of the 
farmers. While originally the ancient farmers would use traditional seeds, manure and 
irrigation methods which they procure as use-values by themselves, the new production 
methods require farmers to purchase produced means of production as commodities in 
the market. Suppose, the increased outlay on means of production is secured by the 
ancients through credit obtained from banks. This introduces a new subsumed class 
payment of the ancients—interest on loans. While the ancient surplus increases because 
rate of ancient surplus value increases—along with rate of capitalist surplus value—the 
new subsumed class payment nevertheless may rob the ancients of the benefits of a rise 
in rate of surplus value. If market price suddenly drops below the values, so that ancients 
do not realize their surplus value, the ancients may in fact get caught in the “debt trap”—
hence, the widespread indebtedness of the peasants in developing countries.  
In general, if the ancients do not accumulate, then the market for some capitalist C-goods 
cannot expand either—e.g. the market for agricultural machinery and equipment 
manufactured by capitalists cannot expand if the ancient farmers do not accumulate. Thus 
accumulation in some capitalist C-goods industries may be arrested because of a lack of 
market. We have already seen that the market for capitalist V-goods (non-food means of 
subsistence) cannot expand unless unit-values of food items fall. In such a situation, it is 
not unusual to find a “luxury” goods sector develop within the capitalist economy, the 
market for the luxury commodities being provided by a class of unproductive laborers in 
both capitalist and ancient economies—e.g. landlords, managers, merchants etc.         
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There are other effects of the ancient class structure on capitalist surplus that may help 
capitalists raise the rate of surplus value above what they would otherwise obtain in the 
absence of the ancients. The customary means of subsistence, according to Marxist 
theory, is determined by the historical context. One of the determinants of the customary 
means of subsistence is the class structure itself with its particular political, cultural and 
economic conditions of existence. For ancients with a stagnant and often precarious 
standard of living over a considerable time and a cultural discourse of poverty which 
shape their world-view, the notion of what constitutes a customary standard of living may 
well be lower than that of the workers in capitalist enterprises101. This is particularly true 
in case of ancient farmers who belong to a rural society with distinct social organization 
of life.  
We assume that there is a single labor market in the economy. Therefore, there is a single 
average value of labor power of workers in the capitalist enterprises. Due to the existence 
of a surplus population, there is always a mass of potential migrants—ancients whose 
reproduction of labor power is threatened and who seek entry into the capitalist economy 
with a lower private customary standard of living— to the capitalist labor market. The 
average value of labor power of the workers in the capitalist economy will be determined 
partly by their own notion of a customary standard of living and partly by the ancients’ 
customary standard of living. Thus the average value of labor power of the workers in the 
capitalist economy will be lowered in the presence of ancients under the specific 
conditions considered here. Further, in the presence of a surplus population, there is 
always an oversupply of laborers in the labor market—thus lowering the price of labor 
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power below the lowered average value of labor power. All of these factors may increase 
the rate of surplus value of the capitalists. On the other hand, workers in capitalist 
industries may get unionized to resist any fall in the price of labor power below its value.  
It is obvious that such a social formation will be ridden with inequality, possibilities of 
social disintegration, crime and violence. Particular political and cultural processes are 
bound to emerge that work to minimize these tendencies towards instability and 
disintegration. The state in particular may be forced to address the conditions of the 
ancients in welfarist terms. The state may tax the capitalist profit and subsumed class 
incomes to subsidize health, housing and education to the ancients. This may lower the 
cost of reproduction of labor power of the ancients and allow a larger ancient surplus to 
emerge. Even capitalist C-goods used in ancient production may be subsidized by the 
state. Thus a non-class revenue may accrue to the ancient enterprises. Further certain 
subsumed class payments to the state may be waived for the ancients—e.g. bank loans by 
state-owned banks to farmers may be written off, license fee and other taxes applicable to 
business may be waived for ancients etc. All these expenditures may leave the state with 
less money to finance infrastructure projects crucial for capitalist accumulation. This is 
often the reason why chambers of commerce and corporate media are so vocal against 
fiscal imprudence and populist policies of the state in poorer societies.  
 
Conclusion 
The kind of social formation considered here is typical of many developing countries. In 
analyzing the complexity of the interaction of different class structures at a most abstract 
level, I have introduced several simplifying assumptions at various stages. If we relax 
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those assumptions, other constitutive processes with their unique determinations will 
come into being, reversing, reinforcing or modifying several outcomes considered here. 
The idea has been to assume away many such determinations precisely to isolate and 
trace the effects of primitive accumulation and the production of a surplus population 
through the social formation. Even in such a simplified model and with such a narrow 
focus, we have been able to uncover many sides of a contradictory totality which is what 
a social formation is. The analysis in this chapter can only claim to outline a general 
approach to the study of social formations where a particularly exclusionary form of 
capitalist accumulation is going on. Any concrete analysis has to take into account the 
specificity of the social formation. I will offer such an analysis in the next chapter, 
choosing Indian capitalism as the object of study. 
However, the analysis presented in this chapter carries elements of a Marxian theory of 
poverty that is applicable to the kind of social formation considered here. Needless to say, 
there are as many forms of poverty as there are forms of capitalism. Here a specific form 
of poverty associated with the proliferation of a particular class structure under specific 
conditions is considered. The proliferation of the same class structure under different 
conditions—for example, in the absence of the dominance of capital—may be a solution 
to poverty! The proliferation of ancient class structures under the dominance of capital 
may lead to poverty, but poverty in this context takes the form of a social response to the 
problem of surplus population. Only by sharing poverty, can the surplus population 
subsist in the face of exclusionary capitalist accumulation.    
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CHAPTER 5 
CONTRADICTORY DEVELOPMENT OF CAPITALISM IN POSTCOLONIAL 
INDIA: PRIMITIVE ACCUMULATION AND SURPLUS POPULATION 
  
Introduction 
 
In many ways, economic development in India constitutes the stylized economic hi(story) 
of many Third World countries in the discourse of development. According to this story, 
Third World countries embarked on a rapid process of industrialization after the WWII in 
an effort to “catch up” with the advanced industrial economies of the West. In the initial 
decades of development—roughly till the end of the 1970s—the ‘developmentalist’ 
nation-states of these countries followed an autarkic development policy based on 
import-substitution in a more or less ‘planned’ economy with regulated markets and 
significant state ownership of the means of production in the economy. This dirigiste 
regime ran out of steam and encountered serious crises in the 1970s, which led to its 
abandonment, for good or for bad.  Industrialization now proceeded under a different 
(and a competing) policy regime characterized by reliance on free international and 
domestic trade, non-interventionist state and unregulated private capitalist enterprises—
the regime popularly referred to as the neoliberal regime (Bhagwati (1993). 
In the context of economic development in India, two distinct policy regimes are 
identified—the first one covering the period since independence to the end of the 1980s 
and the second inaugurated by the New Economic Policy of 1991. Import-substitution 
was one of the main components of the first regime, while a greater reliance on exports 
marks the second policy regime. The first policy went much beyond conventional import-
substitution in promoting industrialization in India. It supported an overwhelming 
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presence of the government in the Indian economy—the nature and degree of which was 
remarkable outside the so-called socialist economies of the time. It suppressed markets 
and regulated private economic decision-making to a significant extent and sought 
progressively to replace private sector with the state capitalist sector. On the other hand, 
despite the emphasis on free international trade in the new economic policy, India’s 
contemporary economic policy is much broader than what is known as export-led 
industrialization. Hence, the distinction between the two regimes has to be drawn based 
more on the three features of an economy—a) the nature of markets, b) ownership of 
means of production of the society and c) the scope of private decision-making. The 
dirigiste regime is characterized by a) a heavily regulated market with economic planning 
determining to a large extent the flow of means of production, commodities and capital b) 
significant and steadily enlarging state ownership of means of production of the economy 
and c) an elaborate policy framework that guided, circumscribed and directed private 
decision-making. The laissez faire regime is characterized by a) free markets as the main 
institution for allocation and distribution of means of production and capital b) 
privatization of means of production of the economy and c) a policy framework that 
facilitates rather than directs private decision-making.  
The distinction between the two policy regimes also supported a popular view that the 
political ideology of the state and the nature of the economic organization under the 
dirigiste regime were influenced by socialism and that under the neoliberal laissez faire 
regime by capitalism. To a Marxist, however, industrialization under both regimes is an 
attempt to expand the productive circuit of capital (industrial capitalist class 
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processes)102. The difference lies in the relative strength or domination of various forms 
of capitalist enterprises under the two regimes—more precisely, the relative strengths of 
state-capitalist versus private capitalist enterprises and within private capitalist 
enterprises, between monopolistic and competitive markets. The debate on the relative 
merits of the two regimes boils down to debates on 1) public vs. private capitalist 
industries and 2) free market vs. planning. This debate on the relative merit of the two 
regimes is not a Marxian debate in so far as it fails to acknowledge the uniquely Marxian 
insight that expansion of the productive circuit of capital, whichever form it takes, is also 
the multiplication of capitalist class exploitation and the choice between its forms is not a 
Marxist’s choice. Yet, neoliberalism has also forced Marxists to get involved in the 
debate and make their targets of criticism not class relations, but unfortunately, markets 
and private property. 
Critics of neoliberalism often emphasize certain desirable social outcomes of the dirigiste 
regime—a better provision of public goods and a relatively more egalitarian distribution 
of income. A case in point is the debate over the role of the state in promoting 
employment, reducing poverty and keeping inequality in check. The roll-back of the state 
from the economic space in the neoliberal era—starting as a policy stance in 1991—was 
seen by many as an abandonment of these social objectives by the Indian state. The 
Indian state has increasingly been described as a stooge of global corporate interests—
submissive to the dictates of International Monetary Fund, World Bank, World Trade 
Organization and US-led global geo-political strategies. In comparison, it is argued, the 
Indian state had greater flexibility to respond to domestic economic problems in the 
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dirigiste regime (Swaminathan, 2000; Chandrashekhar and Pal, 2006; Patnaik, 2007; 
Selvaraj and Karan, 2009). On the other hand, critics of the dirigiste regime point out the 
inefficiency of the state in running the economy, the failure of the regime to engineer 
sustained high growth of the economy, the dismal performance of poverty-eradication 
policies and the stifling of domestic business and hence domestic livelihoods-creating 
opportunities (Kruegger, 1974; Bhagwati, 1982, 2001; Bardhan, 1984; Ahluwalia, 1985). 
Both adherents and critics of the dirigiste regime focus on similar sets of economic 
problems—growth, employment, poverty etc., but they differ on the relative effectiveness 
of the state and the market in achieving those objectives.  
Within Indian Marxism, class103 has been replaced by concerns with poverty, livelihoods, 
macroeconomic performance and growth104. The famous “modes of production” debate 
had petered out by the 1980s and the neoliberal turn in state policy has riveted the Indian 
Marxists’ attention to the state rather than class. In this chapter, I intend to bring class 
back into the discourse on Indian capitalism. I claim that the theoretical arguments 
presented in the preceding chapters can be used to construct not only a unique history of 
capitalist development in India, but also a Marxist analysis of enduring poverty and 
unemployment in India cutting across different regimes. More precisely, I argue that a 
focus on surplus-based notions of class and primitive accumulation can account for the 
specificities of Indian capitalism in general and poverty and crisis of subsistence in India 
in particular. In this chapter, I only present a broad outline of how such a history and 
understanding of Indian capitalism may be constructed. A full and detailed account will 
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 See Bagchi (1999), Patnaik (2007), Ghosh and Chandrasekhar (2002).  
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require a separate work by itself. My purpose here is to underscore the contradictions of 
Indian capitalism and add to the exploitation-focused critique of capitalism another 
political critique in terms of dispossession.  
If capitalist development was the raison d'être of both regimes, they were both haunted by 
the specter of surplus population. Even as both regimes struggled to facilitate capitalist 
development in India, they had to grapple with the problem of surplus population that 
was often expanded by the same policies undertaken to facilitate capitalist development. 
The existence of surplus population is generally attributed by Marxists to insufficient rate 
of capitalist growth and consequently attention has been given to imperialist and feudal 
relations that obstruct capitalist development in postcolonial societies like India. What is 
absent in the Marxian literature is the recognition of how capitalist growth itself thrives 
on primitive accumulation and may in turn exacerbate the problem of surplus population 
and how the latter in turn may peculiarly constrain capitalist accumulation. In general, the 
discourse on economic development in India has portrayed capitalist accumulation as a 
solution to the problem of surplus population. I argue that once we take into account 
primitive accumulation as a process constitutive of reproduction of capital, the 
problematic of surplus population gets complicated—capitalist growth may have 
contradictory effects on the surplus population, incorporating and excluding it at the same 
time, the net outcome being crucially dependent on the social context in which capitalist  
development occurs. In India, surplus population has expanded along with capital 
accumulation through both regimes. Hence, as we argued in Chapter III, non-capitalist 
class structures proliferated along with the expansion of surplus population. The 
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postcolonial history of India is a history of the unstable dominance of capital in a social 
formation with a large non-capitalist economic space.  
 
Political, Cultural and Economic Conditions of Postcolonial Capitalist Development 
in India 
 
India at the time of independence in 1947 was, in many ways, the product of the great 
transition in Europe and particularly, England. Primitive accumulation had ravaged both 
India and England and prevalent pre-capitalist class structures have been largely 
dissolved or modified by the transition to capitalism in England and class-transformations 
under its impact in India. However, at the end of the colonial period, the English and 
Indian social formations also differed in significant ways—first, capitalist class structures 
had developed to a far greater degree in the English compared to the Indian social 
formation and second, the surplus population in England had taken the form of a “reserve 
army of labor” by the early twentieth century, while India, in 1947, harbored a surplus 
population, the size of which dwarfed the working class in India’s capitalist industries or 
any ‘notion’ of a reserve army of labor105. The nature of colonial relations imposed 
unique conditions on the dynamics of social formations in the two countries and lies at 
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 Surplus population emerged in both England and India in the course of transition to capitalism in the 
former and class-transformations under colonial impact in the latter. The British experience illustrates the 
classic and the most visible form of primitive accumulation. The social context in which primitive 
accumulation took place in England enabled the most virulent forms of “enclosures” in the history of 
capitalism—matched only by the annihilation of indigenous populations in some colonies like North 
America and Australia. Not surprisingly, surplus population emerged in England even as it was emerging 
as the factory of the world and the most powerful and the richest imperial country in the world. In rapidly 
industrializing England, the prisons were overflowing with incarcerated unemployed, vagabonds and petty 
criminals. Even trade unions were assisting emigrating laborers to the settler colonies of USA, Australia, 
New Zealand, South Africa etc. (See Clements, 1955; Richards, 1993, 2004; Robinson, 2002. Along with 
the emigration of the surplus population, the process which produced it in the first place—primitive 
accumulation—was exported to the colonies, as the emigrants ‘cleared’ lands for settlement. In nineteenth 
century England, the surplus population subsisted much in the same way as the working poor subsist in the 
informal economy in India today—in small, “ancient”, barely remunerative economic activities (Benson, 
1983).  
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the heart of this great divergence. To understand the evolution of Indian capitalism in the 
postcolonial period, we must begin by specifying the particular economic, political and 
cultural conditions that prevailed in India at the time of independence and how they 
changed over time.  
 
The Social Context at the Time of Independence 
The historical experience of colonial rule and the nationalist movement shaped the views 
of the new sovereign Indian state in matters of economic policy. The idea behind 
economic planning was to reverse the effects of colonial rule—namely, to industrialize 
the Indian economy and reverse the long process of deindustrialization under colonial 
rule, to develop an indigenous capital goods industry and thus reduce dependence on 
Western countries for technology and capital goods and to break out of the colonial 
pattern of trade. Jawaharlal Nehru, the first prime minister of India, and a Fabian 
socialist, was greatly influenced by the experience of Soviet industrialization106. While 
choosing not to take sides with either the Soviet or the Western camp during the Cold 
War, he nevertheless adopted Soviet economic planning as the vehicle of economic 
development in independent India. The role of the state would be to directly undertake 
capitalist industrialization to achieve social objectives like eradication of poverty and 
generation of employment opportunities. In fact, the state could and did replace, restrain, 
regulate and circumscribe private capitalists in order to achieve its goal.  
It must be remembered that it was Gandhi rather than Nehru who was the iconic leader of 
the struggle for independence; Gandhi mobilized the passion and energy of the Indian 
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masses against British rule by privileging tradition over modernity and by explicitly 
rejecting the modern Western industrial future for India. Gandhi’s economic views were 
the exact opposite of Nehru’s; Gandhi was an anti-modernist, liked Ruskin, Thoreau and 
Tolstoy, shunned modern capitalist industries and labor-displacing technology, favored 
decentralized economically self-sufficient village republics and was a quasi-anarchist in 
his opposition to the strong state107. Planning was initiated against these divergent and 
opposed views of economic development, which threatened to undermine the possibilities 
of any consensus on economic development. 
Certain effects of the colonial rule shaped Gandhi’s views and in turn helped him harness 
popular energy in the struggle for independence. First, the colonial rule severely 
dislocated the traditional economy of India consisting of stable, self-sufficient village 
economies, with its population ordered by the caste system and a village-level division of 
labor, largely dominated by non-market production and allocation of goods and services 
and a unity of agriculture and industry that had previously shielded them from the 
corrosive impact of trade. Second, the introduction of private property rights in land by 
the British led to erosion of many of the customary rights enjoyed by the peasants as well 
as the traditional social security systems that alleviated the misery of the peasants in 
times of crises in the pre-colonial social formation of the Indian sub-continent108. On the 
other hand, the nationalization of forests in the name of scientific forestry and declaration 
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of production—a name Marx gave to the prevalent mode of production in India as well as much of the 
Orient and which he distinguished from the feudal mode of production that prevailed in Western Europe. 
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1957; Melotti, 1977; Bailey and Llobera, 1981) is not relevant to the subject of this dissertation and hence I 
will refrain from engaging with the debate.  See Guha (1962) for the intellectual history of the British 
attempts at introduction of private property in colonial India. 
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of ‘wastes’ and ‘commons’ as state property for raising state revenues unleashed 
processes of primitive accumulation that undermined many traditional economic 
activities (Gidwani, 1992; Guha and Gadgil, 1989). Third, the very processes that led to 
the emergence of capitalist industries in Britain also led to destruction of Indian 
industries—for example, protective tariffs in Britain enabled capitalist industries to 
develop there while free imports of British manufactured goods undermined traditional 
non-capitalist and capitalist products of India. India was gradually inserted into the 
colonial pattern of trade—a supplier of raw materials and an importer of manufactured 
goods. This phenomenon is most starkly illustrated in the case of textile industries in the 
two countries. This colonial pattern of trade was further strengthened by the development 
of the railways. Fourth, with the fall of the pre-colonial surplus appropriators and 
subsumed classes, urban Indian industries patronized by them also declined (Habib, 1975, 
1984). Luxury consumption by the Mughal imperial court and the maintenance of the 
army supported a large urban craft industry. With decline in the royal power, such 
demand for the whole range of urban manufactures declined leading to urban 
unemployment. Palace-factories (karkhanas) which were established to cater to the 
demand for the royal court and the urban nobility were closed down (Bhattacharyya, 
1972). The new Indian elite during the colonial period—including the new agrarian 
feudal class emerging after the Mutiny of 1857 and the end of the Company rule in 
1858—tried to emulate the British lifestyle and consumed imported British goods. On the 
other hand, the new middle class, a product of English education, developed a taste for 
British goods.  
  175
The colonial period had left a large population dependent on agriculture and an extremely 
low land-man ratio that hampered productivity of agricultural labor. By the last quarter of 
the nineteenth century, deindustrialization of India under colonial rule was complete. 
Modern capitalist industries were set up by both Indians and British starting from the 
second half of the nineteenth century. However, if we look at the occupational structure 
of India over the period 1901-1931, we find that industrial growth made little or no 
inroads into aggregate employment of the country109. In fact, from Table 1, we see that 
agricultural share of the labor force increased between 1901 and 1931 and total industrial 
labor force in modern industries increased only marginally, much less than required to 
offset the decline of labor force in traditional industries.        
The pressure of labor force on agriculture lead to a steady decline in land-labor ratio and 
agriculture became the reservoir of surplus population as poor peasants desperately held 
on to rapidly fragmenting land as their only means of production in conditions of surplus 
population. At the time of independence, therefore, “there was much scope for further 
primitive accumulation” (Byres, 2005: 84).  
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Three years before independence, in 1944, seven leading Indian capitalists, aided by an 
economist, prepared “A Brief Memorandum Outlining a Plan of Economic Development 
for India”—a document that came to be known as the Bombay Plan. The Bombay Plan 
unequivocally called upon the sovereign Indian state (foreseeable in the very near future) 
to intervene in the economy in promoting industrialization (Chibber, 2003). Though wary 
of state ownership and management of business, big business nevertheless asked the state 
to have rigorous and extensive control over the economy. India was probably the first 
country outside the Soviet Bloc to experiment with comprehensive and extensive 
economic planning and it is interesting to note that economic planning—usually 
associated with socialist economies— was actually asked for by business houses in India 
(Sen, 1982: 92)110. At the same time, two alternative plans of national development were 
drafted by the Gandhians and the Communists (Patnaik, 1998). The pre-independence 
National Planning commission furiously debated the nature of economic development in 
independent India. Heated debates led to the resignation from the Commission of the sole 
Gandhian voice—J.C.Kumarappa—who questioned the authority of the Commission to 
debate future industrialization of India when the country was evidently galvanized into 
the struggle for independence by the Gandhian critique of British rule and modern 
industrialism. It is in this context that economic planning emerged as a solution to 
ideological differences.      
[T]he very institution of a process of planning became a means for the determination of 
priorities on behalf of the “nation”. The debate on the need for industrialization, it might be 
said, was politically resolved by successfully constituting planning as a domain outside 
“squabbles and conflicts of politics. (Chatterjee, 1995: 202). 
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2003: 88).  
 
  177
 
Chatterjee’s very influential neo-Gramscian account of the Indian state and economic 
planning singled out the most important and socially disruptive process associated with 
capitalist development—primitive accumulation—and that too in a poor country that had 
recently rode on mass popular movement to independence. The problem was that of 
legitimation of capitalist accumulation and hence primitive accumulation in a 
representative democracy and with a colonial history of unconstrained dispossession111. 
According to Chatterjee, planning was the instrument of ‘passive revolution’ by the 
Indian state, ideologically representing capitalist interests. 
The notion of ‘passive revolution’ captures the nature of class–transformation in 
transitional societies where the classical revolution has failed to materialize. Instead of 
historical change by which the capitalist class takes over power and establishes its 
hegemonic rule and order, passive revolution refers to the case, where capitalist class 
manipulates the transformation in its favor through ‘molecular’ or incremental change. In 
the process, the capitalist class has to incorporate many non-capitalist elements in its 
social order. The hegemonic ideology is not the ideology of the bourgeois extended over 
the civil society, but rather the construction of a new ideology that represents the social 
order as standing for the entire society or nation. The socialist rhetoric or economic 
planning in India is seen as an exercise in ‘passive revolution’ by the Indian bourgeoisie, 
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These two objectives—accumulation and legitimation—produced two implications for 
planning in India. On the one hand, planning had to be “a way of avoiding the unnecessary 
rigours of an industrial transition in so far as it affected the masses resident in India’s 
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conflict in a large and heterogeneous subcontinent”.  
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where interests of different class structures in the Indian society were sought to be 
balanced in order to secure the conditions of slow yet advancing capital accumulation112.    
While appreciative of Chatterjee’s insights, this dissertation rejects any essentialized 
notion of the state as the agent of any particular class interests. The state, like any other 
social site, is an overdetermined and ever-changing entity. The specific economic, 
political and cultural conditions prevailing in India determine the concrete manifestation 
of the state in terms of economic policies. The policy documents of the Indian state are 
fraught through with contradictions and tensions that promoted and inhibited capitalist 
and non-capitalist class processes at the same time. To understand the policies of the 
Indian state in class-terms, one must look at the existing class-structures of India at the 
time of independence and their transformations over time. However, economic, political 
and cultural conditions did impose a particular contradiction on the nascent sovereign 
Indian state—a contradiction between accumulation of productive capital as the main 
engine of economic growth and the promotion of livelihoods for India’s surplus 
population—a contradiction that resulted in the accommodation of capitalist and non-
capitalist class structures in national plans. Indian planning was an exercise in selective 
accommodation of different class structures—a utopic adventure in promoting 
harmonious economic growth by balancing different class structures. The failure of 
planning is testimony to the inescapable contradictions that beset it from the very 
beginning. Marxian theory can account partly for such failure by pointing to the absence 
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of class in the official discourse on planning. Despite the best of intentions, planning 
failed in India, partly because it did not take into account class contradictions in 
visualizing a future for India.   
 
The Two Regimes of Capitalist Development in Postcolonial India 
A useful way to construct a history of postcolonial India is to distinguish between two 
different “regimes” with markedly different economic, political and cultural conditions—
in effect, two different social contexts within which capitalist development proceeded in 
India. Economists agree that the New Economic Policy, announced by the central 
government in 1991, is a watershed in India’s economic history. It marked the transition 
from almost four decades of an uninterrupted “planning” regime to an increasingly 
liberalized, globalized and privatized economic regime. While, in class-terms, in both 
regimes, there was an expansion of capitalist class structures, important economic, 
political and cultural changes after 1991 required a reorientation of the Indian society to a 
new life under private capitalism as opposed to state capitalism. Such transformations 
had important consequences for non-capitalist class structures too.  
At the political level, significant changes distinguish the period since the late 1980s from 
the earlier period. The most important of these changes was the erosion of the hegemonic 
one-party rule of the Indian National Congress (hereafter, simply Congress) and the birth 
of an era of coalition politics—with shifting and unstable alliances between many smaller 
regional and major national political parties. For the first twenty five years after 
independence, a relatively patient electorate remained politically loyal to the Congress 
whose political morality and legitimacy, derived from its role in India’s independence 
  180
movement, went largely unchallenged. Congress represented a “rainbow political 
philosophy”—i.e. a political philosophy that accommodated political views on the right, 
left and center under a single umbrella, displaying all the colors of the political spectrum 
(with the notable exception of the Communist Parties of India). Congress’s rainbow 
politics was an effective barrier to political crystallization around issues like caste, 
religion, ethnicity, autonomy etc. Congress was the parliament. The heady days of 
Nehruvian planning coincided with the overarching ideological stance of the Congress 
founded on socialism, modernization, secularism and development. 
In the late 1960s and the 1970s, the regime of economic planning and the political 
hegemony of Congress faced a series of crisis. After two decades of impressive growth, 
the five-year planning strategy ran out of steam in mid-60s with resulting industrial 
deceleration, food crisis and soaring unemployment. Politically, the Congress hegemony 
faced parliamentary as well as extra-parliamentary challenges in several states113. The 
Congress Prime Minister Indira Gandhi responded by launching a nation-wide poverty 
eradication program in 1971. In 1975, she declared national emergency—for the first and 
the only time—in India and tried to crush opposition. During the emergency, in 1976, the 
constitution of India was amended and the words “socialist” and “secular” were added to 
the Preamble. None of these could save the Congress. In the elections of 1977, after 
Emergency was lifted, Congress is routed in the national elections and the first non-
Congress coalition government is formed in India.  
                                                 
113
 The Maoist leftist movements in West Bengal, Bihar and Andhra Pradesh and the social justice 
movements in Tamil Nadu shook the Congress in late 1960s. Further, there was an internal split of the 
Congress into Right Congress and Left Congress in 1967. By 1974, there was nationwide mobilization, led 
by one of the most respected political leaders, Jay Prakash Narayan against the Congress Prime minister 
Indira Gandhi. 
  181
Though Congress and Indira Gandhi returned to power in 1980, the small interregnum of 
coalition rule changed Indian politics forever. The breakaway fractions from that 
coalition developed into many of the smaller regional and national parties of India that 
secured political importance over succeeding decades. Early 1980s saw the first attempts 
at deregulation of the Indian economy leading to an economic environment for private 
capitalists to become economically powerful vis-à-vis state capitalist enterprises. 
Furthermore, growth rate of the economy picked up after a decade of slowdown.  
Since 1991, neoliberal policy has actually helped the fracturing of politics. The fact that 
the central government no longer allocates capital investment between states or control 
private capitalist investment through licensing and other regulations as before means that 
states have to compete with each other to attract domestic and foreign investment. As a 
result, regional aspirations often provide the material motives to formation of regional 
parties. Moreover, the weak economic role of the center means a single hegemonic party 
is not an essential political condition of local development. More important is strategic 
alliance with one of the major Parties to form a coalition government at the center in 
order to secure for the region a larger share of Central funds. However, this could happen 
with whoever emerges as the major party in the elections and hence is the best choice to 
enter into a coalition with. The shifting allegiance of smaller parties, often viewed as 
“opportunism” and portrayed as a decline of ideology and morality in Indian politics is in 
fact partly explained by two phenomenon—the neoliberal policy and the fractured 
political space.    
Two significant political and cultural developments in the 1980s changed the Indian 
society in radical ways—the rise of lower castes as a particular political force and the rise 
  182
of Hindu nationalist Right. One of the most significant events under the coalition 
government of 1977-1980 was the setting up of the Mandal Commission in 1979 with the 
mandate to “identify the socially or educationally backward”. The Commission’s report, 
submitted in 1980, recommended “a positive discrimination” in favor of lower castes 
with a certain percentage of government jobs and educational seats reserved for them. 
This immediately led to a controversy as upper caste people protested against 
reservations which took away some of their social and economic privileges. Over the next 
decade, the lower caste people mobilized around new political parties who focused on the 
caste issue. The implementation of Mandal Commission’s recommendations in 1990 was 
a watershed event that brought caste into the center of Indian politics and it has remained 
central after that.  
The rise of Hindu Right in the 1980s and the communal tension that it created through its 
aggressive assertion of Hindu nationalist identity and its attacks on the Muslim minority 
provides another traumatic experience in India. The Hindu right combined aggressive 
military posturing with laissez faire economic policies favoring private capitalists and at 
the same time promoted a conservative culture that asserted Hindu identity in an 
increasingly Westernized middle class. Even as they asserted the Indian identity at the 
cultural level, their economic policies undermined the same through rapid spread of 
global consumerist culture across Indian middle classes which undermined many of the 
traditional Indian cultural norms. 
 In the words of Yogendra Yadav (1999), the period since the 1990s has been dominated 
by three Ms—Mandal (caste), Mandir (temple, in English, i.e. religion) and Market 
(globalization). At the same time, class-based politics have weakened in India over the 
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last two decades. This is surprising, since movements against loss of livelihoods, 
dispossession through markets and displacement of traditional communities by state and 
private capitalist industrial projects have increasingly come into prominence over the 
same period.  
If one has to demarcate the regimes—always at the risk of oversimplification—one can 
highlight the following differences. The period from 1947 to 1991 was a regime that 
combined centralized economic planning with one-party hegemonic rule of the Congress 
and social cohesion based on relatively controlled inequality of income and an inclusive 
culture of accommodation and appeasement of religious, ethnic, caste and class 
contradictions. The period since 1991 is a regime of free-market private capitalism with a 
fractured, uncertain and contested political space, cultural ambivalence due partly to the 
clash of global consumerism with an assertive Hindu chauvinism and a society in general 
torn apart by rising inequality, jobless economic growth and clashes around caste, 
religion, ethnicity and autonomy114.  
The period since 1991 is also unique in the sense that the contradictions of capitalist 
development are brought into sharp relief since an economically powerful, paternalistic 
and populist state is replaced by a state subjected to all the contradictory pulls and pushes 
of capitalist and non-capitalist class structures as well as other non-class processes, even 
as it increasingly loses its economic power to intervene in the society to maintain social 
cohesion. One particular manifestation of this contradictory development of the society is 
what is often referred to as a “radical disjuncture” between economics and politics in 
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 These changes were gradual, rather than discontinuous and hence the choice of the year 1991 as the 
point of discontinuity is purely arbitrary—being significant only to the extent that the formal change of 
policy regime was a “statement” of how things were to move in the coming decades, an official 
acknowledgement of a new vision of capitalist development.     
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India today, pulling the population in opposite directions. In the sphere of economic life, 
more and more people are excluded from the benefits of economic growth under the 
neoliberal regime—with jobless growth, increasing inequality and widespread 
dispossession brought about by accelerated capitalist accumulation—yet the same 
marginalized groups are included in the political processes of electoral democracy. “The 
rich dominate the economy now more than earlier, but the poor have a strong voice in the 
polity more than earlier. And there is a mismatch." (Suri, 2004: 5405). 
More and more people are voting and participating in the broader electoral processes in 
India in the recent times. Interestingly, oppressed and marginalized groups are voting in 
increasing numbers115. Despite state-level differences, at the national level, participation 
of women, dalits (lower castes), and adivasis (tribals) has increased. As Palshikar and 
Kumar (2004) observe, "in spite of all the limitations of the electoral process, people 
have succeeded in instituting their own democratic meaning in this process." (Palshikar 
and Kumar, 2004: 5417). Given the fractured political space since 1990s, the deep 
tensions that threaten social integrity and the fundamental uncertainty of global markets, 
it is surprising that both a vibrant democracy as well as rapid capital accumulation have 
characterized the new regime—providing one of very few examples of capitalist 
development within a democratic regime in world history. The current regime also lay to 
rest the long-standing idea that capitalist class structures are too weak in India to develop 
independently without state assistance or that a strong state is necessary to manage the 
contradictions of capitalist development in a heterogeneous society like India or for that 
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 Rural participation exceeds urban, and hence poorer sections of Indian society are voting in greater 
numbers than the richer. In the 1991 national elections, 61 % of the rural and semi-urban electorate voted 
as against 53% of the urban electorate. In 2004 national elections, 60% of dalits (lower castes) voted as 
compared to 56% of upper-caste voters. (Palshikar and Kumar, 2004) 
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matter, the idea that premature democracy is bad for development. When Prime minister 
Nehru laid the foundation stone, in 1948, for the Hirakud Dam, one of the earliest large 
dams built in postcolonial India he addressed the villagers displaced by the dam in the 
following words—“if you are to suffer, you should suffer in the interest of the 
country”116. And they did! When we come to 2006, in the same state of Orissa,  tribal 
people demonstrated, with bows and arrows, against the setting up of a giant steel plant 
by a multinational company—the largest FDI project in the world in that year. The plant 
is yet to take off.  
The Dirigiste Regime: The Dilemma of Planning 
The economic history of postcolonial India is often written around the dominant theme of 
capitalist development—its failures, successes and reversals. Scant attention is paid to 
non-capitalist class structures in the process of transformation of Indian economy. Yet, 
once we take our gaze away from the dominating image of capital, we uncover a new 
history of postcolonial India—how different class-structures existed and continue to exist 
in Indian society and how non-capitalist class structures shaped and continue to shape the 
Indian society as much as the capitalist class structures. In fact, the moment we recognize 
this, we will find that the characterization of economic development in India as capitalist 
becomes problematic—it rather appears as a representational strategy that privileges 
certain processes over others and hence suppresses certain kinds of political responses to 
the emerging contradictions of the Indian society.   
Yet, economists and planners were always forced to accommodate non-capitalist class 
structures in their plans of economic development, even as these plans were meant to 
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 See Bhattacharya and Basole (2009: 117, n. 20). 
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promote capitalist production in India. The Industrial Policy Resolution (1948) presented 
the first outline of the allocation of production between state and private capitalist 
enterprises. Certain industries were reserved for the exclusive monopoly of the state 
enterprises. In certain industries all new enterprises would be established solely by the 
state. While existing private enterprises were allowed to function, it was emphasized that 
the state had the right and could exercise it to acquire any private enterprise in these 
industries. In the rest of the industries, business was normally left to private initiatives, 
though the state enterprises were supposed to progressively participate in those industries 
and the state could intervene in any industry if the performance of private business was 
unsatisfactory. The Second Industrial Policy Resolution of 1956 expanded the sphere of 
state ownership and categorically declared that all industries of basic and strategic 
interest and public utilities, should be in the public sector. More significantly, it declared 
that the industrial policy goal is to create a “socialistic pattern of society”.   
The Soviet-style Five-Year Plans went into effect in 1951, but it was with the second 
Five-Year Plan covering the period 1956-1961, that the distinct path of capitalist 
development in India was laid. 117The second Five-Year Plan—based on the Mahalanobis 
model—was a ground-breaking project that radically shaped the future of Indian 
economy; it put industrialization through rapid capital accumulation at the heart of the 
process of economic development in India. Yet, there were Gandhian challenges to 
modernist industrial paradigms from the beginning. We have already seen how the 
freedom struggle was animated by the misery heaped on India’s working people by the 
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 The architect of the second plan was Prashanta Chandra Mahalanobis, an eminent statistician from 
Calcutta and the founder of the Indian Statistical Institute. The second Plan is often referred to as Nehru-
Mahalanobis-Feldman model. See Bhagwati and Chakravarty (1969). 
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destruction of traditional industries in India under the impact of British transition to 
capitalism and colonial relations. One way the Gandhian opposition was neutralized was 
through the setting up of the Khadi and Village Industries Commission to protect 
handicraft and traditional industries (Tyabji, 1984b). But more importantly, the protection 
of village and handicrafts was deemed important for providing livelihoods in labor-
intensive production and the supply of non-agricultural wage goods, so that the state’s 
investment of productive capital could be concentrated in capital-goods industries. In 
these maneuvers emerges an enduring contradiction of postcolonial India’s experiments 
with capitalist development—the contradiction between capital accumulation and 
employment generation, or in other words, the contradiction between capitalist 
accumulation and surplus population that the particular social context produces. This 
contradiction cuts right through the entire Planning process. The Mahalanobis model was 
opposed by some economists118, who presented an alternative development model 
focused on employment and expansion of wage goods. The protection of urban and rural 
handicrafts was a response to these mounting criticisms of the Mahalanobis model.   
To counter criticism from all quarters, the Second Five Year Plan document deviated from 
the Mahalanobis framework, but only by sweeping the problem under the carpet. It was said 
that the cottage and village industry sectors would be responsible for supplying the non-
agricultural wage goods. Since these were labor-intensive, i.e. low productivity, by a 
miracle the problem of unemployment was also thereby solved (Ahluwalia and Little, 1998: 
44-45).      
 
Village and cottage industries were pre-dominantly characterized by ancient class 
structures. Whenever family labor was utilized in these industries, ancient class processes 
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 See C.N. Vakil and P.R. Brahmanand (1956). Bhagwati (1998 :25) argues, however, that accumulation 
in the Plans was conceived not in opposition to employment, but rather as the only possible way to 
eradicate poverty and create employment. 
The key strategy that defined the resulting developmental effort was the decision to target 
efforts at accelerating the growth rate……Accelerated growth was thus regarded as an 
instrumental variable; a policy outcome that would in turn reduce poverty, which 
constituted the true objective of our efforts. (Bhagwati, 1998: 25. Italics in the original )    
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were articulated with household feudal class processes. The (male) head of the family 
appropriated not only his surplus labor but also the surplus abort performed by members 
of his family and made subsumed class payments to the merchants, moneylenders or 
banks, etc. Thus, non-capitalist class processes figured very prominently in the national 
plans otherwise designed for rapid capitalist accumulation, though they were hardly 
understood and debated in class terms. 
Along with village and cottage industries, relatively modernized small-scale industries—
both capitalist as well as ancient—were also promoted because of their capacity to 
generate livelihoods. Certain industrial products were specifically reserved for production 
in the small-scale industrial sector119. The number of products reserved for small scale 
industries rapidly increased over time, particularly under the non-Congress coalition 
government during 1977-1980120.  
It will not be an exaggeration to say that under the dirigiste regime, the overall state 
policy was to promote state-capitalist enterprises and small-scale competitive capitalist 
enterprises at the cost of oligopolistic capitalist enterprises121. The vision of the state in 
curbing large, powerful business houses in India was not to restrict capitalist 
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 The Karve committee on small-scale and village industries proposed in 1956 a policy of reservation of 
certain products for small-scale units. 
120
 “The policy of reserving items for production in the Small Scale Sector taken as a whole had begun with 
the reservation of dhotis and sarees of specific kinds for handloom units in the early nineteen fifties. In the 
case of those industry groups which lay within the purview of' the Central Small Industries Organisation, 
reservation had been made by 1967, for 46 items. By 1977, this had increased to 504 items. In 1980, the 
number was apparently increased to a total of' 807, but closer scrutiny shows that in the majority of cases, 
the existing items had been more carefully defined at the level of eight and nine digit national industrial 
classification codes” (Tyabji, 1984b: 1426).  
121
 Oligopolistic enterprises yielding some degree of monopoly power in the market would be able to price 
their commodities above their values and would thus secure either non-class revenue from consumers or 
subsumed class payments from both state capitalist and small competitive private capitalist enterprises as 
well as ancient enterprises, thus undermining accumulation in these enterprises. Such an outcome was 
deemed undesirable for a broad-based capitalist development. On the other hand, a check on the growth of 
corporate power would establish the image of the new independent postcolonial state as the guardian of its 
people—workers, capitalists and ancients—against private corporate “greed” and “manipulation”.   
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development, but rather to facilitate capitalist transition “from below”, i.e. the emergence 
of competitive capitalism relying on individual entrepreneurial capitalist. It was expected 
that such broad-based capitalism, will balance the economic power of large oligarchic 
business houses on the one hand and at the same time facilitate a differentiation of the 
ancients into capitalists and wage-workers. According to the 1951 census, more than 58% 
of the industrial labor force was ancient producers (Tyabji, 1984b). It was expected that 
protection for small scale industries would actually help capitalist class structures to 
develop through a process of differentiation of the ancients and in the absence of 
monopolistic strangulation of the incipient capitalist initiatives. It must be remembered 
that by the time of independence, there had already emerged large business houses—both 
productive and unproductive capitalists—which controlled the lion’s share of society’s 
total productive and unproductive capital. The concentration of economic power in the 
hands of a small group of business houses meant that while “while independence meant 
the transfer of "political" power to the Congress, it also meant the transfer of "economic" 
power to the big Indian industrialists and agricultural landlords” (Tyabji,1984a:36). 
Popular desire for democracy stirred up by the freedom struggle meant that such 
concentration and inequality of wealth and income would destroy social cohesion in an 
emerging nation-state. The growth and expansion of small capitalist class structures 
would sustain the democratic image of capitalism—i.e. small property holders and 
freedom and opportunity of enterprise.    
What is of interest in the Indian case, however, is that these requirements could be skillfully 
matched to the popular support for small industrialists and small enterprises which had been 
generated by democratic currents within the Congress itself in the pre-Independence period 
(Tyabji, 1984 a: 37) 
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On the other hand, the development of state capitalist industries in areas where massive 
doses of initial capital investment and long “gestation” periods are involved actually 
helped the growth of large private enterprises—by providing crucial C-commodities as 
well as market for private capitalist products (Patnaik, 1979; Desai, 1975) 122.  On the 
other hand, the compulsions of rapid growth of capital-goods industries meant that actual 
Plan expenditure on village and traditional industries and small-scale industries was 
insignificant compared to that on modern industries. As we can see from Table 2, starting 
from second Five-Year Plan, the plan outlays on modern industries has dwarfed that on 
village and traditional industries, clearly illustrating the bias of the planners towards 
modern versus traditional industries. Therefore, the Nehruvian policy regime had 
contradictory implications for large as well as small private capitalist enterprises as well 
as traditional and modern ancient enterprises.  
Of course, the leading business houses asked for government intervention in the economy 
to secure certain conditions of their existence and expansion as productive and 
unproductive capitalists. But they never liked the nationalization of society’s means of 
production or reservation of products for state capitalist and small capitalist and ancient 
enterprises. Squeezed between these two “sectors” of the economy, the oligopolistic 
productive and unproductive capitalists had “either to remain where they were in terms of 
industrial assets, or to subvert the strategy, by making inroads into the sphere either of the 
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 In terms of Keynesian macroeconomics, public investment doesn’t “crowd out “private investment, 
rather, it “crowds in” private investment in the Indian context.  
Public Investment, therefore, was effectively to play a dual role: it was to eliminate to some 
extent the serious gaps in the production structure which the private sector, would have 
been reluctant to overcome on its own and to provide a stimulus to private investment by 
extending the markets of private industrialists directly and indirectly (Patnaik,1979: 6).  
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public sector or of the small scale sector” (Tyabji,1984b:1427). They tried to 
systematically subvert the policy regime by encroaching on both the reserved sectors. It 
was found by the Report of the Industrial Licensing Policy Inquiry Committee (1969) 
that economic concentration and degree of monopoly has increased among the private 
capitalist sector throughout the planning period. Specific anti-monopoly laws were 
brought into effect; foreign exchange and foreign investment were put under strict 
control; banks, insurance companies and coal mines were nationalized.123 These moves 
had often led private capitalists to accuse Indian state of destroying capitalism and 
promoting socialism124. Nationalization of means of production on a significant scale was 
equated with socialism. The Marxists criticized the Indian state for not destroying private 
capitalism fully or for being complicit with private capitalist interests despite socialist 
rhetorics. Class understood in terms of production, appropriation and distribution of 
surplus labor—as opposed to class-as-property-relations—did not inform Marxist debates 
on India’s economic development.  
The expanding control and regulation of the state of private capitalist enterprises 
provoked a response of the latter in terms of a severe critique of Nehruvian planning in 
terms of economic performance (e.g. ridicule expressed by reference to a “Hindu rate of 
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 Indira Gandhi nationalized major banks in 1969, the insurance sector in 1972 and the coal industry in 
1973. The Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices Act went into effect in 1969. The Foreign Exchange 
Regulation Act (FERA) was passed in 1973, which put into place numerous restrictions for foreign 
investment and the operations of foreign companies in India.  
124
 Till that period, Indian National Congress was the hegemonic political party at the national level. In the 
1967 elections, the Congress party received a major setback in the centre and particularly in the states. 
Prime Minister Indira Gandhi took a radical stance which led to a split within the Congress. India turned 
more towards Soviet Russia in international relations and internally the congress under Indira Gandhi 
moved closer to Communist parties of India. By that time, the Indian political landscape was getting 
fractured into slowly emerging regional political parties. At the same time, radical agrarian movements 
threatened the legitimacy of the central government. In 1971, Dandekar and Rath’s (1971) study showed 
that after 3 five-year Plans, poverty had not decreased in India. If one looks at per capita expenditure, 
poverty appeared to have increased over that period. Indira Gandhi launched the Garibi Hatao (eradicate 
poverty) slogan and adopting socialist rhetoric, got a landslide victory in 1971. 
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growth”) and inefficiency of state-capitalism in India as well as state-regulation of private 
capitalism in India125. Therefore, by the early eighties, a reversal of the earlier policy 
regime was gradually but steadily under way leading to its formal abandonment in 1991 
and adoption of private capitalism as the privileged engine of economic growth in India.  
Four decades of planning had generated significant growth of capitalist industries in 
India, most notably in domestic capital goods and basic goods industries supplying C-
commodities to both state and private capitalist industries. The Nehruvian regime was 
successful in installing state capitalist industries at the commanding heights of the 
economy. Table 3 shows that in terms of net capital formation, the public sector and 
private sector were close in 1950-51, but by 1990-91 the public sector clearly dwarfs the 
private corporate sector. Table 4 shows that the share of the public sector in the GDP of 
different sectors of the economy increased continuously over the entire planning regime.   
However, if we look at the occupational structure of Indian labor force, we find the 
striking result that it had hardly changed since the beginning of the century under colonial 
rule. Industrial employment continued to be stuck at a very low percentage of the labor 
force and agriculture continued to hold on to a very high share of the labor force. In 1991, 
66.7% of the work force was still employed in agriculture, 3% in modern industry, 7.2% 
in traditional industry and construction and 20.5 % in services (Roy, 1999). The growth 
of industrial output and expansion of industrial state and private capital was not matched 
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 The Nehruvian policy regime is referred to as the license raj, where industrial expansion or investment 
required a formal license from the state. A vast literature exists on the resources spent by private capitalists 
in obtaining those licenses (a scarce commodity under restricted imports and regulated investment regime). 
In the Indian case, these expenditures of business have been termed as “directly unproductive, profit-
seeking activities (DUP) by Bhagwati (1982) or competitive rent-reeking activities (Krueger, 1974). The 
cost of such bureaucratic control of private capitalists emerged as a major category of subsumed class 
payment to the state or political parties—as formal license fees as well as informal bribes—by private 
capitalists to secure conditions of accumulation. The reaction of private capitalists was partly fueled by 
their desire to get rid of such subsumed class payments to the state. For an overview of debates on 
liberalization in India, see Ghosh (1998). 
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by the growth of industrial employment. Therefore, there is a disjuncture between 
capitalist accumulation and employment generated by such accumulation. As Table 5 
shows, per capita GDP in agriculture continuously declined relative to that in non-
agricultural sectors over the entire planning period. This is reflected in the overall decline 
in employment elasticity in the Indian economy.    
Employment elasticities, measured as the ratio of employment growth to the growth 
of value-added have declined from around 0.65 in the 1960s to 0.55 per cent during 
the 1970s and around 0.38 during the 1980s. This decline has occurred due both to 
the technology and composition effect. Changes in technologies of production in 
industrial sectors, subsectors and products have tended to reduce the labour 
requirement per unit of output. At the same time, the share of products and sectors 
with high labour-output coefficients in total output has declined and that of products 
and sectors with high capital-output coefficients has increased (Papola, 1992: 308-
309).  
 
In class terms, we find that the surplus population continued to be engaged as ancients in 
agricultural as well as non-agricultural production after four decades of planning. Hence, 
the vision of the planners that capitalist class structures would slowly replace non-
capitalist class structures did not materialize and contradictory effects of the planning 
regime were felt not only by the state and private capitalists, large and small capitalist 
enterprises, but also by non-capitalist class structures, whose conditions of existence were 
simultaneously undermined and strengthened by the state policies. For example, state 
subsidies on capital equipment as well as underpricing of domestically produced state 
capitalist C-goods allowed both state and private capitalist industries to adopt higher 
organic composition of capital.  
Meanwhile, expansion of capitalist production destroyed conditions of existence of other 
non-capitalist production units—leading to dispossession of direct producers from their 
means of production on a massive scale. One of the major forms of dispossession was the 
development of infrastructure, including dams, highways, but also through acquisition of 
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natural resource base for growth and expansion of new industries. The dispossessed 
people are often referred to as the “internal refugees” (Cernea, 1990) or “development 
refugees” (Mahapatra, 1991). According to Fernandes (2007), over the period 1947-2000, 
more than 60 million people have been deprived of their customary access to means of 
production by “development”—i.e. infrastructural and industrial—projects. Majority of 
the displaced persons are tribal and lower caste people (ibid). One of the main 
instruments of dispossession is the colonial Land Acquisition Act of 1894 which did not 
allow for “rehabilitation of the displaced” (Guha, 2005). The colonial Act was used by 
independent Indian state to engage in primitive accumulation with as much impunity as 
the British colonizers126.  
State interventions as well as rising pressure of population on land have led to depletion 
of “commons” and “wastes”. The commercialization and monetization of the economy 
has eroded traditional natural and common property resources. Technological changes in 
agriculture have created massive environmental degradation of natural resources and with 
it the means of production for many non-capitalist class processes. As agricultural inputs 
came to be industrially produced with intense application of science, many of the 
traditional modes of agricultural practices have vanished. Rao and Storm (1998: 235) 
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 The Land Acquisition Act of 1894—which was legislated into existence during the colonial era—is an 
infamous example of how the concept of “eminent domain” is misused by the state, whether colonial or 
postcolonial. The government can acquire any land—privately or communally owned—in the name of 
“public purpose”.  
Once the government notifies any land for acquisition under the Act, the acquisition 
itself or its purpose cannot be challenged in court. Projects like dams, mines, private 
industries and SEZs can always be interpreted as being in “public purpose” since 
they are considered imperative for development and industrialization. There is no 
mechanism to determine whether this “public purpose” actually translates into 
“public interest” or not. Only compensation amount for the land can be urged upon 
and decided in such cases in courts” (Perspectives, 2008: 7). 
In independent India, no central government has made any serious attempts at amendment of the 
Act until 2004, though certain sate governments did come up with some rehabilitation laws  since 
the 1980s (See Guha, 2005) 
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claim that 30 to 50 percent of common property resources have been depleted in the last 
four decades127.  
Primitive accumulation and capitalist accumulation with sluggish rates of growth of 
productive workforce have expanded the surplus population of India throughout the 
planning regime. The classic location of surplus population in India has always been 
agriculture. Let us now look at the dilemma that agriculture posed for the planners in 
such a context.  
 
Surplus Population and the Agrarian Dilemma 
Surplus labor power was trapped in agriculture since colonial times, when destruction of 
Indian industries and the erosion of traditional social security mechanisms forced people 
to fall back on land as the last means of production and subsistence. A rapid increase in 
population in the twentieth century led to a steep fall in per capita availability of land. 
Due to the pressure of population on land, rents increased and ate away most of the 
peasants’ surplus where ancient class structures existed. Money-lenders and traders also 
dominated ancient farmers through exorbitant claims on surplus. Under feudal class 
relations, feudal exploitation intensified under absentee landlords who had no personal 
ties with land and often claimed rent that exceeded the surplus produced by the serfs, thus 
threatening serfs’ subsistence. At the time of independence, agriculture was stagnant with 
peasants immersed in deep misery and economic crisis.  
Writing in 1961, Sundaram estimated that “about 40% of India’s population now engaged 
in agriculture should be removed from farming so as to make cultivation more economic” 
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 See NSSO (1999), Jodha (1985, 1989, 1990, 2000). 
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(Sundaram, 1961: 131). The guiding model of economic growth in poor countries with 
large surplus labor power was that provided by Arthur Lewis (1954) who argued that 
capital accumulation can proceed by withdrawing surplus labor power from agriculture at 
subsistence wage. At the end of the process, expanding capitalist economy will absorb 
the entire surplus labor power and both the traditional pre-capitalist economy and surplus 
labor power will disappear. 128  
However, deep doubts persisted in the minds of even those economists who believed in 
the Lewisian growth process. Let us read a neoclassical text to uncover contradictions 
that plagued the modernist vision of capitalist transformation of agriculture and 
accumulation and expansion of industrial capital in the presence of surplus population. I 
will use a single text in illustrating the dilemma—an article by V. M. Dandekar in 1962. 
Dandekar writes this article on the issue of appropriate agrarian reforms in the context of 
an economy undergoing capitalist industrialization in the presence of over-population or 
“superfluous” population (Georgescu-Roegen, 1960:12). Consider a Lewis-type process 
occurring in the non-agricultural sector. A small capitalist nucleus is expanding, by 
reinvesting its profit and drawing laborers from the agricultural sector. The agricultural 
sector is overpopulated with labor whose marginal productivity is zero or at least much 
below subsistence level. What should be the appropriate agrarian reforms in such a 
context? The dominant view, in those days, at least in the non-communist countries, was 
that individual peasant holdings was the best choice. This, in fact, led Georgescu-Roegen 
to argue for a “double negation”—not capitalism, not socialism—in agrarian reforms. 
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 The Lewis model provided the intellectual vision for the planning models in India. See Chakrabarti and 
Cullenberg (2003). 
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Dandekar analyzes the merit of this argument. While the Lewis-type process is occurring 
in the modern industrial sector with growth in investment and output, employment 
growth in the industrial sector is constrained by the principle of capitalist profit-
maximization whereby labor is employed up to the point where marginal product of labor 
is equal to the real wage rate. In conditions of over-population, the entire residual labor 
force is thrown onto the agricultural sector to absorb and feed them while the Lewis 
process is occurring. Moreover, agricultural output has to be maximized, too, in order to 
siphon a food surplus to the industrial sector to feed the industrial proletariat129. 
Capitalism in agriculture cannot be a solution to this problem, since it would introduce 
the capitalist employment principle (MPL = Real wage rate) into agriculture and would 
thus fail to absorb the surplus labor. Can co-operatives be a solution? Not the way they 
are usually operated, because once individual peasant holdings are put in the form of a 
cooperative, the marginal productivity principle comes into play and even family 
members of the peasant families in the cooperatives may not be employed. This is 
because the managers of cooperative farms, trained in modern economic theory and 
coming mostly from the urban educated literate classes, will have imbibed the capitalist-
entrepreneurial spirit. Moreover, the cooperatives will function in an economy where the 
modern non-agricultural sector is run on capitalist principles and hence the efficiency 
calculus of the capitalist firm will inform any evaluation of the performance of the 
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 “Conceived as a part of the problem of economic growth, the agrarian problem consists in holding on to 
this population until an increasing part of it is withdrawn to the non-agricultural sector and in the 
meanwhile in employing it usefully so as to maximize the total output of the agricultural sector”. 
(Dandekar, 1962: 70).  
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cooperatives.130 Hence, there will be a pressure on the managers to run the cooperative on 
capitalist principles. 
If neither capitalism nor socialism can provide a solution to the agrarian problem, can the 
traditional agrarian mode of production, feudalism, provide a solution? Georgescu-
Roegen and Dandekar argue that traditional feudalism did provide a solution to the 
problem of employment of the surplus population. The feudal landlord does not receive 
profit-rent, but a tithe, which is a fixed share of the output of land. Given a constant share 
of the tithe in output, the landlord’s tithe can be maximized by maximizing employment 
and output, i.e. by employing labor up to the point where its marginal product is zero, 
beyond what capitalism would permit. However, in contact with capitalism, feudalism 
changes its character. Feudal lords become more interested in non-agricultural activities 
and try to leave traditional societies. This leads to absentee landlordism, rack-renting and 
all the horrors of rural exploitation. Hence feudalism doesn’t work either.  
The solution is to be found in individual peasant holdings. In conditions of surplus labor, 
opportunity cost of labor is zero and family labor will be employed to the full extent of 
zero MPL. Labor will be employed without any reference to marginal productivity and 
output will be maximized. Thus the surplus labor is employed and fed by sharing of the 
total produce within the family. Agrarian reforms, according to Dandekar, which attempt 
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 This fear is not unfounded. We have seen this in the debate over reforms of the public sector in the 
1990s in India. The critics of the public sector policy have incessantly pointed out the dismal performance 
of the public sector in terms of profitability, productivity and quality of goods and services. The defenders 
have in vain fought back arguing that the public sector enterprises were not run according to private 
business criterion, but had several “social objectives” to achieve in addition to productivity and 
profitability. The critics seem to have won, since today public sector units either have to prove themselves 
to be competitive with the private sector or else they suffer privatization or disinvestment. Consequently, 
the public sector follows the same cost-cutting, productivity-raising competitive strategies as the private 
sector. 
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to break up feudalism and redistribute land to individual peasant families, actually restore 
the old feudal formula in a better form.  
Note, that this agrarian arrangement is only for a temporary period, until the non-
agricultural sector sufficiently weans away the surplus labor in agricultural. Also, note 
that the Lewis-type process and the strategy of rapid capitalist growth are never 
questioned. But, when it comes to ensuring the employment and livelihoods of the 
people, the same capitalist principles are rejected. In effect, non-capitalist class 
structures—mainly ancient—are promoted precisely to tackle the problem of surplus 
population while enabling expansion of capitalist class structures. 
This is not the end of the story, however. Dandekar realizes the limitations of individual 
peasant holdings in generating rapid growth and capital accumulation in agriculture. 
Individual peasant holdings work as a solution only up to a point. Beyond that they 
hinder economic growth. This nagging contradiction between requirements of growth and 
requirements of livelihood now pushes Dandekar in a new and opposite direction. 
Dandekar finally argues for large land-holdings “feudal in theory, modern in technology 
and oriented to a socialistic purpose”. The entire paper of Dandekar takes you through a 
dizzying sequence of negations. Dandekar arrived at individual peasant holdings by 
negating socialism, capitalism and feudalism-in-presence-of-capitalism as all of them 
failed to employ the surplus population. Then he negates individual peasant holdings 
because they fail to generate growth in agriculture and fail to maximize output and 
release enough food to fuel the growth of the industrial sector. Therefore, individual 
small plots of land are to be consolidated into large holdings under a “feudal overlord 
who will collect the tithe and hand it over to the non-agricultural sector” (Dandekar, 
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1962: 80).  He argues against any redistribution of land to landless laborers or permanent 
settling of farmers on lands with proprietary rights, since they must be available for 
withdrawal when the expanding industrial sector needs them. People are to be loosely 
settled on the large tracts of land and the feudal overlord has to ensure that output is 
maximized using all the resources, but most importantly using all the labor resources, 
while waiting for the industrial sector to absorb the rural surplus labor. Thus, the only 
way Dandekar can find a solution to the problem of over-population in the presence of 
capitalist development, without hindering the latter, is to revert to a feudal type of 
arrangement. Also, what is interesting in his analysis is the idea that surplus population 
should not have secure access to means of production—i.e. there should not be a reversal 
of primitive accumulation by the policies undertaken to manage surplus population. 
“Free” labor power must be available for withdrawal by the capitalist industries.    
 
Land Reforms and Surplus Population in Agriculture 
Of course, Dandekar’s ideas were never put into practice. But, to a certain extent, the 
state undertook land reforms with varying degrees of success. While no radical 
redistribution of land took place in India and peasants continued to be subjected to feudal 
class exploitation in various pockets of India, Indian agriculture was transformed from its 
late colonial feudal form to a predominantly ancient form with some capitalist and feudal 
farms. The idea of the planners was to get rid of feudalism in agriculture and promote 
ancient class structures (peasant family farms) with the hope that capitalist agricultural 
entrepreneurs would emerge through the process of differentiation of the ancients and 
accumulation of capital. On the other hand, agriculture had also to act as a “sink” for 
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surplus labor power. Therefore, processes of dispossession or differentiation cannot be 
allowed to destroy the “sink”. These led to same contradictory policy interventions in 
agriculture as in industry. The following rather long quote admirably captures the 
contradictions and the compulsions that drive state intervention in agriculture.  
Indeed the problem of India’s agriculture lies outside agriculture, namely that the other 
sectors did not grow fast enough to withdraw sufficient population out of agriculture. 
………………………………………………The non-agricultural sector is in part an 
‘organized’ sector and entry into that sector is highly restricted. That sector does not take in 
any more people than it can remunerate at the relatively high level. All the rest must stay 
behind in agriculture and share whatever may grow there. Agriculture is a parking lot for 
the poor. 
Underlying this fact is the agrarian reform and policy pursued in the last four decades. It 
failed to make a distinction between abolition of feudal elements and elimination of 
enterprises. For instance, not only were intermediaries abolished but lease and sale market 
in land also abolished. Ceiling limits on landholdings were imposed with the ostensible 
purpose to distribute the surplus land to the landless. Whatever the success of these 
measures, they tended to freeze the situation in agriculture and inhibit movement in and out 
of agriculture. Special agencies were created called Small Farmer Development Agency 
(SFDA) and Marginal Farmer and Agricultural Labourer (MFAL) development agency to 
administer programmes initiated to make essentially non-viable small and marginal farmers 
and agricultural labourers viable by providing them with credit. Subsequently, thee were 
supplemented by the Integrated Rural Development Programme (IRDP) to provide them 
with additional self-employment. There were also programmes providing additional wage 
employment, such as the Cash Scheme for Rural Employment (CSRE), Pilot Intensive 
Rural Employment Programme (PIREP) and the Food for Work programme. The intention 
had been to give to the surplus population, which agriculture could not support, some 
succour, without withdrawing it from agriculture (Dandekar, 1992:54-55, Italics mine).   
   
Land reforms in India had the following components— 
i) Abolition of intermediaries, i.e. the Zamindars (who had developed into a 
feudal class by late colonial period), so that the state could directly collect 
revenue from the cultivators.  
ii) Reforms aimed at tenancy relations—security of tenure, reduction of rent, 
conferment of ownership rights to tenants. 
iii) Ceilings on the size of landholdings 
iv) Cooperativization of agriculture 
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Only the first component of land reforms was implemented with relative success. The 
second and third components were only partially successful, while the fourth never really 
took off. The peasants’ anger against the zamindars, the anti-nationalist role of the 
zamindars in the freedom movement and their alienation from the rural community made 
the abolition of zamindari politically feasible and desirable. The zamindars as a class, 
however, fought back, delayed and obstructed the process through endless litigations. But 
their power as a class was broken by the mid-fifties. The abolition of zamindari 
transformed twenty million erstwhile tenants into landowners (Chandra, Mukherjee and 
Mukherjee, 1999). This directly transformed former tenants into ancient farmers, though 
the richer strata of these peasants also became landlords in turn. Tenancy declined after 
reforms, partly as a result of increase in self-cultivation and partly as a result of evictions 
of existing tenants by landowners at the time of reforms. Loopholes in the legislation 
were used by the zamindars to resume land by claiming to perform ‘personal cultivation’ 
on land. Even “absentee landlords” made a show of labor expended in direct cultivation 
and assumed large areas of land under personal cultivation. At the same time, they also 
resorted to eviction of tenants on a large-scale in order to keep for ‘personal cultivation’ 
as large a proportion of their lands as possible. A section of the erstwhile rent-earning 
zamindars turned to capitalist farming. And the evicted tenants became landless 
proletariat. Large feudal ‘estates’ were gone, except in some pockets of India.  
The second part of land reforms—concerned with tenancy reforms—had three basic 
objectives—1) security of tenure, 2) reduction in rent and 3) ownership rights over land 
cultivated by tenants, subject to certain restrictions.  The reforms had a legal provision for 
the resumption of entire land-holding by small landowners—who were no better off than 
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their tenants—for self-cultivation. This legal provision was manipulated by large 
landlords who transferred lands in the name of number of their relatives as “small 
landowners” and evicted existing tenants on a large-scale. Thus the very reforms aimed at 
protecting tenants and small landowners were used by landowners as an instrument of 
primitive accumulation. Delays in implementation of land reforms offered ample 
opportunity for such acts131. 
Tenancy reforms were carried to its farthest in states where Communist Parties were in 
government, e.g. West Bengal and Kerala. But, even in these states, the pressure of 
population on land was so high that egalitarian distribution of land beyond a point 
became infeasible. 
As it has been noted that in West Bengal, where over time the overwhelming majority of 
the cultivators were small cultivators controlling less than five acres, a further redistributive 
thrust was difficult. ‘The “class enemy” [the feudal landlords] had dissolved into a sea of 
small landholdings’. The dilemma was the same as the one that was faced in other parts of 
India. (Chandra, Mukherjee and Mukherjee, 2000:382) 
 
The pressure of population on land was such as to push up the rent and eat away a large 
part of the surplus of the direct producers. Legal ‘fair’ rents in such a situation could only 
be enforced in case of tenants with occupancy rights. The partial success stories like 
Kerala and West Bengal notwithstanding, the practice of unsecured and underground 
tenancy continued, partly fueled by the high rents.  
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 “Even after the tenants got legal protection against eviction, large-scale evictions occurred. For example, 
the Planning Commission’s Panel on Land Reforms noted in 1956 that between 1948 and 1951 the number 
of protected tenants in the State of Bombay declined from 1.7 million to 1.3 million, i.e. by more than 23 
per cent; in the State of Hyderabad between 1951 and 1955, the number declined by about 57 per cent. 
Another detailed study of Hyderabad showed that out of every 100 protected tenants created in 1951, after 
four years, i.e. by 1954, only 45.4 per cent maintained that status; 12.4 per cent became landowners by 
exercising their right to acquire land; 2.6 per cent were legally evicted; 22.1 per cent were illegally evicted 
and 17.5 per cent ‘voluntarily’ surrendered their claims to the land. Voluntary surrenders by tenants was 
really an euphemism for illegal eviction as most often the tenant was ‘persuaded’ under threat to give up 
his tenancy rights ‘voluntarily’. So common was the practice that the Fourth Plan was constrained to 
recommend that all surrenders should only in favor of the government, which could allot such lands to 
eligible persons. However, only a handful of states acted upon this recommendation.” (Chandra, Mukherjee 
and Mukherjee, 2000:380).      
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Another component of land reforms was the imposition of ceilings on the size of land 
holdings with the objective of attaining an equitable distribution of land. The limited 
political consensus on this issue and the legal provisions of exemptions allowed many to 
manipulate the laws and avoid ceilings. In the wake of political and economic crises of 
the mid-sixties, agrarian radical movements in late sixties and early seventies— 
spearheaded by communist parties—took the form of ‘land grab’ by the landless in many 
parts of the country. The movement was itself was brutally crushed. But it forced the 
government to implement ceiling laws more strictly. More than four million landless 
peasants did receive some land, however small its size may be. But more importantly, the 
ceiling laws, by restricting concentration of landholdings, had killed the land market. The 
law prevented “the possible dispossession of numerous small and marginal holders which 
would probably have occurred through a competitive process in the land market in the 
absence of a ceiling on landholdings” (C.H. Hanumantha Rao quoted in Chandra, 
Mukherjee and Mukherjee, 2000:391). Thus, while conditions for development of 
capitalist class structure in certain branches of production were being created, the 
management of surplus population required that the same conditions be prevented from 
emerging in other areas of production. We have already seen how reservation of 
commodities for traditional non-capitalist industries prevented private and state capital to 
make inroads into the production of those commodities. In the same way, land reforms 
policies led to a “freezing” of agriculture as a sector dominated by small “ancient” farms. 
Tables 6 and 7 show the steadily increasing preponderance of small and marginal farms 
in Indian agriculture. Marginal and small operational holdings (i.e. for land holding sizes 
less than 2 hectares) constitute 85.9 % of all holdings in agriculture in 2002-2003 
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compared to 61.7% in 1960-61. Marginal and small farms command 42 % of total 
operated area in 2002-2003 as compared to 19.2 % in 1960-61. On the other hand, large 
and medium land holdings command 35.6 % of total operated area in 2002-2003, a large 
decline from 60.2 % in 1960-61. Despite continuing inequalities in land holdings, it is 
clear that the trend is towards fragmentation and subdivision of land and Indian 
agriculture has increasingly come to be dominated by small and marginal farms by 
numbers132. Extreme fragmentation of landholding is captured by the steadily declining 
average size of operational landholding in India. As Table 8 shows, from 2.63 hectares in 
1960-61, the average size of landholding has declined to 1.06 hectares in 2002-03.   
This freezing of agriculture constrained accumulation of industrial capital in other ways. 
First of all, ancient farmers cultivated small landholdings with primitive technology and 
hence technical productivity of labor was very low. Secondly, the high rents to landlords, 
usurious interest charged by money-lenders leading to perennial indebtedness of the 
peasants and the exorbitant “merchant fee” left the peasants with little or no surplus to 
accumulate and invest in productivity-enhancing techniques and inputs. Thus, food prices 
could not fall enough and hence continued to dominate the budget of not only the 
peasants, but also the industrial workers. Hence, the market for capitalist non-agricultural 
wage goods could not expand. Thirdly, capitalists could not cheapen labor power and 
hence increase rate of surplus value because conditions of ancient farming erected 
absolute barriers to cheapening of the main wage good, food. Fourth, markets for 
capitalist C-goods could not expand either because peasants continued to farm with 
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 “Also, though the opportunity to acquire large areas of surplus lands for redistribution was missed 
because of defective and delayed ceiling laws, in the long run the high population growth and the rapid 
subdivision of large holdings over several generations (in the absence of the practice of primogeniture for 
inheritance in India) led automatically to little land remaining over the ceiling limits” ((Chandra, 
Mukherjee and Mukherjee, 2000: 391). 
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traditional implements and could not afford costly capitalist commodities as inputs or 
machines.  
By the mid-sixties, a food crisis had developed in agriculture as the thrust on industry in 
the Five-year plans and neglect of agriculture took its toll on agricultural output and 
productivity. The state had to respond with a massive program for increasing agricultural 
productivity—an initiative that came to be known as Green revolution in agriculture. It 
consisted of the application of laboratory-produced High-Yielding Variety seeds, 
chemical fertilizers and pesticides to Indian agriculture and mechanization on the larger 
farms. This led to a significant increase in yield per unit of land, initially in wheat, but 
later in other crops too and India achieved self-sufficiency in food. However, by the end 
of the eighties, the effect of the green revolution petered out and productivity once again 
came to a standstill. Meanwhile, in the north-western state of Punjab, where Green 
revolution was most successful in wheat, capitalist agriculture emerged and was 
facilitated by Green revolution.   
Despite these efforts, productivity of agriculture remains very low in India even in 
comparison with other developing countries and Indian agriculture is still dominated by 
“ancient” farms. It is fair to say that by the end of the Planning regime, agriculture was 
exhausted as a “sink” of surplus labor power. There was no more land to distribute to the 
landless and industrial growth was unable to absorb the landless rural labor force. The 
only viable option was to distribute homestead land, encourage animal husbandry that 
required minimal land and ancient production of non-agricultural wage goods133. 
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 “Perhaps the only viable programme left for the landless was the one which has been to some extent 
taken up in recent years, of distributing homestead lands or even just home sites, ensuring the payment of 
minimum wages, as well as providing security of tenure and fair rents to sharecroppers and tenants. Other 
answers are to be found in increasing off-farm employment in rural areas, in increasing animal husbandry 
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The Neoliberal Regime 
In 2001, one of the foremost social scientists of India wrote that “inside every thinking 
Indian, there is a Gandhian and a Marxist struggling for supremacy” (Guha, 2001:6). This 
observation may be an exaggeration, but it does reflect a turn among radical thinkers in 
India today. Yet, postcolonial India had attempted to get rid of Gandhi’s ideas in its 
discourses on nation-building and economic development as soon as it became 
independent. Then, how can we understand the resurgence of Gandhian ideas in the late 
twentieth century? I argue that the political economy of India’s capitalism has something 
to do with that. We have seen how capital accumulation and rapid industrialization have 
been paralleled by the enduring problem of surplus population and crisis of subsistence 
for the majority of the population confined to a non-capitalist space whose conditions of 
existence and prosperity are subverted by the thrust of capitalist accumulation, including 
primitive accumulation of social means of production. It is this disappointment with 
capitalism in independent India that have made radical thinkers increasingly interested in 
the Gandhian critique of modern industrialism, machines and the resulting unemployment 
of laborers and the virtues of traditional handicrafts and agriculture in providing 
livelihoods for the surplus population throughout the period of capitalist expansion. 
The neoliberal regime has exacerbated all those contradictions that had plagued the 
planning regime and unleashed new contradictions that derive from the ascendance of 
private capitalism over state capitalism, freer international trade and a more enhanced 
role of market-driven economic decisions.  In one sense, the neoliberal regime has 
                                                                                                                                                 
and other activities associated with cultivation but not requiring land.” (Chandra, Mukherjee and 
Mukherjee, 2000: 391-392). 
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brought visibility to the problem of surplus population and the limits of capitalist 
development in the Indian economy. The existence of surplus population was always 
attributed to low rates of growth and the weakness of the Indian bourgeoisie and/or the 
inefficiency of state capitalism. Starting from the 1980s, India has achieved high rates of 
growth and capital accumulation: Indian private capitalists are becoming increasingly 
powerful domestically as well as globally. Yet at the same time, job-creation in both state 
and private capitalist industries has slowed down markedly, even as productivity is 
increasingly rapidly (Kannan and Raveendran, 2009). It is this social conjuncture that 
prompted thinkers to finally locate surplus population within capitalism rather than 
outside it (i.e. as a pre-capitalist residue that survive obdurately). 
Under the neoliberal regime, previous allocation of production spheres among state 
capitalist, large private capitalist, small competitive capitalist enterprises and non-
capitalist (i.e. ancient) enterprises were uninstalled. Large business had the opportunity to 
expand, as the roll-back of the state meant fresh areas of investment and de-reservation 
opened up new areas for expansion of large capitalist enterprises at the cost of state 
capitalist enterprises and small scale capitalist and ancient enterprises. So, the new 
economic policy reverses the trends in the structure of the industry established by the 
dirigiste regime. On the other hand, there were new opportunities for expansion of small 
capitalist industries and ancient enterprises under sub-contracting relations with larger 
capitalist enterprises. The entire discourse on informalization is testimony to the 
phenomenal expansion of subcontracting and outsourcing of production to small 
capitalist, ancient and even feudal enterprises by larger capitalist enterprises. Even 
independent ancient and small capitalist enterprises could and did expand by exporting its 
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cheap commodities in the international markets. The expansion of ancient enterprises is 
also partly due to expansion of surplus population who set up ancient enterprises to 
sustain themselves, failing to get jobs as wage-workers. Several factors lead to an 
explosion of surplus population in the neoliberal era. First, globalization and 
liberalization of trade means both private and state capitalist enterprises in India have to 
compete in both domestic and international markets with capitalist enterprises from other 
countries. Since, there are no protected domestic markets, competition forces them to 
raise productivity and lower prices or face the threat of extinction. Cost-cutting measures 
have increasingly taken the form of massive labor retrenchment through rationalization of 
production and labor-serving technology. As a result, intensity and productivity of labor 
is increasing, while number of productive labors is either stagnant or only sluggishly 
growing. In the state sector, productive and unproductive workforce as a whole is 
actually declining. From Table 9, we can see that organized sector employment (which 
includes public sector productive and unproductive employment and employment in large 
corporate private sector) has actually declined in absolute numbers between 1999 and 
2004. On a longer time span, Ghosh and Chandrashekhar (2007) show that total 
employment in the organized sector has declined between 1981 and 2003, while labor 
productivity (net value-added per worker) has almost tripled over the same period. 
Secondly, neoliberalism has undermined those barriers that protected non-capitalist 
enterprises from capitalist competition. The dissolution of these non-capitalist units 
released fresh waves of laborers to the already tight wage-labor market, forcing them to 
return to some form of self-employment. Thirdly, rapid capital accumulation has also 
unleashed new forms of primitive accumulation and accelerated the existing forms. 
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The liberalization of trade in agricultural commodities, the long-run ecological impact 
and the short-run economic impact of capitalist commodity inputs (new varieties of 
seeds, fertilizers and pesticides) have pushed the “ancient” farmers of India to the edges 
of an economic disaster (Patnaik, 2003). On the one hand, because of unequal subsidy 
structures in the world—developed countries subsidize their agriculture much more than 
developing countries—and differences in productivity, free trade in agricultural 
commodities leads to falling unit prices domestically. At the same time, farmers are 
forced to replace traditional non-capitalist inputs by agricultural inputs sold by 
multinational giants like Monsanto and Cargill which raise the cost of production. At the 
same time, productivity on land is declining, requiring more fertilizers and more 
expenses. New varieties of seeds are more prone to pest attacks requiring more expenses 
on pesticides. Similarly, the new varieties of HYV seeds require more irrigation and 
hence higher costs of production. As a result, in the event of any crop failure or adverse 
market outcomes, farmers are trapped in indebtedness. They are forced to sell their land 
at throwaway prices. In many cases, farmers are committing suicides. Between 1993 and 
2003, 100,000 indebted farmers committed suicide in India, often consuming the same 
pesticide they used on their fields134.  
Another prominent form of primitive accumulation is through the establishment and 
extension of private property rights. The most controversial form of this is the new Patent 
regime or Intellectual Property Rights Regime that seeks to impose private property over 
world’s bio-diversity or gene pool (Shiva, 1997, 2001). In many instances, use-values 
that have been procured directly and freely from nature for thousands of years are sought 
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 Newman (2006).  Also see Vaidyanathan (2006), Mishra (2006), Jeromi (2007) etc.  
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to be converted into industrial commodities protected by patents. This patent regime will 
prohibit traditional uses of these natural resources in production and consumption and 
constitute a unique moment of primitive accumulation.   
At the same time, intense international competition leads the capitalists to evade or 
dismantle all the social regulations that may constrain its competitiveness or 
accumulation—this capitalist response has taken its most spectacular form in the concept 
of SEZs (Special Economic Zones) which are literally described as “countries within a 
country”. These SEZs are created by the state for capitalist industries with specific tax 
exemptions, subsidized infrastructural support, absence of labor laws and cheap land. 
These are literally foreign lands within the boundaries of a nation in the sense that the 
laws of the land do not apply here (Samaddar (2009), Basu (2007)). In the name of job 
creation, the capitalists are able to get rid of or substantially reduce many of the 
customary subsumed class payments to the state. The insane rush to set up hundreds of 
SEZs all over the country has unleashed a spectacular drive towards acquisition of land, 
in the process dispossessing many non-capitalist (predominantly “ancient” farmers) 
producers. The first decade of the twentieth century has seen numerous such projects 
announced by the government and resisted by the peasants and tribals135. Rapid industrial 
expansion, construction of highways, dams and power plants, expansion and 
gentrification of metropolitan cities etc, have translated into a frenzied conversion of 
agricultural lands into industrial lands or residential lands (Perspectives (2008). In many 
cases, such acquisition of agricultural lands is done by force or through market by land 
speculators at cheap prices because of the agricultural crisis.  
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 Basu (2007), Chandra and Basu (2007). 
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The political instability, the democratic assertion of the poor and the absence of 
hegemonic political parties at the center mean that the people are often able to force the 
state to roll back its industrial projects. Democracy and capitalism are fighting out a bitter 
battle in contemporary India. The accelerated process of dispossession and the furious 
resistance to it inscribe a bloody moment in the history of postcolonial India.  
 
The Dilemma of the Informal Sector 
If we look at the labor force of India, a striking fact emerges, which is increasingly 
dominating official, academic and radical discourses. Of the total labor force of India, 
more than 90% work in the so-called “informal” or “unorganized” sector, which covers 
enterprises outside the regulatory framework of the state. Almost the whole of agriculture 
belongs to it. The dominant class nature of “informal” production is self-employment. In 
the neoliberal regime, the rapid expansion of the informal economy casts doubt on the 
assertion that whatever is happening in India is capitalist development. Let us focus on a 
recent report by a Commission set up by the Central Government (NCEUS (2007))136. 
From Table 10, we can see that employed labor force in India increased from 396.8 
million in 1999-2000 to 457.5 million in 2004-2005. The informal sector absorbed 86% 
of the increase in employed labor force. Given the preponderance of self-employment, we 
can say that “ancient” class structures are the fastest growing class structure in terms of 
share of the labor force. “Ancient” producers constitute 56% of the total workforce—
64% of the agricultural workforce and 46 % of the non-agricultural workforce in 2004-
2005 (Sanyal and Bhattacharya, 2009). In agriculture, after a steady decline in the 1990s, 
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 Also see Sanyal and Bhattacharya (2009). 
  213
the number of self-employed farmers has increased between 1999-2000 and 2004-2005. 
As neoliberal policies begin to have their impact on agriculture, self-employment seems 
to be on the rise in agriculture. Over the same period (1999-2000 to 2004-2005) the 
agricultural wage-labor force has actually declined. India is home to the largest mass of 
surviving small farmers in the world (Sanyal and Bhattacharya, 2009). 
Given the dismal conditions of Indian agriculture, the labor force in agriculture is 
desperate to get out of agriculture. This is reflected in the steady decline in the share of 
agricultural workers in the rural workforce. Agricultural has finally hit its limits as a 
“sink” of surplus population, forcing workers to set up “ancient” non-agricultural 
enterprises in the rural areas or migrate to urban areas where they are predominantly 
employed in the urban informal sector (Sanyal and Bhattacharya, 2009). 
Within the informal non-agricultural sector, there are two kinds of enterprises—own-
account enterprises (OAEs) where production is done by the owner-operator, largely 
assisted by family labor but without any hired workers and “establishments” where the 
owner-operator works along with family labor and “hired” workers. In case of OAEs, we 
have predominantly ancient enterprises as well as enterprises where ancient fundamental 
class processes are often combined with feudal class processes (whenever labor of 
members of feudal household are used). This situation is similar to the dominant form of 
peasant farming in India. In case of “establishments” ancient, feudal and capitalist 
fundamental class processes are often combined. OAEs constituted 87% of all non-
agricultural informal enterprises and 73% of the informal non-agricultural labor force in 
1999-2000 (Sanyal and Bhattacharya, 2009). This clearly shows the preponderance of 
non-capitalist class structures in the “informal” sector.  
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It is evident that the so-called “informal” sector has always been and is, at present, the 
major source of livelihoods. Yet this presents a new dilemma for capitalist accumulation. 
Being outside the regulatory framework, the informal production units often operate on 
the borders of illegality—by encroaching on land, by illegal producing and selling cheap 
copies of capitalist commodities violating all copyright laws, illegally using public 
utilities, violating environmental norms etc. In order to ensure the conditions of capitalist 
accumulation, the informal sector have to be brought into the regulatory framework of the 
state for policing, surveillance and disciplining. However, the legal framework will “kill” 
these production units and thus destroy the source of livelihoods of the surplus 
population. This dilemma is most eloquently articulated in the now-famous Report to the 
International Labor Conference, 1991, by the Director-General of International Labor 
Organization (ILO). 
The dilemma, put simply, is whether to promote the informal sector as a provider of 
employment and incomes, or to seek to extend regulation and social protection to it and 
thereby possibly reduce its capacity to provide jobs and income for an ever-expanding labor 
force (quoted in Schlyter, 2002: 2).  
 
There is a striking similarity between the agrarian dilemma during the planning regime 
and the dilemma of the informal sector as it has come to be formulated in recent times. 
Both illustrate a social contradiction between the hegemonic/ privileged sector in the 
economy (the “formal” capitalist sector) and the livelihood of a large number of people. 
In case of the agrarian dilemma, we have seen how the contradiction results in an 
abandonment of the class structure of the hegemonic capitalist sector in agriculture. In 
case of ILO, the entire regulatory framework (economic, political and cultural conditions 
of existence of capitalist class process—including the sanctity of private property rights) 
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corresponding to capitalist development has to be evaded, avoided or suspended in order 
to secure the conditions of livelihood of people 137. 
In the context of contemporary political fragmentation, where political parties face 
uncertain electoral outcomes, it is fairly easy for these informal producers to find some 
political party taking up their cause. “Vote bank” politics allows these informal producers 
some leverage in resisting dispossession. The mass of people engaged in informal 
activities constitute a huge electoral constituency and hence important to all political 
parties in their politico-electoral calculations. Strict enforcement of property laws (for 
example, eviction of hawkers from city pavements or demolition of illegal squatter 
settlements on public or private lands), is often strongly resisted by political parties. 
Moreover, many civil society organizations offer resistance to such state programs on 
grounds of human rights, right to livelihood etc. Nationwide alliances and associations of 
informal labor force in particular trades are powerful pressure groups that apply pressure 
on state and central governments through political mobilization and legal battles. In the 
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 Typically, for “informal” ancient enterprises, SV± NCR ≤ Σ SSCP. The terms included in the left and 
right hand sides differ significantly between “formal” capitalist enterprises and “informal” ancient 
enterprises. Ancient enterprises are often set up on encroached land or within the household premises, for 
which the ancients do not pay ground rent. Similarly, in case of pirated products, the ancients routinely 
violate copyright and patent laws and thus avoid payments of ground rent. Similarly, they do not pay 
license fees and other taxes to the state and thus these terms characteristic of subsumed class payments of 
the “formal” capitalist enterprises do not apply to the “informal” ancient enterprises. Further, managerial 
salaries as subsumed class payments do not exist for the latter. They often use water, electricity etc. without 
paying for them, which may leave a non-class revenue term on the left hand side. On the other hand, 
ancient commodities, for reasons discussed in Chapter 4, often sell at prices les than values and thus lose 
NCR to consumers. The “informal” ancients have to pay bribes to the police for tolerance of illegality, 
payments to the mafia for protection and monetary contributions to political parties and organizations to 
fight for them against eviction by the state—all of which are important components of subsumed class 
payments featuring on the right hand side. Furthermore, they have to pay the merchants exorbitant 
merchant fees and they are most often charged usurious interest by “informal” money-lenders, since the 
ancients are excluded from the “formal” banking system. All these subsumed class payments may exceed 
the left hand side, thus threatening the reproduction of the ancients’ labor power. In general, even if 
reproduction of the ancients’ labor power is ensured, very little is left for accumulation by the ancients. 
Very often ancients have to accumulate and invest by depressing their consumption below the customary 
standard of living.  
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Indian political system, where no single political party could claim absolute majority of 
seats in recent parliamentary elections and many different political parties carve out the 
electorate among them, a huge vote-bank like the informal labor force can have 
significant bearing on the electoral outcome.   The following rather long quote captures 
the complexity of the social context in which “informal” street vendors in Mumbai secure 
their conditions of existence. Its shows how religion, regional chauvinism, political 
calculations and class overdetermine the conditions of existence of “ancient” food stalls 
on Mumbai’s pavements.   
Given the limited scope of jobs in the organized sector and the decline of industry in the 
Mumbai region, the Shiv Sena concentrated on politically mobilising the poor in the 
unorganized sector. A few years back, as a part of this localised politics, it decided to set 
up ‘regularised’ food stalls on the footpaths of BMC lands, ostensibly to provide cheap 
food to the city poor. Regular pucca shops – measuring 60 to 80 sq ft or more – were 
constructed on the footpaths. This involved removing those already using the space, and 
not unexpectedly, many were non-Maharashtrian hawkers…………. 
The control and direction of land use in Mumbai, or any other economically strategic city 
in the country, vests with the capitalist class with the state pitching in as a facilitator. 
However, it is also true that local political power operates with its own logic. This is well 
illustrated by the ‘zunka-bhakar’ politics of hawking space in Mumbai city. The Shiv 
Sena has for years played the ‘sons of the soil’ card to mobilise the local population as its 
support base. It has openly advocated a policy of restricting jobs and other economic 
opportunities in Maharashtra to the ‘local’ population. This paid dividends when poor 
Maharashtrians seeking relief from deprivations, as also middle class Maharashtrians in 
search of better prospects, voted the Shiv Sena to power. Since then, the party has 
consolidated its hold in Mumbai by openly discriminating against non-
Maharashtrians……. 
The proposal of the BMC to create ‘hawking zones’ is another example which illustrates 
the contradictions faced by the state in allocating space for social consumption vis-a-vis 
its role in serving monopoly capital. Be it the collection of illegal money (hafta) by local 
politicians and concerned public officials (including the police), or the occasional 
‘eviction’ operations against hawkers from public lands – both actions can be explained 
by the same logic, of the state catering to multiple interest groups in the city. In such a 
situation, who supports the cause of hawkers and who doesn’t often become 
irrelevant………… 
  
Today, hawking in high growth cities like Mumbai is no more confined to a struggle for 
survival by the ‘lumpen proletariat’ but involves multiple actors, including bureaucrats, 
local politicians and muscleman. Their struggle for a share of urban space has to be 
understood in a proper perspective (Sharma, 2000). 
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Moreover, the social crisis of survival of the surplus population often promotes cultural 
responses that recognize human being’s inalienable right to livelihood that has moral 
primacy over all other rights138. Such a social context constrains the conditions of 
existence of capitalist class structures by creating barriers to primitive accumulation and 
enabling non-capitalist class structures to survive on humanitarian grounds. 
The contradictions of capitalist development in India are such that securing the conditions 
of existence of capitalist class structures unleashes processes—primitive accumulation 
and the expansion of surplus population—which in turn undermine the very conditions of 
existence and expansion of capital. The particular social context has contradictory effects 
on all class structures, including capitalist class structures. In capitalocentric notions of 
non-capital, essentialism precludes the visibility of this contradictory nature of a 
particular social conjuncture. 
  
The Contradictions of “Inclusive Growth” 
India’s 11th five-year (2007-2012) plan presents a vision of “inclusive growth” for 
India—an official response to processes of economic exclusion underway in the Indian 
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 Consider the following Supreme Court verdict in the Sodhan Singh Vs. NDMC case, 1989138. Sodhan 
Singh used to sell garments at Janpath in New Delhi and was evicted by New Delhi Municipal Corporation. 
Sodhan Singh filed a Public Interest Litigation that this act of NDMC violated his fundamental right, 
namely his right to carry on trade. 
In a very significant judgement, the Court ruled that, "if properly regulated according to 
the exigency of the circumstances, the small traders on the side walks can considerably 
add to the comfort and convenience of the general public, by making available ordinary 
articles of everyday use for a comparatively lesser price. An ordinary person, not very 
affluent, while hurrying towards his home after a day's work can pick up these articles 
without going out of his way to find a regular market. The right to carry on trade or 
business mentioned in Article 19(1)g of the Constitution, on street pavements, if properly 
regulated cannot be denied on the ground that the streets are meant exclusively for 
passing or re-passing and no other use." (Bhowmick, 2003: 1544). 
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economy. For the official discourse, exclusion is about poverty and the unequal sharing 
of the expanding wealth of the society. In class terms, we can discern a different meaning 
of exclusion—the expansion of a non-capitalist “outside” that can always and already 
does, in many different ways, though hardly in class-terms, threaten the dominance of 
capital.     
This concern with inclusive growth reminds one of Polanyi’s “double movement”139 in 
capitalist market economies. Polanyi interprets the history of industrial society in the 19th 
and 20th centuries in terms of a pendulum-like "double movement". One side of that 
movement was toward free and flexible markets that enabled the material and 
technological gains associated with the Industrial Revolution. The other side was a 
reaction to the disruption that these markets imposed on people’s lives, threatening nature 
and society on a large scale and prompting the society to take steps towards self-
preservation. The current era of globalization mirrors that of the late 19th and early 20th 
centuries in many ways. Markets are being established, liberalized, and deregulated 
throughout the world. Commodities, capital and means of production are moving within 
and across frontiers at an ever-accelerating pace. And people’s lives are caught in the 
anarchy of the market. Severe dislocations, real and potential, urge people to look for 
alternatives to their increasingly chaotic and insecure lives. Neoliberalism and inclusive 
growth, therefore, constitute the two halves of the pendulum’s oscillation140. “Inclusive 
growth” is an emerging discourse specifically to address the contradictory development 
of capitalism that threatens to dissolve it.  
                                                 
139
 Polanyi (1944) 
140
 See also Resnick and Wolff’s argument about oscillation between state and private forms of capitalism 
in capitalist as well as so-called “socialist” economies like Soviet Union (Resnick and Wolff (2002). 
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As Samir Amin pointed out141, three billion peasants exist in the world today with the 
ratio of productivity of large, mechanized capitalist farms to that of those peasant farms 
with lowest productivity—i.e. those farms who have not benefited from green revolution 
technology—being 2000:1. The entire economy of three billion peasants can be replaced 
by twenty million large and efficient capitalist farms. Then why does petty commodity 
production exist? I argue that they exist partly as “sinks” for surplus population. 
Agriculture in India has always acted as one such “sink”. So did cottage and village 
industries and urban and rural non-agricultural “informal” sector enterprises.  
There is continuity of a particular contradiction across the two economic policy regimes 
in India – the planning regime and the neoliberal era—articulated as a contradiction 
between employment and accumulation, but which in Marxian class-terms, is a result of 
uneven and contradictory development of different class structures which provide and 
undermines each others’ conditions of existence at the same time.  
The deplorable economic conditions of the Indian labor force—with its gigantic size of 
surplus population—subsisting in a predominantly ancient economy whose conditions of 
existence are threatened by the pressure of surplus population and the forces of primitive 
accumulation—have always been a concern for economists and policy makers. Poverty 
alleviation programs and protection to small industries, including reservation of products 
for small scale industries have been staple components of economic policy during the 
planning regime.  
How does the discourse of “inclusive growth” differ from these earlier attempts? Firstly, 
the problem of poverty in the 1960s and the 1970s were formulated in the context of 
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 Mentioned in Sachs (2004: 1807) 
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inadequate economic growth. The persistence of these conditions in a handsomely 
growing economy since the 1980s is what makes the problem of exclusion theoretically 
challenging. Secondly, in the days of planning, the state was in a better position to 
influence the direction of the economy than today. The notion of inclusive growth 
becomes significant if we consider the problem as one of devising economic policies that 
try to achieve certain targets that are not automatic outcomes of a free market economy, 
yet where the state is committed increasingly to a non-interventionist stance with respect 
to the same free-market economy. Thirdly and most importantly, in the context of the 
contradictions between livelihoods and capital accumulation, one major constraint on any 
strategy of inclusive growth is posed by the preservation of the ‘sinks’ for surplus 
population of the economy. The objective of inclusive growth, in this context, is to 
achieve capitalist growth and increase the standard of living of the masses keeping the 
‘sinks’ intact, at least for the foreseeable future. This is the new utopic vision of the 
neoliberal development discourse. 
Let us consider then the model of market-led inclusion advocated by the World Bank. 
One of the major campaigns of the Bank is aimed at labor market reforms. The following 
quote summarizes well the arguments of the Bank. 
Restrictive labor laws thus end up creating a bias to protect already employed formal 
workers at the expense of creating more and better jobs for workers outside the formal 
manufacturing sector or encouraging firms to enter the formal sector. These laws create 
massive inequality. They divide a tiny enclave of relatively better-paid salaried formal 
sector workers, who have good job security and benefits, from the vast majority of 
informal or unorganized sector workers, who work for much lower wages and with little 
or no social protection. (World Bank. 2006: 123)  
 
This is an argument for a single labor market. The argument seems to rest on the 
assumption that capitalist accumulation will lead to rising demand for labor power which 
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will lead to increase in real wages and employment. This is the Smithian vision of 
capitalist growth and increasing prosperity of a society. But this vision, of course, misses 
the Marxian insights on the many forms of capitalist accumulation, with very different 
implications for the size of productive labor force, as well as the insights offered by the 
particular notion of primitive accumulation developed in this dissertation. Specifically, 
the World Bank approach rests on the assumption that the capitalist sector expands by 
drawing labor from the “ancient” economy—obviously by offering a wage higher than 
the average income in the latter (and more decent conditions of work). But in order for 
this process to work, the workers will have to be withdrawn incrementally leaving the 
whole “ancient” economy intact during the process of withdrawal. This is similar to how 
the “traditional” sector plays outs its role in the Lewis model. But, and this is important, 
capitalist class structures do not expand in vacuum. We have argued that primitive 
accumulation is constitutive of the capitalist class processes and thus capitalist 
accumulation may often involve dissolution of the “ancient” economy and dispossession 
of large numbers of “ancient” producers. This may happen either due to market 
competition as capitalist commodities destroy the markets for “ancient” commodities or 
due to processes of primitive accumulation involving appropriation of “scarce” means of 
production. This will dissolve the ‘sink’ and more people will join the labor force than 
can be absorbed by the capitalist sector. This will depress wages and work conditions and 
defeat the very policy of raising the standard of life of the workers. Given that the 
employment generation in the capitalist economy has been lagging behind its rate of 
accumulation, the dissolution of the “ancient” economy means that number of people 
‘dispossessed’ of their means of subsistence in the latter will be many times the number 
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of people absorbed in the capitalist sector. This process will have the effect of increasing 
the “dependency ratio” of the economy since dispossessed petty producers will simply 
live on charity adding to the beggars, vagabonds and the criminals.  
A second strategy might be to preserve the “ancient” economy, i.e. to restrict the spread 
of capitalist economy and to engage in redistribution of income (partly financed by taxes 
on capitalist surplus value)  as non-class revenues to ancient producers or by using the 
subsumed class receipts from capitalist enterprises to provide certain conditions of 
existence of non-“ancient” enterprises and thus secure political and cultural conditions of 
existence of capitalist enterprises in an otherwise explosive social context. Alternatively, 
the state could provide for “free” or “subsidized” housing, education and health for 
“ancients” by using the subsumed class payment from capitalist enterprises, thus reducing 
the necessary labor time of the ancients and allowing a larger “ancient” surplus to 
emerge. This surely would complete the “double movement”, but go against the 
fundamentals of neoliberal capitalism. Moreover, given the size of the “ancient” 
economy, this will seriously undermine some of the conditions of existence of capitalist 
enterprises, including capitalist accumulation.   
A third possibility involves strategies that increase productivity of “ancients” and hence 
raise the “ancient” rate of surplus value. The policy of inclusive growth, in this case, may 
require provision of subsidized credit, technological services, establishment of secure 
markets, etc. Firstly, a particular class structure requires many conditions of existence—
not simply credit or technology; what is required is an entire social context that provides 
particular economic, political and cultural conditions for the expansion of surplus in a 
class structure. These economic, political and cultural conditions that favor “ancient” 
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surplus must exist alongside a dominant capitalist class structure. But most importantly, 
again, the expansion of “ancient” surplus will raise the possibilities of accumulation and 
differentiation within the “ancient” economy and the policy will have to ensure that 
productivity growth and accumulation of “ancient” surplus does not dissolve the 
“ancient” economy.  Differential outcomes across many different producers with varying 
talents and personal circumstances are only natural in a market economy. The processes 
that lead to some winning and some losing out in the game have to be arrested such that 
the ancients do not differentiate into capitalists and workers. In the latter situation, the 
problem of exclusion will reassert itself with full vigor.  
These are only a few of the contradictions that unsettle the utopian vision of “inclusive 
growth”. A Marxian overdeterminist perspective, building on the notion of 
“contradiction”, recognizes that such management of contradictions is epistemologically 
ruled out. The new experiment with inclusive growth is riddled with as many 
contradictions as the planning experiment and which therefore threaten it with its possible 
failure from the very beginning.    
 
 
 
 
  224
CHAPTER 6 
CONCLUSION 
This dissertation develops a notion of primitive accumulation that unmasks the violent 
face of capitalism and at the same time points to its fragility—the fragility of a social 
formation where the dominance of a class structure (capitalist, in this case) is always 
provisional and vulnerable to revolutionary transformations. It is unfortunate that this 
fragility is often lost to the Marxists. The essentialist and teleological framework of 
historical materialism has crippled Marxian politics in many ways. The telos of historical 
materialism posits an inevitable—even if delayed—destruction of pre-capitalist class 
structures. This telos underlies the two-class image of capitalism—the bourgeoisie and 
the proletariat being the two great antagonistic classes in “mature” capitalism—that 
informs much of Communist politics. This enduring image of capitalism makes 
Communist activists and thinkers ambivalent about other class structures—for example, 
ancients and communist class structures (self-employed peasants and manufacturers, 
tribal and primitive communist societies). They are devalorized as pre-capitalist residues 
in an “immature” capitalist social formation. Yet, all over the world, ancients (peasants as 
well as urban “informal” producers like slum dwellers) and primitive communist 
societies are at the forefront of the most spectacular mass resistance movements against 
capital. Yet, the Communists have hardly any theory of class struggle that can enable 
them to engage in Marxist interventions in these struggles that continuously threaten the 
hegemony of capital—even more than the much more prominent “crises” of capitalism.    
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I argue that this lack is theoretical—a blindness of the Communist activities and Marxist 
thinkers to the inescapable heterogeneity of class in a capitalist social formation—in any 
social formation. It’s not a matter of “delayed” transition—it’s a basic ontological view 
that accepts heterogeneity and ubiquitous contradictions between different class 
structures in any society and understands the development of any social formation as an 
uneven development of different class structures constituting it.  
The present work is emoted by the ethical questions that many societies are currently 
facing and struggling to resolve, in the wake of large-scale threats to stable livelihoods—
i.e. to reproduction of life in general— for majority of the world’s population living 
within global capitalism. In the last three decades, starting with the Reagan-Thatcher era, 
the hegemonic representation of capitalism is not that of a social system more “efficient” 
or more “promising” than the alternative “socialist” society—as used to be the case 
during the Cold War days. Rather, the capitalist system has secured a representation for 
itself as a system that has no alternative142. I do not mean to say that those social systems 
that were represented as alternatives to capitalism—the “really existing socialisms” — 
during much of the 20th century, can be regarded as an alternative to capitalism in the 
Marxian sense143. However, at the level of representation in dominant discourses, there 
was a strongly perceived alternative to capitalism in the “really existing socialist” 
societies. With the fall of those “really existing socialist” societies, the last three decades 
have witnessed a unique process of expropriation of all alternatives at the level of 
representation in discourses on economic development and future of societies.  
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 Many would remember Thatcher’s famous little acronym—TINA which stands for “There Is No 
Alternative”.  
143
 See Resnick and Wolff (2002). 
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For those who are trapped in this hegemonic representation of capitalism-without-an-
alternative, the “inevitability” of capitalism calls for a social sanction of the violence that 
accompanies growth and expansion of capitalism. More specifically, for many in 
developing countries, this brings to mind the violence associated with capitalist 
development in 17th and 18th century Britain and the uncomfortable realization that 
developing societies will still have to pass through similar “rigors of transition”— 
something, these societies admittedly have always been doing since colonial times. Thus, 
we face the following dilemma—capitalism is represented as the only solution to poverty 
and yet, to have capitalism is to reenact the entire bloody history of pauperization, 
dispossession and expropriation of millions of peasants, petty producers and communities 
in developing societies. This history has been eloquently sketched in Marx’s chapters on 
“primitive accumulation” at the end of Volume 1 of Capital. It is not therefore surprising 
that a long-buried concept like “primitive accumulation” suddenly acquires such 
eminence, in this peculiar world-historical context.  
This dissertation argues that we should appreciate the (non-exploitative) “others”  of 
capital if we are to imagine the alternatives—i.e. make capital’s  “others” a part of our 
lived experience and an object of our theoretical concerns. We must rescue 
capital’s “others”  from history—i.e. de-historicize them, break the theoretical mold that 
can make sense of capital’s “others” only as pre-modern residues (pre-capitalism) or 
futuristic visions (socialism) borne out of the perennial Hegelian “unhappy 
consciousness”. The concept of primitive accumulation, as worked out in this 
dissertation, brings into the domain of Marxian political economy an understanding of 
how capital’s “others” are subjected to violence and devalorization at the level of the 
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economic and how that economic process sustains the expropriation of the alternative at 
the ideological-cultural level.   
By presenting a disaggregated picture of the social formation and by emphasizing the 
contradictory nature of development of such a social formation, this dissertation claims to 
unsettle the dominant representation of such a social formation as undergoing capitalist 
development. As my account of the development of Indian capitalism shows, Indian 
social formation is dominated by the capitalist class structure in terms of surplus, 
accumulation and growth, but it is dominated by the ancient class structure in terms of 
livelihoods of the labor force. Such a representation opens up the space for anti-capitalist 
interventions by highlighting the limits or fragility of the dominance of capital. I argue 
that this dissertation contributes to a new approach to writing history of economic 
development of developing countries—a new approach that eschews any kind of telos in 
favor of contingencies, dissolves all stable outcomes into provisional “encounters” and 
recognizes uneven development at the heart of the process of change of a social 
formation. In the process, this dissertation dissolves the notions of transition and the 
dominance of a particular class structure inherited from the essentialist structure of 
historical materialism. 
I would like to point out some political implications that flow from this dissertation. 
Marxists had always been interested in the problem of poverty. But in the absence of a 
sustained class theory of poverty, the urgent problem of poverty in certain societies has 
often compelled Marxists to engage in struggles around poverty from a non-Marxian 
perspective—involving the debates on state versus market or private versus state 
capitalism. Thus, for example, neoliberal policies are often blamed for the increasing 
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poverty of the majority of the population while enabling rising wealth of a minority. Even 
when the notion of primitive accumulation is employed by the Marxists to account for the 
processes of dispossession, exclusion and marginalization, they place undue emphasis on 
neoliberal policies to account for the onslaught of primitive accumulation. In 
emphasizing one particular form of capitalism, namely free market private capitalism—
which is what “neoliberal” capitalism stands for—many writers in recent times seem to 
imply that state-guided or state-regulated capitalism is not guilty or less guilty of the 
crime of primitive accumulation. This, I strongly assert, is at variance with the Marxian 
class-focused understanding of the concept. In fact, such an identification of primitive 
accumulation with neoliberalism invites the dangers of a possible interpretation of 
primitive accumulation as a policy problem and a target of capitalist governance. Hence, 
one objective of the present work is to dissociate and distance my understanding of the 
notion of primitive accumulation from those associated with the critics of globalization 
and neoliberalism, despite the many useful contributions of the latter to an understanding 
of contemporary capitalism and even primitive accumulation itself. I believe that this 
work will add to the Marxian exploitation-focused critique of capitalism, another political 
critique in terms of the contradictory relations between capitalist and non-capitalist class 
processes—captured in the Marxian notion of “primitive accumulation”— which is 
germane to the ethical concerns of the society over threats to reproduction of life for 
majority of population living within or alongside capitalism. Thus, one purpose of the 
present work is to show that not only is labor within the capitalist fundamental class 
process exploited in the Marxian sense, but even labor outside capitalist class structures, 
in other non-capitalist class processes like ancient and communistic class processes, are 
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threatened with systematic disruption of their conditions of existence, as a result of the 
expansion of capitalist class structures. The reformulation of primitive accumulation, 
presented in this work, is the crucial concept that unmasks the latter process.  
Further, the analysis presented here allows the Marxists to intervene in struggles around 
dispossession as well as class struggles around capitalist exploitation of workers. I have 
tried to show, in the Indian context, that despite rapid capitalist accumulation, the size of 
the productive labor force in capitalist industries is growing only sluggishly or may even 
be declining. For the Marxists, the shrinking size of the “only revolutionary class”—the 
industrial proletariat—makes them despair of revolutionary possibilities in such a 
society.    
 Moreover, in such a social context, the balance of power in the class struggle between 
capitalists and workers often tilt in favor of the capitalists. This leads to a decline of the 
strength of workers’ movements. I argue that the analysis presented above presents a new 
understanding of how the dynamics of the social formation benefit the capitalists in their 
class struggles against their workers. Specifically, I have argued that, in a social 
conjuncture, where the surplus population expands along with the capitalist class 
structure, the following peculiar situation may prevail—the dissolution of non-capitalist 
class processes through primitive accumulation and a simultaneous expansion of the 
same—in fact, almost as a parallel movement. This is because dispossessed people would 
secure their subsistence, however precariously, in non-capitalist (mainly ancient) class 
structures, if they do not get employment in the capitalist factories. The simultaneous 
expansion of capital and non-capital has the following implications for Marxists 
interested in class struggles in the society. First, emergence of these new spaces of non-
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capital also and at the same time implies that they may become targets of fresh waves of 
primitive accumulation. Conditions of existence of these non-capitalist class processes 
are therefore continuously subverted by the primitive accumulation of capitalism even as 
they are simultaneously expanded through the expansion of the surplus population. 
Hence, livelihoods of labor in alternative non-capitalist class processes are continuously 
destabilized. Second, continuously expanding “ancient” class structures under conditions 
of depressed “ancient” surplus enable capitalists to tap the former for their requirement of 
labor power, which in turn, allows capitalists to be unscrupulous, in many different ways, 
with respect to workers they employ and exploit—by denying them secure contracts, by 
depressing their wages, by increasing exploitation or breaking up workers’ resistance 
movements etc. Thus, for the majority of the laboring population and cutting across class 
processes, reproduction of life remains insecure and uncertain. However, I must hasten to 
add, that such a social conjuncture may benefit capitalists vis-à-vis their workers, but 
they constrain capitalists in other ways—for example, capitalists have to struggle against 
the ancients to secure their conditions of existence, including access to “scarce” means of 
production like “land”. The analysis presented in this dissertation allows Marxists to 
understand how capitalist and non-capitalist class structures overdetermine each other—
particularly how the condition of “ancients” affects the workers in capitalist class 
processes.  
To be fair, Marxists have always recognized such problems posed by non-capitalist class 
processes for workers’ movements. But, they have always taken an essentialist view of 
the interaction between capital and non-capital. First, they have assumed that the 
presence of non-capitalist class structures can be explained by inadequate rates of 
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expansion of capitalist class structures (i.e. low rates of growth or capital accumulation). 
Hence, with faster capital accumulation, the non-capitalist class structures would 
disappear and hence the problem itself would disappear. In this dissertation, I have 
argued why it is perfectly reasonable to expect an expansion of non-capitalist class 
structures with rising capitalist accumulation once we take into account primitive 
accumulation as a condition of existence/expansion of capitalist class structures and when 
the forms of capitalist accumulation are such that, in conjunction with primitive 
accumulation, a surplus population expands along with capitalist accumulation. Thus, the 
Marxists have to rethink their class politics in a social context where non-capitalist class 
structures proliferate alongside a rising, stagnant or even declining proletariat. Second, 
Marxists have assumed that non-capitalist class structures adversely affect only the 
workers in the capitalist factories while the capitalists benefit from such a situation by 
increasing the rate of exploitation of their workers. I have argued that expansion of 
ancient class structures both benefit and harm capitalists—for example, enabling the 
capitalists to increase the rate of exploitation while constraining their ability to 
accumulate capital. Thus, capitalist accumulation itself is overdetermined by the ancient 
class structures. One cannot posit capitalist accumulation as a process independent of 
whatever is happening to the ancient economy—the conditions governing ancient surplus 
both enable and constrain capitalist surplus, as I have argued in Chapter IV.    
Thus, this dissertation points to the complexity of the working class struggles, even as the 
analysis builds on a highly simplified “model”  involving only two class structures—and 
thereby ignoring others—and focusing on only primitive accumulation, which is just one 
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process belonging to the space of a complexly overdetermined interaction between 
capitalist and ancient class processes.  
In the process of such a reformulation and application of the concept of primitive 
accumulation, I claim that the present work faces the possibility of transcending the 
current boundaries of the dissertation. Though I restrict myself to a discussion of 
postcolonial India and a simplified representation of class structures in postcolonial India, 
I believe the theoretical arguments presented in this dissertation will break new grounds 
in understanding the class-dynamics of developed countries as well and offer an entirely 
new perspective on the question of historical transition to capitalism. Primitive 
accumulation is not specific to developing countries and its class-effects can be similarly 
ascertained in the context of developed societies. In fact, one of the main contributions of 
the contemporary literature is to locate primitive accumulation not at the peripheries of 
capitalism, but within the metropolitan centers of capitalism. One possible extension of 
the current work consists of applying this analysis to developed societies and mark out 
the similarities as well as differences in the social conjunctures in developed and 
developing societies. 
Secondly, the arguments presented in this dissertation offer elements for a Marxian class-
theory of poverty. Poverty has so far been theorized within capitalist class structures in 
terms of Marx’s notions of reserve army of labor, rising rate of exploitation coupled with 
stagnant or falling real wages and crises. This dissertation allows a peek into the 
possibilities of a theory of poverty associated with non-capitalist class structures and how 
the latter overdetermines the poverty associated with capitalist class structures and how 
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both forms of poverty support and undermine capitalists at the same time. Such an 
analysis enables Marxists to engage in struggles around poverty from a class-perspective. 
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APPENDIX 
 TABLES 
 
 
 
TABLE 1 
Occupational Structure in India, 1901-1931 (in Percent) 
 
 1901 1931 
Agriculture and allied Activities 67.8 71 
Modern Industry 0.4 1.2 
Traditional Industry and Construction 10.1 7 
Services 14.4. 15 
Others (Mining and Unspecified 7.3 5.8 
 
 Source: Sivasubramonian (2000, Table 2.4), Statistical Abstracts of  
India, various years. Reproduced from Roy (2002:113). 
 
 
 
 
 
TABLE 2 
Plan Outlay on Industry 1951-1990 (in Percent) 
 
Plan/Year 
Village and small 
industries 
Industry and 
minerals 
First Plan (1951-1955) 2.1 2.8 
Second Plan (1956-61) 4 20.1 
Third Plan (1961-66) 2.8 20.1 
Annual Plans (1966-69) 1.9 22.8 
Fourth Plan(1969-74) 1.5 18.2 
Fifth Plan(1974-79) 1.5 22.8 
Annual Plans (1979-80) 2.1 19.6 
Sixth Plan (1980-85) 1.8 13.7 
Seventh Plan (1985-90 1.5 11 
               
                   Source: Kapila (1993: 245) 
  235
                     
TABLE 3 
Net Capital Formation (at Current Prices in Rs.Crores)  
 
Item 1950-51 1960-61 1970-71 1980-81 1990-91 
Net Capital Formation 511 1665 4648 15228 86520 
Public Sector 203 973 2106 8057 32507 
Private Corporate Sector 207 469 726 2176 17163 
 
Source: CSO, Government of India 2010, Statement 11.  
 
                                                                 
 
 
 
TABLE 4 
Share of Public Sector in the GDP of Different Sectors of the Economy  
(Per Cent at Current Prices) 
 
 
Source: Dandekar (1992:57) 
Item 1960 - 61 1970 – 71 1980 - 81 1988 – 89 
Administration and defence, 
railways and communications 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
Other services, mainly, health and 
education 21.12 33.62 39.09 46.46 
Mining and quarrying,  
manufacturing (reg.), electricity, 
gas,  etc., Construction, banking & 
insurance 11.29 23.68 39.99 53.42 
All other sectors 1.41 2.12 4.15 4.57 
All sectors (Total GDP) 9.99 13.84 19.74 27.12 
  236
 
TABLE 5 
Per Capita GDP in Agricultural and Non-Agricultural Sectors 
(Rs. at Constant 1980-81 Prices) 
 
Year 
Proportion of 
Population in 
Agriculture 
Per Capita GDP 
Total Agriculture Non-Agriculture 
Ratio of 
(5) to (4) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
1950-51 67.5 1194.18 860.83 1886.52 2.19 
1960-61 69.5 1449.40 956.17 2573.32 2.69 
1970-71 69.5 1671.46 955.60 3302.69 3.46 
1980-81 66.5 1800.09 940.48 3506.47 3.73 
1989-90 64.9 2430.84 1117.69 4858.87 4.35 
 
Source: Dandekar (1992:53) 
 
 
 
TABLE 6 
Changes in the Size Distribution of Operational Holdings Shown by Different Land 
Holding Sizes 
 
Category of Holdings 
Percentage of Operational Holdings 
60-61 70-71 81-82 91-92 2002-03 Kharif Rabi 
Marginal 
(< 1.000 hectares) 39.1 45.8 56.0 62.8 69.7 70.0 
Small 
(1.001-2.000 hectares) 22.6 22.4 19.3 17.8 16.3 15.9 
Semi-medium 
(2.001-4.000) 19.8 17.7 14.2 12.0 9.0 8.9 
Medium 
(4.001-10.000 hectares) 14.0 11.1 8.6 6.1 4.2 4.4 
Large 
(> 10 hectares) 4.5 3.1 1.9 1.3 0.8 0.8 
All Sizes 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
 
Source: NSSO (2006: 18) 
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TABLE 7 
Changes in Percentage Distribution of Operated Area by Category of  
Operational Holdings 
 
Category of Holdings 
Percentage of Operated Area 
60-61 70-71 81-82 91-92 2002-03 Kharif Rabi 
Marginal  
(< 1.000 hectares) 6.9 9.2 11.5 15.6 22.6 21.7 
Small  
(1.001-2.000 hectares) 12.3 14.8 16.6 18.7 20.9 20.3 
Semi-medium  
(2.001-4.000) 20.7 22.6 23.6 24.1 22.5 22.3 
Medium  
(4.001-10.000 hectares) 31.2 30.5 30.1 26.4 22.2 23.1 
Large  
(> 10 hectares) 29.0 23.0 18.2 15.2 11.8 12.5 
All Categories 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
 
Source: NSSO (2006:20) 
 
 
 
 
 
TABLE 8 
 
Average Area Operated per Holding (in Hectares) 
 
Year Area 
1960-61 2.63 
1970-71 2.2 
1981-82 1.67 
1991-92 1.34 
2002-03 1.06 
  
                                   Source: NSSO (2006: 16) 
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TABLE 9 
Organized Sector Employment:  
Estimates of Employment in Organized Public & Private Sectors 
 
Year 
Lakh (=100,000) Persons on March 31 
Public Private Total 
1999 194.15 86.98 281.13 
2000 193.14 86.46 279.60 
2001 191.38 86.52 277.89 
2002 187.73 84.32 272.06 
2003 185.80 84.21 270.00 
2004 181.97 82.46 264.43 
2005 180.06 84.52 264.58 
 
Source: Planning Commission, Government of India. 2009. 
 
 
 
 
 
TABLE 10 
Employment by Sector (in Millions) 
 
 1999-2000 2004-2005 
Informal 342.6 394.9 
Formal 54.1 62.6 
Total 396.8 457.5 
 
Source: NCEUS (2007:3) 
  239
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
 
Althusser, Louis. 2006. Philosophy of the Encounter: Later Writings, 1978-1987. London 
and New York. Verso.  
 
Althusser, Louis and Etienne Balibar. 1970. Reading Capital. Trans. B. Brewster. 
London: New Left Books. 
 
Ahluwalia, Isher J. 1985. Industrial growth in India: Stagnation since the Mid-Sixties. 
New Delhi. Oxford University Press.   
 
Andreasson, Stefan. 2006. “Stand and Deliver: Private Property and the Politics of Global 
Dispossession”. Political Studies, 54 (1): 3–22 
 
Arrighi, Giovanni. 2004.”Spatial and Other “Fixes” of Historical Capitalism”. Journal of 
World-Systems Research, 10 (2): 527-539 
 
Ashman, Sam and Alex Callinicos. 2006. “Capital Accumulation and the State System: 
Assessing David Harvey’s The New Imperialism”. Historical Materialism, 14 (4): 107-
131 
 
Bagchi, Amiya K. 1999. “Globalisation, Liberalisation and Vulnerability: India and Third 
World”. Economic and Political Weekly, 34(45): 3219-3221, 3223- 3230. 
 
Bailey, Anne M. and Llobera, Josep R. 1981.The Asiatic Mode of production: Science 
and Politics. London, Boston and Henley. Routledge and Kegan Paul.   
 
Baran, Paul. 1957. The Political Economy of Growth. New York. Monthly Review Press. 
 
Bardhan, Pranab. 1984. The Political Economy of Development in India. Oxford and New 
York. Basil Blackwell. 
 
Basu, Pranab K. 2008. Globalisation: An Anti Text; A Local View. Delhi: Aakar 
Publications. 
 
Basu, Pranab K. 2007. “Political Economy of Land Grab”. Economic and Political 
Weekly, 42 (14): 1281–87. 
 
Benson, John. 1983.  The Penny Capitalists: A Study of Nineteenth-century Working-
class Entrepreneurs. New Brunswick. Rutgers University Press. 
 
Bhagwati, Jagdish N. 1982. “Directly Unproductive Profit-Seeking (DUP) Activities”. 
Journal of Political Economy, 90(5): 988-1002.  
  240
Bhagwati, Jagdish N.1993. India in Transition: Freeing India. New York. Oxford 
University Press. 
 
Bhagwati, Jagdish N.1998. “The Design of India’s Development”. In India’s Economic 
Reforms and Development, ed Isher J. Ahluwalia and I. M. D. Little, 23-39. New Delhi. 
Oxford University Press. 
 
Bhagwati, Jagdish N. 2001. “Growth, Poverty and Reforms”. Economic and Political 
Weekly, 36 (10): 843-846. 
 
Bhagwati, Jagdish N. and Sukhamoy Chakravarty. 1969. “Contributions to Indian 
Economic Analysis: A Survey”. The American Economic Review, 59 (4:2):1-73. 
 
Bhattacharya, Dhires. 1972. A Concise History of the Indian Economy. Calcutta. 
Progressive Publishers. 
 
Bhattacharya, Rajesh and Amit Basole. 2009. “The Phantom of Liberty: Mo(der)nism 
and Postcolonial Imaginations in India”. In The Challenge of Eurocentrism: Global 
Perspectives, Policy, and Prospects, ed. Rajani K. Kanth, 97-119. New York. Palgrave 
MacMillan  
 
Bhowmik Sharit, K. 2003. “National Policy for Street Vendors”. Economic and Political 
Weekly, 38(16): 1543-1546  
 
Boyle, James. 2002. “Fencing off Ideas: Enclosure & the Disappearance of the Public 
Domain”. Daedalus, 131(2): 13-25 
 
Bradby, Barbara. 1975. “The Destruction of the Natural Economy”. Economy and 
Society, 4(2): 127-161. 
 
Brenner, Robert. 2006. “What Is, and What Is Not, Imperialism?” Historical 
Materialism, 14 (4): 79–105.  
 
Byres, Terrence J.2005. “Neoliberalism and Primitive Accumulation in Less Developed 
Countries”. In Neoliberalism: A Critical Reader, ed. Alfredo Saad-Filho and Deborah 
Johnston, 83-90. London and Ann Arbor, MI. Pluto Press. 
 
CSO (Central Statistical Organization). 2010. “National Accounts Statistics” Back Series 
1950-51-1999-2000.  New Delhi. Ministry of Statistics and Program Implementation. 
Government of India. 
http://mospi.nic.in/rept%20_%20pubn/ftest.asp?rept_id=nad02_1950_1993&type=NSSO 
(accessed January 7, 2010) 
 
Cernea, M. 1990. ‘Internal Refugee Flows and Development-induced Population 
Displacement’. Journal of Refugee Studies. 3(4): 320-33. 
 
  241
Chakrabarti, Anjan and Stephen Cullenberg. 2003. Transition and Development in India, 
New York and London: Routledge.  
 
Chakravarty, Sukhamoy. 1987. Development Planning: The Indian Experience. Delhi: 
Oxford University Press. 
 
Chandra, Pratyush and Dipankar Basu. 2007.  “Neoliberalism and Primitive 
Accumulation in India”. Radical Notes, February 7. 
http://radicalnotes.com/content/view/32/30/  
  
Chandra, Bipan, Aditya Mukherjee and Mridula Mukherjee. 2000. India after 
Independence. New Delhi. Penguin Books India. 
 
Chandrasekhar, C.P. and Parthapratim Pal. 2006. “Financial Liberalization in India: An 
Assessment of its Nature and Outcomes”. Economic and Political Weekly, 41(1): 975-85. 
 
Chari, Sharad. 2005. “Political Work: the Holy Spirit and the Labours of Activism in the 
shadow of Durban’s Refineries”. In From Local Processes to Global Forces. Centre for 
Civil Society Research Reports. Volume 1, 87-122. Durban: University of Kwazulu-
Natal.  
 
Chatterjee, Partha. 1995. Nation and its Fragments. Delhi. Oxford University Press.  
 
Chaudhury, Ajit, Anjan Chakrabarti, and Dipankar Das. 2000. margin of margin: Profile 
of an Unrepentant Postcolonial Collaborator. Calcutta. Anustup. 
 
Chibber, V. 2003, Locked in Place: State-Building and Late Industrialization in India. 
Princeton, New Jersey, USA and Woodstock, Oxfordshire, UK. Princeton University 
Press  
 
Clements, R. V. 1955. “Trade Unions and Emigration, 1840-80”. Population Studies, 
9(2): 167-180 
 
Dandekar, V.M. 1962. “ Economic Theory and Agrarian Reform”, Oxford Economic 
Papers, New Series 14(1): 69-80 
 
Dandekar, V. M., and N. Rath. 1971. Poverty in India. Pune. Indian School of Political 
Economy. 
 
Dandekar.V.M. 1992. “Forty years after Independence”. In The Indian Economy: 
Problems and Prospects, ed. Bimal Jalan. India, 33-84. New Delhi.Penguin Books India. 
 
De Angelis, Massimo. 2001. “Marx and Primitive Accumulation: The continuous 
character of capital’s enclosures”, The Commoner, 2, September. 
http://www.commoner.org.uk/02deangelis.pdf  
  242
De Angelis, Massimo. 2003. “Reflections on Alternatives, Commons and Communities 
or building a new world from the bottom up”, The Commoner, 6. 
http://www.commoner.org.uk/deangelis06.pdf  
 
De Angelis, Massimo. 2004. “Separating the doing and the deed: Capital and the 
continuous character of enclosures”. Historical Materialism 12: 57-87 
 
De Angelis, Massimo. 2006. “Enclosures, Commons and the “Outside.”” Paper presented 
at the annual meeting of the International Studies Association, Town & Country Resort 
and Convention Center, San Diego, California.  
http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p100277_index.html 
 
Deleuze, Gilles and Felix Guattari. 2004. Anti-Oedipus, London and New York. 
Continuum. 
 
Desai, Akshayakumar R.1975. State and Society in India.: Essays in Dissent, Bombay. 
Popular Prakashan 
 
Dobb, Maurice H.1947. Studies in the Development of Capitalism, New York. 
International Publishers. 
 
Escobar, Arturo. 1995. Encountering Development: The Making and Unmaking of the 
Third World. Princeton. Princeton University Press.    
 
Evans, Peter. 2005. “The New Commons vs. The Second Enclosure Movement: 
Comments on an Emerging Agenda for Development Research”. Studies in Comparative 
International Development, 40(2): 85-94. 
 
Federici, Silvia. 2004. Caliban and the Witch: Women, the Body, and Primitive 
Accumulation. New York. Autonomedia. 
 
Fernandes, Walter. 2007. “Singur and the Displacement Scenario,” Economic and 
Political Weekly, 42 (3):203-206  
 
Fried, Gabriel F. and Richard D. Wolff. 1994.  “Modern Ancients: Self-Employed 
Truckers”. Rethinking Marxism, 7(4):103 - 115   
 
Gabriel, Satya. 1990. “Ancients: A Marxian Theory of Self-Exploitation”. Rethinking 
Marxism, 3(1):85-106. 
 
Georgescu-Roegen, N. 1960. “Economic Theory and Agrarian Economics”. Oxford 
Economic Papers, New Series, 12(1):1-40. 
 
Ghosh, Jayati. 1998. “Liberalization Debates”. In Indian Economy: Major Debates Since 
Independence, ed. Terrence J. Byres, 295-334. New Delhi. Oxford University Press. 
 
  243
Ghosh, Jayati and C. P. Chandrasekhar. 2002. The Market That Failed: A Decade of 
Neoliberal Economic Reforms in India. New Delhi: Leftword Book. 
  
Ghosh, Jayati and C. P. Chandrasekhar. 2007. “Growth and Employment in Organised 
Industry”. Macroscan, January 30. 
http://www.macroscan.com/fet/jan07/pdf/Organised_Industry.pdf 
 
Gidwani, Vinay K. 1992. “Waste” and the Permanent Settlement in Bengal”. Economic 
and Political Weekly, 27 (4): PE39-PE46 
 
Gibson-Graham, J.K and David Ruccio. 2001. “After” Development: Re-imagining 
Economy and Class”. In Re/Presenting Class: Essays in Postmodern Marxism, ed. J.K.  
 
Gibson-Graham, Stephen A. Resnick and Richard D. Wolff, 158-181. Durham, NC. Duke 
University Press. 
 
Glassman, Jim.2006. “Primitive accumulation, Accumulation by Dispossession, 
Accumulation by Extra-economic Means”. Progress in Human Geography, 30(5): 608-
625 
 
Government of India. 2004.  Foreign Trade Policy 2004-2009. New Delhi. Directorate 
General of Foreign Trade, Ministry of Commerce and Industry. 
http://dgftcom.nic.in/exim/2000/policy/chap-07.htm (accessed January 7, 2010)  
 
Guha, A. 2005. "Resettlement and Rehabilitation: First National Policy." Economic and 
Political Weekly 40 (46): 4978-4802. 
 
Guha, Ranajit. 1962. A Rule of Property for Bengal: An Essay on the Idea of Permanent 
Settlement. Paris. Mouton & Co. 
 
Guha, Ramachandra and Madhav Gadgil. 1989. “State Forestry and Social Conflicts in 
British India”. Past and Present, 123: 141-177. 
 
Guha, Ramachandra. 2001. An Anthropologist among the Marxists and Other Essays. 
Delhi: Permanent Black 
 
Guha, Ramachandra. 2007. India after Gandhi: the History of the World’s Largest 
Democracy. London. Macmillan. 
 
Habib, Irfan. 1975. “Colonialization of the Indian Economy, 1757 – 1900”. Social 
Scientist, 3(8): 23-53. 
 
Habib, Irfan. 1984.”Studying a Colonial Economy without Perceiving Colonialism”. 
Social Scientist, 12(12): 3-27. 
 
Harvey, David. 2003. The New Imperialism. New York. Oxford University Press.  
  244
Harvey, David. 2006. “Neo-liberalism as creative destruction”. Geografiska Annaler., 88 
B (2): 145–158. 
 
Hawking, Stephen. 1988. A Brief History of Time. New York. Bantam Books. 
 
Jeromi, P.D. 2007. “Farmers’ Indebtedness and Suicides: Impact of Agricultural Trade 
Liberalisation in Kerala”. Economic and Political Weekly, 42(31):3241-3247 
 
Jodha, N. S. 1989. “Depletion of Common Property Resources in India: Micro-Level 
Evidence”. Population and Development Review, 15 Supplement: Rural Development 
and Population: Institutions and Policy: 261-283 
 
Jodha, N. S. 1990. “Rural Common Property Resources: Contributions and Crisis”. 
Economic and Political Weekly, 25(26): A65-A78 
 
Jodha, N. S. 2000. “Waste Lands Management in India: Myths, Motives and 
Mechanisms”. Economic and Political Weekly, 35(6): 466-473. 
 
Jodha, N.S. 1985. “Population Growth and the Decline of Common Property Resources 
in Rajasthan, India”. Population and Development Review, 11 (2): 247-264 
 
Kannan, K.P. and G. Raveendran. 2009. “Growth sans Employment: A Quarter Century 
of Jobless Growth in India’s Organised Manufacturing”. Economic and Political Weekly, 
44(10):80-91 
 
Kapila, Uma. 1993. Indian Economy since Independence. New Delhi. Academic 
Foundation.  
 
Kautsky, Karl.1910. The Class Struggle. Chicago. Charles H. Kerr & Co, 1910.  
 
Kautsky, Karl. 1925. The Economic Doctrines of Karl Marx. London: A. & C. Black Ltd.  
 
Kawashima, Ken C. 2005. “Capital’s Dice-Box Shaking: The Contingent 
Commodifications of Labor Power”. Rethinking Marxism, 17(4): 609-626.  
 
Kay, Cristobal. 1989. Latin American Theories of Development and Underdevelopment. 
London and New York. Routledge. 
 
Krueger, Anne O.1974. “The Political Economy of the Rent-Seeking Society”. American 
Economic Review, 64(3):291-303 
 
Lazonick, William. 1974. “Karl Marx and Enclosures in England”. Review of Radical 
Political Economics, 6(2): 1-59 
 
Latouche, Serge.1993. In the Wake of the Affluent Society: An Exploration of Post-
Development.London. Zed Books.  
  245
 
Lenin, Vladimir I., 1967. Karl Marx: A Brief Biographical Sketch with an Exposition of 
Marxism. Peking. Foreign Languages Press. 
 
Lenin, Vladimir I. 1916. Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism. Chicago. Chicago 
International. 
 
Luxemburg, Rosa. 2003. The Accumulation of Capital, tr. Agnes Schwarzschild. London 
and New York. Routledge. 
 
Lewis, W.Arthur.1954. “Economic Development with Unlimited Supplies of Labor”. The 
Manchester School, 22 (2): 139-191   
 
Mahapatra, L.K. 1991. “Development for Whom?” Social Action, 41(3):271-287. 
  
Marx, Karl. 1912. Capital. Vol.I.. Chicago. Charles H. Kerr and Company.  
 
Marx, Karl. 1909. Capital. Vol. III. Chicago. Charles H. Kerr and Company.  
 
Marx, Karl.1973. Grundrisse. London: Penguin Books. 
 
McGee, Terrence G. 1973. “Peasants in the Cities: A Paradox, A Paradox, A Most 
Ingenious Paradox”. Human Organization, 32(2): 135-142 
 
Melotti, Umberto. 1977. Marx and the Third World, tr. P. Ransford. London. Macmillan. 
 
Mies, Maria. 1986. Patriarchy and Accumulation on a worldscale: women in the 
international division of labour. London and Atlantic Highlands, NJ. Zed. 
 
Meillassoux, Claude. 1972. "From Reproduction to Production: A Marxist Approach to 
Economic Anthropology", Economy and Society, 1(1): 93-105 
 
Mishra, Srijit . 2006. “Farmers' Suicides in Maharashtra”. Economic and Political 
Weekly, 41(16): 1538-1545. 
  
NSSO (National Sample Survey Organization).1999. “Common Property Resources in 
India”. Round 54th, Report No. 452. New Delhi. Ministry of Statistics and Program 
Implementation. Government of India.  
 
NSSO (National Sample Survey Organization).2006. “Some Aspects of Operational Land 
Holdings in India, 2002-03”. Round 59th. Report No. 492. New Delhi. Ministry of 
Statistics and Program Implementation. Government of India. 
 
NCEUS (National Commission for Enterprises in Unorganized Sector). 2007. Report on 
Conditions of Work and Promotion of Livelihoods in the Unorganized Scetor. New Delhi. 
NCEUS, Government of India. 
  246
 
Negri, Antonio.1999. Insurgencies: Constituent power and the modern state. Trans. M. 
Boscaglia. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press 
 
Negri, Antonio.1996. “Notes on the evolution of the thought of the later Althusser”. In 
Postmodern materialism and the future of Marxist theory, ed. A. Callari and D. Ruccio, 
51–69. Hanover: Wesleyan University Press. 
  
Newman, Bryan. 2006. “Indian Farmer Suicides—A Lesson for African Farmers”. 
Foodfirst, February 16.  http://www.foodfirst.org/node/1626 
 
Niggle, Christopher J. 1995. “The Role of the Financial Sector in the Socialist Economies 
in Transition: “The Second Primitive Accumulation of Capital”. Review of Social 
Economy, LIII (3): 311-331 
 
Nun, Jose. 2000. “The End of Work and the "Marginal Mass" Thesis”. Latin American 
Perspectives, 27(1): 6-32 
 
Nurkse, Ragnar. 1957. “Reflections on India's Development Plan”. The Quarterly 
Journal of Economics, 71(2): 188-204 
 
Palshikar, Suhas and Sanjay Kumar. 2004. "Participatory Norm: How Broad-Based Is 
It?" Economic and Political Weekly, 39(51): 5412-5417. 
 
Papola, T.S. 1992. “The Question of Unemployment”. In The Indian Economy: Problems 
and Prospects, ed. Bimal Jalan, 297-320. New Delhi. Penguin Books India. 
 
Patnaik, Prabhat. 1979. “Industrial Development in India since Independence”. Social 
Scientist, 7(11): 3-19 
 
Patnaik, Prabhat.1998. “Some Indian Debates on Planning”. In Indian Economy: Major 
Debates Since Independence, ed. Terrence J. Byres, 159-192. New Delhi. Oxford 
University Press. 
 
Patnaik, Prabhat and C.P. Chandrashekhar. 1998. “India: dirigisme, structural adjustment, 
and the radical alternative” in Globalization and Progressive Economic Policy, ed. Dean 
Baker, Gerald Epstein and Robert Pollin, 67-91.Cambridge, UK. Cambridge University 
Press. 
 
Patnaik, Utsa. 2003. “Global Capitalism, Deflation and Agrarian Crisis in Developing 
Countries”. In Agrarian Change, Gender and Land Rights, ed. Shahra Razavi, 33-66. UK. 
Blackwell Publishing. 
 
Patnaik, Utsa. 2007. “Neoliberalism and Rural Poverty in India”. Economic and Political 
Weekly, 42(30): 3132-50  
 
  247
Perelman, M. 2000.  The Invention of Capitalism: Classical Political Economy and the 
Secret History of Primitive Accumulation. Durham: Duke University Press. 
Perspectives. 2008. Abandoned. Delhi. The Perspectives Team 
Planning Commission, Government of India. 2009. Data Tables. 
http://planningcommission.gov.in/data/datatable/databook1509/tab26.pdf (accessed 
January7, 2010). 
 
Polanyi, Karl. 1944. The Great Transformation. Boston. Beacon Press. 
 
Preobrazhensky, Evgeny. 1966. The New Economics, trans. by B. Pearce. Oxford. 
Clarendon Press. 
 
Quijano, Anibal and Peggy Westwell.1983. “Imperialism and Marginality in Latin 
America”. Latin American Perspectives, 10(2/3): 76-83 
 
Rahnema, Majid and Victoria Bawtree (ed). 1997. The Post-Development Reader. 
London. Zed Books. 
 
Rao Mohan J. and Servas Storm. 1998. “Distribution and Growth in Indian Agriculture”. 
In The Indian Economy, Major Deabtes Since Independence, ed. Terrence J. Byres, 193-
248. New Delhi. Oxford University Press. 
 
Read, Jason. 2002. “Primitive Accumulation: The Aleatory Foundation of Capitalism”. 
Rethinking Marxism, 14:2: 24 – 49 
 
Resnick, Stephen A. and Richard D. Wolff. 1979. "The Theory of Transitional 
Conjunctures and the Transition from Feudalism to Capitalism". Review of Radical 
Political Economics,11(3): 3-22. 
 
Resnick, Stephen A. and Richard D. Wolff. 1987. Knowledge and Class. Chicago. 
University of Chicago Press Ltd. 
 
Resnick, Stephen A. and Richard D. Wolff. 2002. Class Theory and History. New York. 
Routledge. 
 
Richards, Eric. 2004. Britannia’s Children: Emigration form .England, Scotland, Wales 
and Ireland since 1600. London and New York. Hambledon and London.   
 
Richards, Eric. 1993. “How Did Poor People Emigrate from the British Isles to Australia 
in the Nineteenth Century?” The Journal of British Studies, 32(3): 250-279 
 
Robinson, Warren C. 2002.“Population Policy in Early Victorian England”. European 
Journal of Population, 18(2): 153-173 
 
  248
Roy, Tirthankar. 1999. Traditional Industry in the Economy of Colonial India. 
Cambridge. Cambridge University Press. 
 
Roy, Tirthankar. 2002. “Economic History and Modern India: Redefining the Link”. 
Journal of Economic Perspectives, 16(3): 109-130. 
 
Sachs, Wolfgang (ed.). 1992.  The Development Dictionary: A Guide to Kowledge and 
Power.London and New York. Zed Books. 
 
Sachs, Ignacy.2004. “From Poverty Trap to Inclusive Development in LDCs”, Economic 
and Political Weekly, 39 (18): 1802–1811. 
 
Safri, Maliha. 2006. “The economics of Immigration: Household and Employment 
Dynamics”. PhD. diss. University of Massachusetts, Amherst. 
 
Samaddar, Ranabir. 2009. “Primitive Accumulation and Some Aspects of Work and Life 
in India”.Economic and Political Weekly, 44(18): 33-42. 
 
Sanyal, Kalyan K. 2007. Rethinking Capitalist Development: Primitive Accumulation, 
Governmentality And The Post-colonial Capitalism. New Delhi and UK: Routledge. 
 
Sanyal, Kalyan K. and Rajesh Bhattacharya. 2009. “Beyond the Factory: Globalisation, 
Informalisation of Production and the New Locations of Labour”, Economic and Political 
Weekly, 44(22): 35-44 
 
Selvaraj, Sakthivel and Anup K. Karan. 2009. “Deepening Health Insecurity in India: 
Evidence from National Sample Surveys since 1980s”. Economic and Political Weekly, 
44(40):55-60 
 
Schlyter, Charlotta. 2002. “International Labour Standards and the Informal Sector: 
Developments and Dilemmas”.  ILO Employment Sector ,Working paper on the  
Informal Economy, 2002/3. 
http://www.ilo.org/public/libdoc/ilo/2002/102B09_157_engl.pdf 
 
Senior, Nassau W. 1836. An Outline of the Science of Political Economy. New York : A. 
M. Kelley, 1965.   
 
Sen, Amartya K. 1968. Choice of Techniques. Oxford. Basil Blackwell. 
 
Sen, Anupam. 1982. The State, Industrialization and Class Formations in India. London, 
Boston and Henley. Routledge and Kegan Paul. 
 
Sharma R.N. 2000. “The Politics of Urban Space”. SEMINAR, 491, July.  
http://www.india-seminar.com/2000/491/491%20r.n.%20sharma.htm 
 
  249
Shiva, Vandana. 1997. Biopiracy: The Plunder of Nature and Knowledge. Cambridge, 
MA, USA. South End Press. 
 
Shiva, Vandana. 2001. Patents: Myths and Reality. New Delhi. Penguin Books India. 
   
Smith, Adam.1776. The Wealth of Nations. New York. The Modern Library, 1937. 
 
Sundaram, T.R. 1961. “Utilization of Idle Manpower in India’s Economic Development”. 
Pacific Affairs, 34(2): 131-140 
 
Suri, K. C. 2004. “Democracy, Economic Reforms and Election Results in India”. 
Economic and Political Weekly, 39(51): 5404-11. 
 
Swaminathan, Madhura. 2000. Weakening welfare. The public distribution of food in 
India. New Delhi. LeftWord. 
 
Sweezy, Paul M. 1942.The Theory of Capitalist Development. New York, Monthly 
Review Press, 1964   
 
Thompson, Edward P. 1967. “Time, Work-Discipline and Industrial Capitalism”. Past 
and Present , 38(1): 56-97 
 
Tyabji, Nasir. 1984 a. “Small Enterprises and the Crisis in Indian Development”. 
Social Scientist, 12(7):35-46. 
 
Tyabji, Nasir. 1984b. “Nature of Small Enterprise Development: Political Aims and 
Socio-Economic Reality”. Economic and Political Weekly, 19 (31/33): 1425 -1427 + 
1429 + 1431 + 1433 
 
Vaidyanathan, A. 2006.“Farmers’ Suicides and the Agrarian Crisis”. Economic and 
Political Weekly, 41(38) : 4009-4013 
 
Vakil, C. N.  and P. R. Brahmanand. 1956. Planning for an Expanding Economy: 
Accumulation, Employment and Technical Progress in Underdeveloped Countries. 
Bombay. Vora & Co. 
 
Werholf, Claudia Von. 2000. “Globalization” and the “Permanent” Process of “Primitive 
Accumulation”: The Example of the MAI, the Multilateral Agreement on Investment”. 
Journal of World-Systems Research, 6(3): 728-747 
 
Wittfogel, Karl A. 1957. Oriental Despotism; a Comparative Study of Total Power. New 
Haven. Yale University Press.  
 
Wolpe, Harold. 1972. "Capitalism and Cheap Labour-Power in South Africa: From 
Segregation to Apartheid", Economy & Society, 1(4): 425-456. 
 
  250
World Bank. 2006. “India: Inclusive Growth and ServiceDelivery: Building on India’s 
uccess”. Development Policy Review, Report No. 34580-IN. Washington, DC. World 
Bank. 
 
Yadav, Yogendra. 1999. “Electoral Politics in the Time of Change: India's Third 
Electoral System, 1989-99”. Economic and Political Weekly, 34(34/35): 2393- 2399 
 
 
 
 
 
